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2ABS TRACT
The aims of this study were to determine the
general outline over three centuries of variations in the
sailors' lot; to establish the linkage with the legis-
lative process, and to ascertain what part Parliament,
the unions and the executive had played in making and
interpreting the law. It was found that the years 1838-
51, 1867-83 and 1905-18 were periods when significant
advance occurred, with the earlier and intervening years
forming plateaux where little change took place. The
legal provision in respect of seamen was of three types -
Admiralty-inspired, trade-enhancing and reformist - with
the first two categories predominating. The Admiralty
consistently attempted to treat merchant seamen as a
secondary source of manpower down to the end of the
nineteenth-century, while trade interests sought to have
the men subject to strict disciplinary requirements and
subscribe to a state-supervised contract of employment
that stabilised variable costs. Unions were unable to
influence the legislative process to any great extent
because they had little real power until the large steam
vessel provided a background to employment similar to
that in large units of enterprise ashore, while the Board
of Trade was dominated by anti-interventionists until
1890 and only slowly moved in support of the reformers.
The arguments of Keir and MacDonagh that the Board was
an example of dynamic expansion in executive capacity
are refuted, with the Parris thesis that it responded
to changes in society seeming more correct, Seamen were
3the most legislated-for body of workers, but voluminous
legislation often failed to touch upon essentials. The
Thornton argument of a delayed industrial revolution at
sea is developed by suggesting that the lag in the
exploitation of the steam-propelled vessel, in successful
unionisation of the workforce and in improving the
condition of merchant seamen can all be put at about
twenty-five years, so that the retardation of the shipping
industry vis-a-vis industry ashore may be fixed at about
a quarter of a century. Tight legislation, designed to
strengthen national defence capability and expand trade,
created instead a corset of regulation that merely
restricted national growth.
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7NOTE ON FOOTNOTES, REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
General guidance to the form and content of
footnotes has been obtained from British Standards
Institution publications Copy preparation and proof
correction CBS 5261), parts one and two, Bibliographical
references (BS 1629) and Abbreviations of titles of
periodicals (BS 4148). Hart's rules for compositors and
readers at the University Press Oxford and the Kate
Turabian work A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses
and Dissertations have been consulted on specific points
of interpretation. In the interests of brevity and
accuracy, the following general rules have been adopted.
Acts of Parliament
A full reference to a British Act of Parliament
in the form of:
Great Britain, Laws, Statutes, etc,
Coroner's Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, cli. 31
is contracted to:
2 & 3 Eliz 2 c 31
in the footnote, provided that the text makes it abun-
dantly clear what Act is referred to.
Parliamentary Debates
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's
Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 5th
series, vol. 58, col. 112
is contracted to:
8Hansard 5 58 112
in the footnote, with a date either in the text or in the
footnote. (For the numbering of Hansard series' see
under the Abbreviations heading).
Parliamentary Reports
The full title and reference of a report is
given in the footnote when it is first referred to in
the text, as follows:
Report of the Select Committee on
Shipwrecks, BPP 1836 (567) XVII 373,
and on all subsequent occasions the short form RSCS 1836
and a page number is used. The bibliography has a column-
list of the short forms to assist the reader who loses
track of the full title and reference of a particular
report.
Parliamentary papers
Similarly, Parliamentary papers have a full
reference when first quoted, followed by a shorter
version. For example, the Wreck Return, 1869, BPP 1870
(300) LX 760 becomes BPP 1870 LX 760 thereafter. When
there are a number of references to an important paper
and it is desirable to use a descriptive form to assist
the reader, this is accomplished, by employing a short
form as in the case of Parliamentary reports. Thus, the
Report from A,G, Finlayson to the Right Honourable Henry
Labouchre on the Merchant Seamen's Fund, BPP 1850 (178)
9LIII 367 is referred to subsequently as Finlayson's Report
1850, and this short form is listed in the bibliography.
Pa2ination
Where reference is made to page numbers in
volumes of Parliamentary papers or reports the following
conventions apply:
(1) A number in arabic numerals (456) refers
to a volume page number.
(2) A number in lower-case Roman (xi) indicates
the page number of a report.
(3) The letters Q
. 
or QQ. followed by a number
or numbers (Q.456 or QQ.456-457) mean that
the reference is to numbered questions and
answers in a volume of evidence.
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations have been employed
in the footnotes, appendices and bibliography.
AB	 Able Seaman
BLRD	 British Library (Reference Division)
BPP	 British Parliamentary Papers
CJ	 Commons Journals
DNB	 Dictionary of National Biography
EIC	 East India Company
Hansard 1 Parliamentary Register to 1805
10
Hansard 2 Cobbetts Parliamentary Debates and the
Hansard New Series, 1803-1830.
Hansard 3 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 1830-1891
Hansard 4 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 1891-1909
Hansard S Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, from 1909
HMSO	 Her Majesty's Stationery Office
ILO	 International Labour Organisation
IOL	 India Office Library
U	 Lord's Journals
MBSHS	 Minute Book of the Seamen's Hospital Society
MNAOA	 Merchant Navy and Airline Officer's Association
MP	 Member of Parliament
NMM	 National Maritime Museum
NUS	 National Union of Seamen
P & 0
	 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company
PRO	 Public Record Office
SHS	 Seamen's Hospital Society
UK	 United Kingdom
US	 United States
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CHAPTER ONE
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK BEFORE 1800
State concern for the welfare of merchant seamen
may fairly be said to spring from the repulse of the
Spanish Armada in 1588, for at that turning point in
British history it was the merchant seamen who provided
the bulk of the sea defence forces, Apart from the large
number pressed to serve in royal ships, 1 merchant seamen
serving in merchant vessels out-numbered the crews of
naval ships in a ratio of eleven to six, while there were
168 merchantmen employed to thirty-four royal vessels.2
A census initiated by Elizabeth's energetic chief
secretary in l583 had established that there were l6,Z55
men 'accustomed to the water' in England. and Wales, and
as 11,262 men manned the merchant ships massed to meet
the Spanish threat it was apparent to contemporaries
that merchant seamen had a vital role in times of war.4
State policy was consequently directed towards keeping
1. See Ronald Pollitt 'Bureaucracy and the Armada: The
Administrator's Battle' The Mariner's Mirror Vol. 60
No. 2 (1974) on the widespread impressment of merchant
seamen in 1588.
2. BLRD Add. MSS, Egerton 2541 1-4.
3. William Cecil Burghley (1520-98), served Henry VIII
as keeper of the writs in the Court of Common Pleas,
Edward VI as master of requests, and was chief
secretary to Elizabeth I for forty years.
4, Figures taken from Sir William Clowes The Royal Navy
(New York edition, 1966) i 439.
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up their numbers, and phrases such as 'for the increase
in mariners' and 'for the increase and encouragement of
seamen' are common in the titles and preambles of Acts
of Parliament passed in the sixteenth and seventeenth-
centuries. The welfare commitment first emerged some
five years after the defeat of the Armada when a measure
with the self-explanatory title of 'An Acte for necessarie
Reliefe of Souldiers and Maryners' reached the statute
book. 1 It made provision for payments to limbless or
disabled men who could supply documentary proof of
service and injury to substantiate a claim. Parishes
with men in this category were to levy a rate, while
payments were to be made by the county in which the
soldier or sailor had been pressed, or where born, or
where he had volunteered for service. The county trea-
surer was empowered to make regular quarterly payments
in approved cases. That the system was widely abused
cannot be doubted, for within four years there was passed
'An Acte against lewd and wandringe persons pretending
themselves to be Souldiers or Mariners' 2
 with severe
pena].ties for forging wound or discharge papers, while
another enactment in the same session permitted the
justices to increase parish rates for the purpose of
relieving genuine cases. 3 The final measure of this
series went through in 1601, and it decreed that from
1. 35 Eliz C 4.
2. 39 & 40 Eliz C 17.
3. 39 & 40 Eliz c 21.
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Easter 1602 every parish in England and Wales had to make
a contribution for the maintenance of Armada veterans,
while the treasurer in each county was to pay 'pencions'
to the survivors.1
In the field of civil law, the contractual
basis of the seaman's engagement with his employer rested
on an amalgam of verbal agreement, customary practice
and English Common Law, with disputes being settled at
Petty Sessions, Doctors' Commons or the Assizes by
reference to precedents taken chiefly from the Laws of
Oléron. 2 This code of practice embodied a concept that
was to tinge a great deal of subsequent legislation, for
the notion that 'freight is the mother of wages' meant
that wages were contingent on the safe delivery of cargo
so that disciplinary measures could be applied if seamen
broached the cargo, neglected duty or left the ship with-
out permission. Another concept was that masters and
owners had a responsibility for sick and injured men,
and in such cases a standard of care was prescribed.3
1. 43 & 44 Eliz	 3.
2. Also known as the Judgements of 01ron, this code of
maritime conduct derived from Rhodian sea law of
about 700 A.D. and was introduced into England in
the ll9Os. The earliest surviving copy is in the
'Liber Memorandum' of the City of London kept at the
City of London Record Office. For a recent analysis
of the impact of these laws see Timothy J. Runyan
'Mariners and the Law of the Sea in Later Medieval
England' in Paul Adam (ed.) Seamen in Society -
proceedings of the International Commission of Mari-
time History-, Bucharest, 1980 - Part II, 1-8.
3. As summarised by C. Ernest Fayle A Short History of
the World's Shipping Industry (1934 edition) 70.
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However, customary law tends to be weak law, and until
the eighteenth-century it was often necessary for an
aggrieved seaman to pursue his claim through the Courts.
A typical case was that of the crew of the Queen Cathrane
who sued the owners of the ship for full wages in 1663
after having been stopped £3 each for allegedly being
negligent in stowing cargo. 1
 They won the day, but legal
process is neither the most convenient nor the least
expensive way of regulating contracts, and it will be
shown later in this chapter that
	 contracts were
made subject to legislative control in the early
eighteenth-century. In the seventeenth-century the state
saw its merchant seamen as being virtually interchange-
able with the fighting seamen of the Royal Navy, and the
legislative emphasis was on maintaining the flow, of
recruits to sea service and ensuring that the fleet
could be manned speedily- in times of war. Interchange-
ability meant, in the (1957) assessment of Geoffrey Penn,
that
iearly all sea officers (in royal service)
were either amateurs who went to sea only
from time to time, or professionals who
spent the majority of their sea-going lives
in merchant vessels and joined men of war
when necessity, patriotism or convenience
suited them.2
It also meant that the state employed coercion and
1. Basil A. Lubbock (ed.) Barlow's Journal of His Life
at Sea in King's Ships,'East and West Indiamen and
other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703 (1934) i 90.
2. Geoffrey Penn Snotty, The Story-of the Midshipman
(1957) 3,
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persuasion alternately to get as many men and boys as
possible habituated to sea life, and then sought for
ways to make them available for naval service.
The Navigation Acts, which were primarily
aimed at wresting control of entropt trade from the
Dutch and fostering a system of flag discrimination
appropriate for an emerging world power, had a useful
by-product in relation to the enlistment of seamen,
for part of the 1660 Act decreed that if a ship wished
to enjoy the privileges of English registration the
master and three-quarters of the crew had to be of
English origin - 'except in cases of sickness, death or
taken prisoner'. 1 This provision had to be regularly
relaxed in time of war, 2 but Lawrence Harper's (1939)
view that the Navigation Acts should be looked at as a
kind of 'social engineering' seems valid in this context
because the increase in shipping arising from the
extension of empire and overseas trade necessitated at
least a three-fold increase in merchant ship crews.3
1. 12 Chas II c 18, s.7.
2. For example, in 1793 the Imprest Service had been so
effective in securing seamen for the fleet that an
Act (33 Geo III c 26) was passed permitting merchant
ship masters to recruit up to 75% of foreign seamen
in their crews. However, in the next year another
Act (34 Geo III c 68) said that the ratio must be
reversed with the return of peace.
3. Lawrence A. Harper The English Navigation Laws (New
York, 1939) viii. While there are no authoritative
statistics for the number of seamen in this period;
a comparison of the figure arrived at by Burghley's
census of 1583 with that of 50,000 common seamen
noted by Gregory King in 1695 for the year 1688 may
be held to justify the observation. King's tract
entitled Natural and Political Observations uyon the
State and Condition of England is reproduced in
Joan Thirsk and J.P. Cooper, Seventeenth-Century
Economç_ppçuments (Oxford, 1972) 781.
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Recruiting to fill this need centred on the young and
disadvantaged. In 1704 when 'An Act for the Increase of
Seamen and better Encouragement of Navigation, and
Security of the Coal Trade' was passed the principal aim
was to get pauper boys of ten years of age and upwards
off the rates and aboard colliers as parish apprentices,1
but it seems that not many of these children survived
the experience because two years later the measure was
modified so that masters of colliers were not required
to take apprentices who were under thirteen years of age,
or were unfit. 2
 This latter piece of legislation also
allowed prisoners in debtors' prisons to achieve freedom
of a sort by going aboard royal ships. Other enactments
passed at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of
the eighteenth-centuries tried to reward pugnacity,
register seamen and provide for castaways and the disabled.
In 1671 the 'Act to prevent the delivery up of
Merchants Shipps, and for the Increase of good and
serviceable shipping' 3
 provided, by s.9., that owners
of a ship attacked by pirates could pay compensation
(but not more than the value of 2% of the vessel and
cargo together) to the widows and children of men killed
defending the ship, and an identical provision was made
in the Act of 1698k compensating men injured as well as
1. 2 & 3 Anne c 6.
2. 4 & 5 Anne c 6.
3. 22 & 23 Chas II C 11.
4. 11 Will III c 7.
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widows and orphans in such circumstances. 1
 The state
was here passing responsibility for compensation to the
private sector and making provision permissive rather
than mandatory, but in an enactment of 1727 it took
direct responsibility for seamen stranded abroad. The
statute was chiefly concerned with inducements to enter
naval service, 2 but part of it empowered colonial governors
and consuls to 'tend and provide' for castaways, released
captives and shipwrecked seamen, spending up to sixpence
a day on their maintenance and sending the bill to the
Navy Commissioners. Additionally, these unfortunates
were to be sent home at government expense, with masters
of conducting vessels having sixpence a day for their
keep. It must be said that Admiralty motives were less
altruistic than might be supposed. Homeward-bound seamen,
not part of a regular crew, are ripe for the attentions
of the Imprest Service; castaways and released captives
stranded overseas are not. A system of registration for
merchant seamen was initiated in the l690s when a £2 a
year bounty was offered to those putting their names on
record, but the repealing Act of l7lO confessed that
1. Contemporaries, such as Daniel Defoe, had pointed out
that as there was no arrangement for the care of
crippled or wounded seamen, such seamen were under-
standably reluctant to defend a ship attacked by
pirates. See his 'Essay on Projects' in H. Morley,
The Early Life and Chief Early Works of Daniel Defoe
(1889) 83-85.
2. 1 Geo II C 14. The title was 'An Act for encouraging
Seamen to enter into His Majesty's Servicet.
3. 9Annec2l.
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the legislation 'had not had good effect'. The plain
truth was that merchant seamen were suspicious of any
law that might lead to service under duress in a royal
ship where the pay was both. inferior and delayed, while
the living conditions tended to be more cramped than
those in merchantmen, which had smaller crews. In war-
time it was not unusual for a man's pay to double if
he was serving in a merchant ship,' while naval pay
might not be increased for a century and a half.2
Admiralty interest in the merchant seaman had a strong
element of self-interest because these men were regarded
as a 'reservoir of ready-made fighting seamen' 3 who were
trained in handling square-rigged ships and accustomed
to the use of guns, That the interest was selfish may
be demonstrated by looking at the history of Greenwich
Hospital which, by and large, did not admit disabled or
sick merchant seamen although from the late 1690s they
had been compelled to contribute to its upkeep.
The founding of Greenwich Hospital as a place
of refuge for old and disabled sailors was 'an act of
royal bounty' 4 which seems to have been set in train by
1. For example, during the Seven Years' War the wages
of seamen in a Whitby collier trebled, while those
of the mate and the carpenter more than doubled.
A.F. Humble 'An Old Whitby Collier', The Mariner's
Mirror Vol, 61, No. 1 (1975) 38.
2. In 1797, one of the complaints of the Spithead
mutineers was that their rate of pay had not increased
since the reign of Charles I.
3. R.B. Chenevix Trench 'National Service Two Centuries
Ago: The Press Gang' History Today Vol. 6, No. 1
(1956) 38.
4. Ralph Davis 'Seamen's Sixpences: An index of commercial
activity, 1697-1828' Economica Vol. 23, No. 2 (1956)
328.
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Queen Mary in order to obtain for her husband, William
III, the kind of popularity achieved by Charles II
through the establishment of Chelsea Hospital as a home
for old and disabled soldiers. The Queen died before
the scheme matured, but its basis was that she gave the
land, her husband endowed the building and the running
costs were to be borne by Parliament and the seamen
themselves. A welfare and service package deal was
outlined in the 'Act for the Increase and Encouragement
of Seamen' of 1696,1 and it was proposed that all seamen
between eighteen and fifty years of age were to sign a
register and receive a bounty of £2 annually. Those
disabled by age, wounds or accident were to be provided
for at Greenwich Hospital, and seamen were to contribute
sixpence monthly from their wages for its upkeep,
However, an amending Act of 16972 revealed that the
scheme was already in trouble with demand for hospital
places exceeding availability, while there was widespread
evasion in respect of the sixpenny contributions. 3 The
practical outcome was that only the best-documented sea-
men - generally those with long naval service - obtained
admission, and when new legislation was introduced in
1747 k
 the preamble to the Act stated baldly that merchant
1. 7 & 8 Will III C 21,
2. 8 & 9 Will III C 23.
3. See Chapter Three for an estimate of the extent of
evasion in respect of seamen's sixpences.
4. 20 Geo II C 38.
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seamen 'have seldom or never' been admitted to Greenwich
Hospital because of the low state of funding and the
superior claims of naval personnel. However, merchant
seamen still had to pay for hospital upkeep, and in the
1720s they were contributing about £590 a year 1
 with
£6,000 coining from coal duties and £10,000 from the
Exchequer. Richard Chard's (1955) comment that 'the
compulsory deduction of sixpence a month from the wretched
wages of seamen was a mean expedient' seems apt, parti-
cularly as so very few merchant seamen received any
benefit. 2 It was revealed in the next century that a
minimum of one day's naval service was a strict require-
ment for admission to Greenwich Hospital, 3 but men with
mixed service in the royal and merchant navies often
failed in their applications through an inability to
cope with bureaucracy. John Nicol, for example, with
many years of service afloat behind him, came to London
in his infirm old age to try for a place at Greenwich
Hospital. He was sent from office to office, passed
from clerk to clerk, and eventually went back to Scotland
in despair. 4 The failure of Greenwich Hospital to
1. CJ 21 74.
2. Richard 011ard 'Greenwich and the Royal Naval
Hospital' History Today Vol. 4, No. 11 (1955) 780.
3. This was a purely administrative requirement, and
its existence was first revealed during a Commons
debate on 24 April 1835. See Hansard 3 22 1372.
4. John Howell ('J.H.') (ed.) The Life and Adventures
of John Nicol, Mariner (Edinburgh, 1822) 209-210.
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provide for aged, sick or disabled merchant seamen led
to the 1747 'Act for the Relief and Support of maimed
and disabled Seamen, and the Widows and Children of
such as shall be killed, slain or drowned in the Mer-
chants Service' which put welfare provision on a sounder
footing.
The new scheme emerged from a proposal pro-
visionally entitled the 'Seamen in the Merchant's
Service, Relief, Bill', and after some amendment in the
Commons it passed the Lords on 28 May 1747.1 The
intention was that seamen and their widows and orphans
should receive life pensions contingent on the produc-
tion of a 'certificate of hurt' or, in the case of ill-
ness or disease, a certificate of previous good health.
The claimants had to have paid a minimum of five years'2
contributions, but apprentices, East India Company seamen
(who had their own scheme), men under eighteen years of
age, fishermen and those employed on river craft and
undecked boats in the coastal trades were ineligible.3
The trustees of the Merchant Seamen's Fund were to be
based in London, while committees would sit at the out-
1. U 27 124.
2. The contribution rate was sixpence a month, but as
most men could only count on getting some nine
months' work a year it might be seven years before
the minimum contribution had been paid.
3. These exclusions were the result of hard-won
experience in trying to collect small sums from
those with small incomes. The Act of 1712 (10 Anne
C 17) had exempted fishermen and small boatmen,
pauper apprentices under eighteen and the crews of
Thames hoys from paying seamen's sixpences.
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ports. The scheme was to last for more than a century,
and, while it was able to provide a kind of supplementary
benefit for those in need the funding was never sufficient
for whole maintenance, and. the location of the majority
of aged and infirm seamen meant that local distribution
of benefit was an impractical and inequitable method.
The pattern of a man's working life was that he began
as a boy in coasting craft and went deep-sea at maturity-.
After thirty years of age with a family to consider and
waning physical capacity he tended to return to coasters
where he would have shorter voyages and more time at
home. Consequently, the demand for Merchant Seamen's
Fund pensions was greatest at the coal ports of the
north-east where perhaps half of all seamen lived, and
the sums granted there were minute. In Chapter Three
this subject will be again explored as the efforts of
the Victorians to bolster the Fund are looked at in more
detail.
The Laws of Olron and English Common Law had
proved to be insufficiently precise for the regulation
of the sailors' contractual commitment in the early
eighteenth-century - especially in time of war when
wages tended to rise dramatically - and in 1728 the
merchant class made an approach to Parliament to complain
of the lack of discipline among merchant seamen. Their
evidence, given to the House on 6 March 1728,1 is most
illuminating. Samuel Bonhani, a Guinea merchant, said
1. CJ 21 253-254.
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that his men collected their 'river pay'' at Gravesend
prior to leaving for the West Coast, and then not only
went ashore unless they got higher wages but compounded
their insolence by neglecting to return the ship's boat.
Henry Gough, in the East Indian trade, testified that
his seamen jumped ship after receiving 'river pay' and
a two months' advance of wages, while those who did
make the round trip tended to leave the ship before it
had been discharged on their return to the Thames.
Joseph Groves was incensed because men absenting them-
selves abroad demanded their wages although they might
have been away from the ship for months at a time,
while Peter Delainot stressed that the work-shy could
not be compelled to carry out their duties. James
Fitter believed that verbal contracts between master
and men were unsatisfactory because they often left
ships in 'Distress for want of Hands'. The House ordered
Alderman John Barnard 2 and Humphrey Morice 3 to prepare
and introduce a Bill to remedy these deficiencies, and
on 14 April 1729 Alderman Barnard presented a Bill for
first reading. The contents of this Bill are not known,
but it may be surmised that it limited sailors' access
1. A sum paid to men 'standing-by' a ship ready to sail.
2. John Barnard (1685-1764), was a Quaker wine merchant
who was MP for the City of London from 1722-1761.
3. Humphrey Morice (1671-1731), was a Turkey merchant
and a governor of the Bank of England. On his
death it was found that he had lived by fraud
for most of his life.
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to the Courts because ten days later several 'Mariners
and seamen' petitioned the House to urge that no steps
be taken to limit their existing recourse to the
Courts for recovery of wages due. 1 The Bill was sent
to committee, and on 1 May 1729 Alderman Barnard
reported back that while the committee had found the
'Allegations of the Bill' correct they wished to make
some amendments. When debated on 3 May 1729 an amend-
ment to allow the Admiralty Court to decide contractual
disputes was lost, and a proposal that fines imposed
under the new Act be paid to Greenwich Hospital was
carried. On 6 May 1729 an additional clause was put
in at the Admiralty's behest to the effect that seamen
leaving a merchant ship to serve in a royal vessel
should have their wages paid to date when leaving.2
The Bill passed the Commons and went off to the Lords
where it had its first reading on 7 May 1729. The Lords
passed the Bill on 13 May 1729 after debate, but without
amendment.3
A full description has been given of the
passage of this Bill because the 1729 Act 4
 is the most
significant piece of legislation effecting the sailors'
1. CJ 21 347.
2. This proviso remained in force until the twentieth-
century, being embodied in ss. 195-197 of the Merchant
Shipping Act, 1894. It is further discussed in the
footnote on page 44.
3. CJ 21 366 and U 23 434.
4. 2 Geo II c 36. 'An Act for the better Regulation and
GovernmenE of Seamen in the Merchants Service'.
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lot put on the statute book prior to 1800. It created
the new offence of desertion, with a penalty of up to
thirty days' hard labour in 'the House of Correction',
while for absence without leave seamen were to forfeit
two days' pay for every day of absence. A man who left
his ship without permission before unloading was com-
pleted, or before he had properly been discharged, could
be fined up to a months' pay. There were some gains
for crew members. All seamen, except apprentices, had
to sign written agreements for wages due within three
days of going aboard ship, and the agreed wages had to
be paid within thirty days of the ship clearing. Customs
inwards. Additionally, if there was a dispute about
wages the owner or master was obliged to produce the
wages agreement to the Court. The Act was regularly
extended until 1761, when it was made perpetual and
extended to cover American colonial ships, 1 while in
1791 the larger vessels in the English coasting trade
were also included. 2 The Act of 1786 which made the
registration of British ships compulsory checked any
tendency towards evasion by owners or masters who wished
to keep their contractual obligations vague, or ran ships
with dual or treble nationality, for this latter piece
of legislation ordered that a change of master be
endorsed on the certificate of registry so as to counter
attempts to shift legal responsibility from one pair of
1. 2 Geo II c 31.
2. 31 Geo III C 39.
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shoulders to another.1
The 1729 Act may be categorised as an attempt
by the merchant class to make labour a stable part of
variable costs for the duration of a voyage, but two
factors acted in such a way as to frustrate this inten-
tion. In times of war, demand for sea labour increases
and higher wages are offered, and there is lack of uni-
formity of demand in the geographical sense during both
war and peace. For example, in the next century wages
tended always to be high in Quebec where new ships were
built for overseas sale and a crew had to be obtained to
deliver them to a buyer, while at Calcutta where old ships
were sent for final employment with lascar crews before
going to the breakers there was a corresponding surplus
of European crew and consequent low demand, and low wages.
Wages in colonial vessels tended always to be higher
because of the relative shortage of labour along the
American seaboard, and in war-time they stood higher
still. In 1797, for example, wages and the desertion
rate were up in the West Indies, and the remedies pro-
posed in an Act of that year 2 were a curious mixture of
threats and a resigned acceptance of economic forces.
Deserters were to forfeit their wages, and masters
hiring known deserters were subject to a fine of up to
£100. However, recognizing the position of masters
1. 26 Geo III C 60.
2. 37 Geo III C 73. 'An Act for preventing the Desertion
of Seamen from British Merchant Ships ... in the
West Indies'.
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recruiting labour during a time of severe shortage of
that commodity, section three of the Act said that up
to double the usual rate of wages could be paid, and if
it was a question of more than double wages the consent
of the governor, chief magistrate or collector had to be
obtained. A man absent for more than twenty-four hours
was deemed to be a deserter - previously the period
had not been specified - and a model wages agreement for
the men to sign was reproduced in a schedule to the Act.
This itemised document gave much fuller information than
before. A man signing it would know what half his river,
or stand-by, pay might be, and the whole sum. His wage,
by the month or by the voyage, was set down, and so was
the total sum due. There could be no chicanery about
his length of service or his rate aboard the ship: it
was noted in the agreement. 1 Did the 1797 Act succeed
in its main purpose? Apparently not, because the amount
of forfeited pay and prize money paid over annually from
deserter's accounts to Greenwich Hospital kept on rising,
and amounted to over £2,500 in 1802.2 The secondary
benefit of a model wages agreement was infinitely more
important in the long term: no class of worker ashore
had such complete theoretical protection of his wages in
1797 - it was unique for the period.
The Admiralty continued to follow its policy
1. A reproduction of this form of agreement is at
Appendix Four (A).
2. Figure quoted by A.G. Course, The Merchant Navy:
A social history (1962) 68.
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of maintaining the number of seamen through coercive
legislation, and s.4 of the 1797 Act directed that
owners were to ship one apprentice for every hundred
tons registered in their names. It was appreciated
that seamen had to be brought young to the trade,' and
that while the labour shortage was acute through the
activities of the Press Gang the recruitment of appren-
tices could fill the gap because they were exempt from
the attentions of the Iinprest Service during the first
three years of their indentures. Masters, mates,
boatswains, carpenters, men over fifty-five years of
age, foreigners and those employed at ports and dockyards
and holding exemption certificates 2 also escaped impress-
ment, so that it was foremast hands in the prime of life
who were at risk and who feared the Press Gang most of
all. John Bechervaise, a Jersey seaman, thought that
'the dread of a ship of war was next to a French prison',3
and the crews of Hull whalers were smuggled ashore in
boxes and barrels, adopted women's clothes and fought
1. Sir Thomas Roe saw the process as 'the breeding of
mariners.' in his 1641 speech on the decay of trade,
and the 1704 Act envisaged the recruitment of boys
at ten years of age. A man of ability who began
life at sea at that age could be a master by his
early twenties. See Thirsk and Cooper, Seventeenth-
Century Economic Documents 44, 2 & 3 Anne c 6, and
the A.G.E. Jones typescript 'Daniel Bennet'f and Co,'
in the BLRD (reference X905/l00).
2. Also called protections, these documents were issued
by the Admiralty and bore a physical description of
the holder in the margin.
3. John Bechervaise, Thirty Six Years of a Seafaring Life:
by an Old Quarter Master (1839) 4T.
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the Press Gangs to avoid being taken for naval service.1
It was a time of high wages, 2 and the workforce numbered
about 100,000 men, 3 but while there was a general
appreciation that seamen were a vital bulwark against
invasion as they had been in Tudor times there was no
disposition to legislate further in respect of this
class of worker. In a 'legally-minded age' 4 it might be
expected that following the mutinies at the Nore and
Spithead and the consequent improvement in the pay and
diet of naval seamen that some standard might be set
for merchant seamen, but fear of any reform that might
be seen to derive from events across the English Channel
seems to have inhibited the government of the day. There
was to be no legislation covering the working conditions
of merchant seamen at this time and, with one exception,
nothing in the statute book covering diet and acconimo-
dation.
1. Peter Adamson, The Great Whale to Snare The Whaling
Trade of Hull (City of Kingston-upon-Hull Museums
and Art Galleries pamphlet, 1975, 6).
2. An ABs wage was about £4-5s a month - almost double
the wage rate obtaining in the depressed l830s.
3. Appendix Three gives a figure of just over 110,000
men taken from PRO Customs 17/21, but it is a theore-
tical maximum based on tonnage figures, and assumes
that all ships on the register are at sea and fully
manned. Three years later, Lord Liverpool's estimate
for 1800 gives about 10% less than the Customs
statistics, and for the period of the Napoleonic Wars
it will be assumed that the figure given in Appendix
Three, less 10%, is correct. See also Appendix Three
(v).
4. G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History (Bath, 1973
edition) 350.
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The diet of seamen during the second half of
the eighteenth-century varied enormously from ship to
ship. Samuel Kelly, serving in the Post Office packet
Grenville in 1778, reports that each man was entitled
to six pounds of bread and five pounds of salted meat
a week. The beef was coarse, and the barrels of pork
contained pig's heads with iron rings through the noses,
pig's feet and tails with the hair still on them.1
The naval provision scale of 17852 was also based on
bread3 and salt meat, but had the addition of dried peas,
oatmeal, butter, cheese and beer, while the food
supplied for the crew of the whaler Exeter outward-
bound on a four months' Arctic cruise in 1756 was both
ample in quantity and so varied as to give a balanced
diet. There were three kinds of meat - pork, beef and.
mutton. Flour, pease, sugar, spice and pickles were
provided, together with tea, coffee, oatmeal, beer,
potatoes, butter, cheese and vinegar. For the after-
guard, twelve fowls gave eggs, while mustard seed was
carried to supply a small amount of fresh greens.4
However, there was one class of ship where, even by the
1. Crosbie Garstin (ed.), Samuel Kelly, An Eighteenth-
Century Seaman (1925) 29.
2. See Appendix Eleven (A).
3. What is euphemistically described as 'bread' in these
diets was a kind of flinty dog-biscuit that had been
baked hard for long keeping. In the twentieth-
century it still forms part of lifeboat rations.
4. From the 'Exeter Whale Fishery Ledger' kept at
the East Devon Record Office.
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standards of the day, both diet and accommodation were
grossly below accepted levels, and that was in slavers
trading to the West Coast of Africa and the West Indies.
When, in 1788, Parliament began to enquire
into the slave trade at the urging of the abolitionists
there was no initial intention of taking any interest
in crew conditions, but the nature of some of the evidence
that emerged compelled action to that end. The death-
rates in slavers were startlingly high. James Jones, a
merchant, revealed that in a ship named The Brothers
half the crew died of disease within three weeks, while
Robert Norris, a Carolina merchant, said that during the
Middle Passage 1 crews slept on deck under an awning
because all the space below decks was taken up with
slave accommodation. Similar evidence from Archibald
Dalziel, a master and supercargo in slavers, was accom-
panied by two suggestions, one general and one specific.
He suggested that 'sonie regulation might be adopted
for ... Seamen on all long voyages' and that 'Seamen be
allowed a certain Quantity of Provisions by law'. 2 This
evidence was given on 16 June 1788, and on the following
day the points made by Daiziel were brought out in
1. That is, the passage between West Africa and the
West Indies.
2. From the Minutes of Evidence taken before the
Select Committee on the Slave Trade, 1788-89.
Sheila Lambert (ed.) House of Commons Sessional
Papers of the Eighteenth-Century (1975) 68 9-33.
(Referred to hereafter as HCSPEC with volume and
page numbers added).
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debate by Henry Beaufoy, the Member for Great Yarmouth.1
He made an appeal for regulation in respect of diet
and accommodation in the following passage:
On the part of your seamen, all that is
suggested is that after they have hazarded
their lives in your service, and fought
the battles of their country, you would
not, when poverty compels them to accept
a birth in an African ship, allow them to
be exposed to useless danger or be con-
signed to unnecessary death.2
Consequently, the 1789 Act for regulating the
slave trade had appended to it specimen articles of
agreement which included a diet scale and the instruction
- 'Provisions to be issued and dressed in the usual
Manner in which it is done on Board His Majesty's Ships
of War', 3 The Select Committee on the Slave Trade was
still at work in 1791-92, and the evidence given before
it about crew conditions was much the same as in 1788.
Alexander Falconbridge, a surgeon who had served in
slavers, testified that there was no accommodation below
decks for seamen during the Middle Passage, while
Richard Story, a naval lieutenant who had formerly served
in the slaver Tyger of Whitehaven, said that ten days
after leaving Whitehaven in 1768 crew rations were cut
to four pounds of bread a week and half a pound of salt
pork a day. He was so hungry during the nine months he
was on this scale of provisions that he once stole a
handful of rice from the slave rations, and was severely
1. Henry Beaufoy, (d. 1795), was the son of a Quaker
wine merchant and a Whig politician.
2. Hansard 1 27 597.
3. 29 Geo III c 66.
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beaten for it) It was felt that some reinforcement
of the 1789 regulations was required, and when a policy
of gradual abolition of the slave trade was agreed
following the Dundas debate of 23 April 1792 legislation
ensued which was again partially aimed at cutting crew
deaths in slavers. 2 The tAct to continue for a limited
Time, several Acts of Parliament for regulating shipping
and carrying Slaves in Vessels from the Coast of Africa'
had appended to it a schedule dealing exclusively with
seamen's accommodation and diet. Schedule A laid down
that awnings or 'tarpawlings' be fitted when the men
were out in boats up-river in West Africa, while during
the Middle Passage they were to be accommodated either
in the half-deck, or the steerage, or in caulked deck-
shelters built for the purpose. The schedule also con-
tamed a statutory scale of provisions, and as it was
to be the only statutory scale in force, however briefly,
before 1906 and it clearly illustrates the 'pound and
pint' basis of other diets the scale appears in full
below.
Sunday
Monday
One Pound and a Half of Beef,
containing Sixteen Ounces to the
Pound, and a Pint of Flour.
One Pound of Pork, containing
Sixteen Ounces to the Pound, and
Half a Pint of Pease.
1. HCSPEC 72 309 and 92 12-13.
2. The debate was initiated by Henry Dundas, subsequently
Viscount Melville (1742-1811), who was Home Secretary
and who later became Treasurer of the Navy. For the
debate see Hansard 1 29 1203-1293. The ensuing Act
was 32 Geo III c 52.
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Tuesday One Pint of Oatmeal and Two
Ounces of Butter, and Four
Ounces of Cheese, or One Pound
of Stock Fish with One-eighth
of a Pint of Oil, and a Quarter
of a Pint of Vinegar, in lieu
of Butter and Cheese.
Wednesday The same as Monday.
Thursday The Same as Sunday.
Friday	 The Same as Tuesday.
Saturday The Same as Monday.
Each Person, besides, to have Six
Pounds of Bread per Week; and a
Quarter of a Pint of Spirits, or
Half a Pint of Wine, together with
(blank) of Water, per Day, during
the Voyage.
A comparison of this scale with the nineteenth-
century diet scales at (B), CD) and (F) in Appendix
Eleven shows the persistence of the pork and peas/beef
and duff motif in seamen's food - itself a reflection
of the difficulties inherent in victualling when only
salted, dried or liquid foods, headed-up in barrels for
longer keeping, are available. A combination of poor
food of this type, hard work, exposure to the elements
and to the ravages of ship-borne diseases ensured that
seamen were poor physical specimens. A contemporary
authority on sea medicine noted that seamen were 'in
general short, and have their constitutions worn out
ten years before the rest of the laborious part of man-
kind. A seaman at the age of 45, if shewn to a person
not accustomed to be among them, would be taken by his
looks to be 55, or even on the borders of 6O'. 	 Long
1. Gilbert Blane, Observations on the Diseases Incident
to Seamen (1785) 211.
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hours were common in all walks of life, but seamen
had. the additional burden of broken and irregular
rest periods due to the watch-and-watch system that
gave them no more than three and a half hours of
sleep at a time. Until the nineteenth-century was
well advanced legislation centred chiefly on discipline
and liability for naval service, and although the Iner-
chant seaman had a state-supervised contract of employ-
ment that contract was often broken by the state
itself. Britain was at war for fifty of the seventy-
five years from 1740 to 1815, and with no long-service
ratings in the Royal Navy the Imprest Service was more
likely to be active than idle in those years. Greenwich
Hospital was a doubtful haven for old and disabled mer-
chant seamen, while Merchant Seamen's Fund payments
were generally inadequate to keep a man out of the
workhouse in sickness or old age. Private charity was
limited, 1 and the economic position of men in work
tended to be precarious. Engaged by the voyage, or
by the 'run', 2 subject to unemployment during the months
of winter when ships were laid up, harassed by the
linprest Service in times of war, it is not to be
1. The Society of Merchant Venturers of Bristol, the
Society of Keelmen at Newcastle and the Corporation
of Trinity House at Hull are examples of local
charities that provided some aid to infirm or dis-
abled seamen, but demand was always greatly in
excess of what could be provided.
2. Normally, a seaman's contract was for a round voyage,
but where a short, single-leg, passage was concerned
men would be engaged at a fixed sum for the 'run'
between ports irrespective of time taken.
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wondered at that recruits to the merchant service were
often, in Alan Villiers' (1975) phrase, 'the landless,
the non-inheritors, the under-privileged'. 1
 A square-
rig seamen needed many skills, but was accorded low
status. Parliament was quick to acknowledge that 'the
Welfare and Riches of this Kingdom greatly depend on
the Trade and Navigation thereof', 2
 but slow to
appreciate that while the workforce had increased six-
fold in the period from the end of the sixteenth-century
to the end of the eighteenth-century the living and
working conditions of that workforce had scarcely changed
at all. Where improvements in the sailors' lot may be
noted they are invariably by-products. Repatriation at
government expense, a fixed-wage contract of employment,
a food scale for the crews of slavers and the institution
of the Merchant Seamen's Fund are by-products of trade-
enhancing and naval recruiting measures - not spontaneous
expressions of goodwill by Parliament in respect of an
essential group of workers.
1. Alan Villiers, Voyaging with the Wind (NIvIM, 1975) 11.
2. From the preamble to the 1729 Act.
37
CHAPTER TWO
BENIGN NEGLECT, 1800 to 1837
In the early nineteenth-century the British
merchant fleet was the largest in the world, but it
was not progressing in line with competitors and its
total tonnage rose by only 8% between 1815 and 1840.1
An excess of carrying capacity and low freights conse-
quent on the end of the Napoleonic wars is generally
blamed for this state of affairs, 2 but three crew-related
factors require emphasis. First, there was divided
responsibility within government for merchant ships and
their crews. The Board of Trade, created in l786, only
gradually took over full responsibility for the merchant
service, and it was not until 1850 that it had the
statutory duty to 'undertake the general Superintendence
of Matters relating to the British Mercantile Marine'.4
1. R.H. Thornton, British Shipping (Cambridge, 1945) 43,
and Appendix One.
2. For example, in Lucy Brown, The Board of Trade and
the Free Trade Movement (1958) 177.
3. It was originally a committee of the Privy Council
dealing with trade and overseas plantations, and
was set up by an Order in Council dated 23 August
1786. The 'Board' was a legal fiction, for the
President generally acted alone. Many leading
politicians, including Gladstone and Lloyd George,
held the office, and it served to give relatively
young men their first experience of running a govern-
ment department. After 1864 the President was
frequently a junior cabinet minister. The most
comprehensive account of the Board's history may be
found in Sir H. Llewellyri Smith, The Board of Trade
(1927)
4. 13 & 14 Vic C 93, s.6.
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Eight other government departments had a finger in the
pie, of whom the Admiralty and the Colonial Office were
the most significant. Admiralty interest waned slightly
after 1853 with the institution of continuous service
for naval ratings - which meant in turn that the merchant
service was no longer seen as the chief recruiting ground
for the navy - while the Colonial Office did not relin-
quish its hold on passenger ships and the emigrant trade
until 1872.1 Indeed, it is not too strong a statement
to say that the whole-hearted interest of the Board of
Trade in the merchant seaman dates from about 1832 - the
year when the Statistical Department was created and
placed under Board of Trade aegis, and when an increasing
amount of adverse publicity was being voiced at the
extent of the loss of life and property at sea and the
rising number of shipwrecks.2
This first factor of divided responsibility
for merchant seamen leads to the second, which is that
most of the legislation effecting British seamen in the
period was either derivative or consolidatory in nature.
In 1805 a loophole whereby coasting seamen in vessels
of under 100 tons had escaped the provisions of the 1729
Act was closed, 3 while in 1813 the maintenance scales
1. By 35 & 36 Vic C 73, s.7.
2. The Nautical Magazine, first in the field, was
followed by the Edinburgh Review and the Metropolitan
Magazine in keeping up a high level of agitation
leading eventually to the 1836 Select Committee on
Shipwrecks.
3. 45 Geo 3 C 81.
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for distressed British seamen were revised. 1
 Five
years later it was decreed that sick seamen left in
hospital abroad should have their wages, less hospital
expenses, paid to them, 2 and the 1819 Act 'for facili-
tating the Recovery of the Wages of Seamen in the Mer-
chant Service' 3
 reduced waiting time for final pay-off
from the thirty days laid down in 1729 to two days from
Customs entry, cargo delivery or discharge. Admiralty-
inspired legislation aimed at keeping up the number of
recruits to the sea service had been a feature of the
eighteenth-century, and this type of law-making was
repeated in 1823 when it was enacted that all merchant
ships of eighty tons or more had to carry apprentices
according to a tonnage-based scale, as follows:
	
80-200 tons
	 at least one apprentice
	
200-400 tons	 at least two apprentices
	
400-500 tons
	 at least three apprentices
	
500-700 tons
	 at least four apprentices
over 700 tons at least five apprentices
and these apprentices were to be under seventeen years
of age at the time of signing indentures and to serve
a four-year term. The measure was also popular with
shipowners because it seemed to endorse the extensive
use of cheaper labour and the Bill's prime mover, the
1. By 53 Geo 3 c 85. The 6d a day maintenance for
castaways ana shipwrecked mariners had been raised
to 9d a day in 1792 and was left at Admiralty dis-
cretion after 1813. In 1825 consuls abroad were
provided with funds under the provisions of 6 Geo 4
C 87 on a scale to be fixed by Order in Council, and
this arrangement continued until repeal in 1973.
2. 58 Geo 3 c 38.
3. 59 Geo 3 C 25.
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free-trader William Fluskisson,' said at the third
reading that the measure had given universal satisfaction
to the shipowning interest. 2
 In the event, the obliga-
tion to produce apprentices at the Customs House at
regular intervals became wearisome to owners, and after
a quarter of a century they gladly voted to be rid of it.
The ninth section of the 1823 Act 3
 sought to
deal with the continuing problem of desertion. There
was a frank admission that previous legislation had
been 'found ineffectual for that Object', and the remedy
was to increase penalties. Deserters were not only to
forfeit all wages due from the ship they had left, as
laid down in 1797, but also the wages earned on the
voyage back to Britain that brought them again within
jurisdiction. Nothing could have been better calculated
to reduce the number of British seamen serving in
British ships, for it gave men who deserted for economic
reasons a prime incentive for remaining in colonial or
foreign vessels. It was also inisconceived as an effec-
tive penalty because the cost of recovering wages earned
on the return voyage by legal process might swallow up
much of the amount awarded. When a case involving the
recovery of the wages of a deserter was heard at the
Sheriff's Court at Greenock in 1849 the finding was in
1. William Huskisson (1770-1830), was President of the
Board of Trade at the time and an early advocate of
the relaxation of the Navigation Laws. He is now
chiefly remembered as being the first person killed
by a train in Britain.
2. Hansard 2 8 1125-1126.
3. 4 Geo 4 C 25.
41
favour of the shipowner. However, while the amount
recovered was £9-lls-6d the costs of the case were
£5-13s, some 59% of the award.1
The Merchant Shipping Act of 18352 was the
first of the three major consolidating Acts of the
century, 3 and the intention was to group into one
measure practically every regulation involving merchant
seamen that had emerged in the previous hundred and
thirty years. The government's view was that 'the
only just ground on which any alteration ought to be made
in the old laws was that they contained provisions that
were not reconcilable to expediency and justice' 4 and,
in general, it contained few new elements. The final
debate 5 was dominated by Sir James Graham6 who, as First
Lord of the Admiralty, put the interests of his depart-
ment first. The 1704 device of shipping parish appren-
tices was revived by s.26, using the numbers formula of
1. Quoted by W.S. Lindsay in Our Mercantile and Navi-
gation Laws Considered with a view to their General
Revision and Consolidation (1852) 272.
2. 5 & 6 Will 4 C 19. Often referred to as Graham's Act.
3. The others are the Merchant Shipping Acts of 1854 and
1894.
4. Hansard 3 28 198.
5. On 27 May 1835. Hansard 3 28 194-201.
6. Sir James Robert George Graham, (1792-1861), was a
Whig politician who went over to the Tories in 1841
and became Home Secretary. According to his DNB
entry, he 'tended to pomposity and carried th
habit of quotation to inordinate lengths'. A kinder
verdict is given in Arvel B. Erickson, The Public
Career of Sir James Graham (1952).
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1823, and the General Register Office of Merchant Seamen
established by s.19 was much on the lines of the register
system set up by the 1696 Act - the object being again
to further the long-standing policy of keeping up the
numbers of seamen and ensuring that they could be readily
called upon to serve in the Royal Navy in times of war.
A recognisable shipowners' lobby in Parliament had been
in existence since 1831,1 and its principal spokesman
in 1835 was George Frederick Young, the Member for
Tynemouth. A small reform group was led by James Silk
Buckingham, the Member for Sheffield. 2 The reformers
were only able to defeat the combined strength of the
Admiralty and the shipowners over one issue - the contri-
bution made by merchant seamen for the upkeep of Greenwich
Hospital.
The question of provision for sick and disabled
1. The Times of 10 June 1831 shows that a general
association of shipowners had been formed following
a meeting in London the previous day. Aaron Chapman,
M.P. for Whitby, and George Frederick Young, MP for
Tynemouth, were the leading lights. An article -
'The General Ship Owners Society' - in the October
1832 issue of The Nautical Magazine Vol.1 420-423 shows
the organisation was created because trade was
depressed, and that it's foundation derived from a
provisional meeting of shipowners on 10 April 1828.
2. James Silk Buckingham, (1786-1855). He had gone to
sea at nine years of age and commanded his first ship
at twenty-one. Subsequently a merchant in Malta,
then editor of the Calcutta Journal, he was expelled
from India for exposing corrupt practices there. He
was MP for Sheffield from 1832, and became a popular
travel writer. His DNB entry describes him as an
imaginative liberal who was industrious, but capricious.
A detailed contemporary account of his life is contained
in the Biographical Sketch of James Silk Buckingham of
1853 prepared for inclusion in a larger work - Lives
of the Illustrious. A copy of the former is in the
BLRD under reference 10825 b.14. See also James Silk
Buckingham 1786-1855 (1934) by Ralph E. Turner.
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merchant seamen was raised by Buckingham on 24 April and
16 May 1835, and he made the telling point that it was
manifestly unjust for poor men to be compelled to pay
for Greenwich Hospital when they received no benefit
from it) Sir James Graham's defence of the contribution
was spirited, but muddled. He claimed on 24 April 1835
that doing away with the merchant seamen's sixpences
would cost Greenwich Hospital a third of its funds, but
on 16 May 1835 said that only a seventh of its revenue
was at stake. The kernel of his argument was that 'many
of the seamen alluded to had acquired chronic diseases
when afloat in the mercantile navy, and having been for
a short time on board his Majesty's ships they fell back
upon the Hospital', but the Member for the City of London
pointed out that a minimum of one days' crown service
had always been required, and quoted the case of a mer-
chant seaman disabled while serving a gun under the
directions of a naval officer at Jamaica who had been
denied admission although he was a contributor. Sir
James Graham then gave figures in an attempt to show
that merchant seamen were not discriminated against in
the matter of admission. In 1834 there were 2,700 inmates
at Greenwich of whom 1,180 had served for some period in
the merchant service. Some 300 of the 1,180 men had
served from between thirty to fifty years, and their
average service in merchant ships was thirteen years.
The House was unimpressed: Sir James Graham lost the
1. Hansard 3 22 1371-1372 and 3 23 1147-1148.
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ensuing division by thirty-seven votes and the seamen's
sixpence, now raised to a shilling, that had for so long
been paid to Greenwich Hospital, went to the Merchant
Seamen's Fund. 1
 He gained the day, however, over the
question of seamen leaving merchant ships to join naval
vessels having full entitlement to pay (s.46). 2 It was
argued that this was the only way of recruiting to replace
losses when on foreign stations, and while the shipping
interest felt the clause to be demoralizing and destruc-
tive of trust they were not prepared to tackle the
government head-on over the issue.
The wage legislation of 1819 was amended by
the 1835 Act. On coasters, the payment of wages within
two days of discharge remained the rule, but in foreign-
going vessels waiting time was increased to three days
from cargo delivery or ten days from discharge. Sir
James Graham took the view that delay was desirable
1. Greenwich Hospital was awarded a compensatory grant
by the Exchequer.
2. This provision had been embodied in the 1729 Act, and
subsequently s. 195 of the 1894 Act confirmed that 'A
seaman may leave his ship for the purpose of forthwith
entering the naval service of Her Majesty, and in that
case shall not by reason of so leaving his ship be
liable to any punishment or forfeiture whatever'. In
practice, what happened was that a disgruntled seaman
in a merchant ship would hoist a shirt in the fore
rigging to attract the attention of a warship's look-
outs, and the first lieutenant - always on the alert
for new recruits - would send a boat. If the man was
accepted for naval service he would get his back pay
to date and take all his effects with him. Naturally,
shipowners detested the practice, and complaints about
it form part of the evidence given to the Navy Manning
Commissioners in 1859, while W.S. Lindsay refused to
sign the Report for that reason. See the Report of the
Commissioners appointed to enquire into the best means
of Manning the Navy, BPP 1859 (2469) VI xxiii.
(Referred to hereafter as RCMN 1859). The legal basis
of the practice was established by the Amphitrite case
of 1832, (2 Hag. Mm. 403).
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because it prevented sailors spending all their money
on the first night ashore, while George Frederick Young
wanted the ten-day delay to enable owners to check on
possible thefts from the cargo. 1 Neither party seemed
to realise that by keeping seamen in the dock area unpaid
and restless after a voyage they were playing into the
hands of the crimps. 2 The latter often obtained initial
control over seamen during the waiting period by pro-
viding them with loans, drink and creature comforts, and
would accompany their clients to the pay-off venue so as
obtain payment for past services and channel future
spending in the crimps t interest. The administration
and the shipping interest cannot have been unaware of
the situation, because s.l0 of the 1835 Act was intended
to deal with crimps. There was to be a £10 penalty for
1. Hansard 3 20 194-201. This episode shows how strongly
the concept that 'freight is the mother of wages' had
survived. Cautions in respect of embezzlement from
cargo or stores continued to be printed on crew agree-
ments down to 1970, and Appendix Four contains repro-
ductions of three crew agreements with appropriate
warnings deriving from the twelfth-century Laws of
01ron.
2. Crimping is a phenomenon much described, but rarely
examined objectively. A crimp made his profits in
three ways. First, he induced the homeward-bound
sailor to spend his money, or use the credit facilities,
at the crimps' premises - often a boarding house, but
sometimes a bar or a brothel. Second, he 'sold' sailors
for 'blood money' to masters seeking crews. Third,
the man in his debt either signed over his advance
note for one or two months' pay, made a fictitious
allotment or permitted the crimp to discount a note
for him before sailing. What is not often appreciated
is that crimps were sometimes valuable intermediaries
in the labour market at a time when sophisticated
arrangements for placing sea labour did not exist.
See J.R. Bruijn, 'Seamen in Dutch Ports: c.1700 - c.
1914', The Mariner's Mirror Vol. 65, No. 4 (1979) 327.
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harbouring deserters, while debts over five shillings
in value incurred between signing-on and sailing were
void until the voyage had been completed. The age-old
device of removing a drunken seaman's clothes so as to
keep him virtually a prisoner in a crimp's boarding-house
was made an offence - the relevant legal phrase reading
'nor shall it be lawful for any Keeper of a Public
House or of a Lodging House for Seamen to withhold or
detain any Chest, Bed or Bedding, Clothes, Tools or other
Effects ... '. The penalties for desertion remained un-
changed, but the form of agreement laid down by the 1835
Act was altered so as make desertion more difficult. In
Appendix Four (B) it may be seen that three new items
of information must be given when signing-on. A man
now had to give his age, his place of birth and the name
of his last ship. The 1797 form of agreement (Appendix
Four (A)) required him to give merely his name, but it is
interesting to note that in both documents his 'Quality'
(rank or competence) had to be stated. Later in this
study the whole question of competence, and qualifications,
of seamen - particularly Able Seamen - will be shown to
be the subject of intense governmental scrutiny.
To the first factor of divided responsibility
for ships and seamen and the second of 'legislative
quiescence' 1 must be added the third - that the British
1. Albert Venn Dicey, the British jurist and constitu-
tional lawyer, used this expression to describe law-
making in the first third of the nineteenth-century
in his Lectures on the Relationship between Law and
Public Opinion during the Nineteenth-Century (1914
edition) 62-64.
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shipping industry was weak because American construction
and operating methods were superior and to compete
British owners had to cut costs to the bone. R.H.
Thornton's (1945) assessment for this period was that
There was little direct recruitment of
officers, masters were illiterate,
navigation crude and unscholarly and,
except in the aristocratic and uneconomic
conditions of East Indiainen, the employment
of hands was beggarly, harsh and poor.1
R. Prouty (1957) thought that British owners 'spent too
little on the construction of a ship, on its maintenance,
and on the training and welfare of the crew. The result
was a general deterioration'. 2
 Oliver MacDonagh (1961)
makes an attack on owners and ships' officers in the
period, saying that 'shipwrecks and putting back in
distress were almost everyday occurrences, with bad
vessels, bad navigation and drunken ships' officers sharing
the blame in almost equal parts'. 3 A contemporary, the
scientist Augustin Creuze, believed that
The mercantile navy of England is the
least speedy and most unsafe that belongs
to a civilized nation. America is not
only in possession of a better mercantile
navy with which to compete with us, but
she also has the vantage-ground of superior
knowledge and ... the merchant builders
of Britain are ... unequal to the task of
competition. 4
1. Thornton, British Shipping 25
2. R. Prouty, The Transformation of the Board of Trade
(1957) 32-33.
3. Oliver MacDonagh, A Pattern of Government Growth
1800-60 (1961) 48.
4. Quoted by John Malcolm Brinnin, The Sway of the Grand
Saloon - a Social History of the North Atlantic (1972)
9.
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Given this background of a general recession, government
indifference, legislative quiescence and inferior
vessels it is hardly surprising that the sailor's lot
was unenviable. His wages had fallen 40% between 1815
and 1833,1 and in the latter year the workforce was
some 14% smaller than in the former. 2 The officers
were practical seamen, but lacked the equipment for
precise navigation. 3 Conditions for seamen were primi-
tive, and W.S. Lindsay, who was at sea in a 420-ton
timber and sugar carrier in 1834, has left the following
pen-picture of his life on board. 4 It is a long quota-
tion, but valuable for its completeness.
The cook, ten seamen and three apprentices
had their abode in the forecastle. This
place, which was in the 'tween decks at
the extremity of the bow, may have been
about twenty-one feet in width at the after
or widest part, tapering gradually away to
a narrow point at the stem. The length in
1. Evidence of Robert A. Gray, shipowner, to the 1833
Select Committee on Manufactures, Commerce and
Shipping. Report of the Select Committee on Manu-
factures, Commerce and Shipping, BPP 1833 (690) VI
231. Report referred to hereafter as RSCMCS 1833.
2. See Appendix Three.
3. 'It was rare to meet with a scientific, efficient
navigator, and not one ship in a hundred was furnished
with a chronometer'. George Coggeshall, Thirty-Six
Voyages to Various Parts of the World (1974 edition) 61.
4. William Schaw Lindsay (1816-1877), was a merchant
and shipowner, a humanitarian and a free trader.
He served afloat from 1831-40, and was MP for
Tynemouth and Sunderland between 1854 and 1865,
His books include A History of Merchant Shipping
and Ancient Commerce and Our Navigation and Mer-
cantile Laws considered with a view to their
General Revision and Consolidation.
49
midships was somewhere about twenty feet,
but much less as the sides of the vessel
were approached. The height was five
feet from deck to beam, or about five feet
nine inches from deck to deck; the only
approach to it being through a scuttle or
hole in the main deck, about two and a half
feet square. Beyond this hole there was no
means of obtaining either ventilation or
light, and in bad weather, when the sea
washed over the deck, the crew had to do as
best they could without either, or receive
the air mixed with spray, and sometimes
accompanied by the almost unbroken crest of
a wave, which in defiance to all tarpaulin
guards, too frequently found its way through
the scuttle. Here fourteen persons slept in
hammocks suspended from the beams and had
their daily food. There was no room for
tables, chairs or stools so the tops of their
seachests in which they kept their clothes
and all their worldly possessions were
substituted for those useful and necessary
household articles. ... At all times it
was a foulsome and suffocating abode, and in
bad weather the water and filth which washed
about the desk and among the chests and
casks created the most intolerable and loath-
some stench. Here, however, these fourteen
sailors and apprentices slept, washed,
dressed and had their food, except in fine
weather, when they took their meals on deck,
their food consisting almost entirely of
inferior salted pork or beef, which was some-
times as hard and unpalatable as the kids in
which it was served, and brown biscuits, too
often inouldy and full of maggots.1
There were no sanitary arrangements for seamen
in this period, and the 'heads' in the bows of vessels were
a sea-washed area beneath the bowsprit without privacy or
comfort. Inadequate clothing led to 'ship-fever' or typhus
in cold climates, with the disease transmitted by body-
lice, while yellow fever, malaria and bubonic plague were
picked up in the tropics. The diet of salt meat and long-
baked biscuit meant that scurvy was common on foreign-
1. W.S. Lindsay, History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient
Commerce (1874) ii 497-498.
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going ships, while cholera spread readily through the
medium of infected water. Exposure to the elements
made for a short working life, as a Glasgow official
testified in 1847.
We find the sea service very severe.
Rheumatism particularly unfits theni;
they often have shrivelled fingers and
hands, and are quite unfitted at 50
from rheumatism. The great portion from
50 to 60 are superannuated.1
In general, the provision of protective clothing, bedding
and food was not regulated in any way by government,
although there was a single exception in the case of
lascars - Indian seamen recruited initially for local
service in what were termed 'country ships'.2
The impressment of British seamen for service
with the Royal Navy in Indian waters during the early
stages of the struggle with France led to an acute
shortage of sea labour, 3 and there was a corresponding
rise in demand for the services of lascars. 4 The earliest
1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Merchant Sea-
men's Fund, BPP 1847-48 (931) XXVIII 491. Referred
to hereafter as RRCMSF 1847-48.
2. Ships which traded solely within the Indian Ocean
and which were often on their final employment
before being broken-up.
3. As may be seen from the exchange of letters between
the EIC and the Indian Commissioners after the war.
See the Return of correspondence between the
Commissioners for the Affairs of India and other
public bodies relative to the care and maintenance
of lascars, BPP 1816 (279) X 349-350.
4. Deriving from the Persian, and Urdu, word 'lashkar'
meaning an army or camp, it became in the seventeenth-
century the name given to native gunners serving
afloat and was finally adopted to describe all Indian
seafarers.
51
indication that lascars were crewing ships bound for
Europe can be traced back to 1782 when a letter from
the East India Company in London to the President and
Council at Fort St. George, Madras, complained that
Indian seamen were arriving at the London offices having
'been reduced to great distress and applied to us for
relief'. 1
 The Danes at their settlement at Frederickna-
gore seem to have been the pioneers in manning ships
with all lascar crews, for the evidence is that the
initial complaint relates to men discharged in Denmark
who then made their way to London to apply for repatria-
tion. The labour shortage in India did not abate and
in 1783, despite objections from shipniasters, 2 a set
of rules was drawn up covering the recruitment of lascars
in British India. 3 A Danish edict of 18 November 1780
had put the onus for the return of lascars from Denmark
1. India Office Library, London, (henceforth IOL). Home
Miscellaneous Correspondence 163 175-185; letter
dated 8 July 1782.
2. For example, Thomas Forrester, a master mariner,
wrote indignantly to the Bengal Council on 23 April
1784 to say that his good name was such that he
ought to be exempted from having to obtain a crew
through the Marine Office. IOL Bengal Public Council
Minutes; 21 June to 16 August 1784, Range 3, 5 69.
3. These rules, registered at the Supreme Court on 7
July 1783, had four main features. Recruitment was
through shipping offices, and there was a fixed wage.
Maintenance abroad pending repatriation was part of
the contract, and after 1806 there was a statutory
diet scale. The long-term impact of the rules is
assessed in the paper 'Lascars: the forgotten seamen'
delivered by the candidate at the Maritime History
Group Conference held at Memorial University, St.
John's, Newfoundland in July, 1980. (Publication
pending).
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to India on shipowners, and when the governor of the
small Danish colony at Fredericknagore sent a copy to
Warren Hastings 1
 the latter embodied its provisions in
the rules. The practical effect was to make the East
India Company responsible for lascars in the United
Kingdom insofar as the Indian administration was con-
cerned, while the British government did its best at
first to keep them out altogether. An Act of 1802 took
the view that lascars were not to be employed in ships
sailing in waters west of the Cape of Good Hope, 2 but
by 1814 economic pressures and a continuing war-induced
labour shortage had led to the East India Trade Act of
that year which was intended to put 'the better mainte-
nance and care of Lascars and other Asiatic Seamen
arriving in this Kingdom' on a proper footing.3
The East India Trade Act outlined a scheme
whereby owners or masters of vessels crewed by lascars
were responsible, under bond, for feeding, clothing and
lodging them in the United Kingdom, while s.3 said that
Indian seamen who had somehow slipped through this
welfare net would be cared for by the East India Company
at the expense of the owners of the conducting ship,
always provided that the latter could be traced. This
provision was a recognition of the existing state of
affairs, because the East India Company had, from 1795
1. In a letter dated 18 March 1783. Warren Hastings
(1732-1818), was governor-general of Bengal between
1774 and 1785.
2. 42 Geo 3 c 61, s.9.
3. 54 Geo 3 c 134.
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provided meals and accommodation for their lascars at
a succession of boarding houses in the Kingsland Road
in East London. In 1802, following complaints from
the City of London magistrates, the home for lascars
was moved to Shoreditch, and from 1804 a contractor
named Abraham Gale supplied food and lodging while
a physician called Hilton Docker looked after their
medical needs) Towards the close of the Napoleonic
period the numbers so increased that some of them were
housed in barracks at Gravesend, while Hilton Docker's
forthright comments on the death rate among these men
led to the setting up of a Parliamentary committee of
enquiry into the problem. 2 The Report from the Committee
on Lascars and other Asiatic Seamen 3 revealed in
particular, that while there were shortcomings in the
care of lascars ashore they enjoyed a higher standard
of care at sea than their European counterparts.
Lascars were victualled according to a
statutory scale, had two suits of clothes issued to
them and bedding consisting of three blankets sewn
together to make a kind of sleeping bag. Shoes, caps
1. IOL Marine Miscellaneous Correspondence, Lascars
1793-1818, 902 116.
2. See The Times of 9 December 1814. The information
available to the Asiatic Society can only have
come from Hilton Docker.
3. Report from the Committee on Lascars and other
Asiatic Seamen, BPP 1814-15 (471) III 217. Referred
to hereafter as RCLAS 1814-15.
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and mittens were also supplied. 1 The provision scale
was not dealt with by this Coimnittee, but another source
gives it in full. Instructions to Commanders issued
by the Bengal authorities in 1814 show that rice, dal,
spices, ghee, onions and garlic formed the basis of
the lascar's diet, with liniejuice, tainarinds, melons,
carrots preserved in sugar, green vegetables preserved
in salt and potatoes in vinegar as supplements. Tea
and sugar were to be provided, while 'Coffee would be
grateful and salutary on such occasions ... as is
wanted'. 2 A full allowance of water was recommended,
together with salt beef, salt fish and freshly-killed
mutton, when available. Lascars were to be encouraged
to oil their bodies and not to sleep in damp clothing.
The perils of the shore also required emphasis. 'During
the stay of the ship in England', said the Instructions,
'the people ought to be kept as much as possible on
board, for on shore they are led into various excesses
destructive to their health'. On this point the
Committee on Lascars reported that the dangers arising
out of squalid conditions at the Gravesend barracks
quite outweighed the potential health hazards involved
in a spree ashore after a long voyage, for scanty con-
cessions to climatic differences were shown to be a main
1. RCLAS 1814-15 225-226. Appendix containing EIC
regulations.
2. IOL Marine Miscellaneous Correspondence, Lascars
1793-1818, 902 72-74.
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cause of ill-health.
The Committee made an unannounced visit to
the Gravesend barracks and found that lascars were
sleeping on bare boards with a blanket apiece in
buildings that were devoid of furniture and unheated.
There were neither hammocks nor charpoys 1
 for the sick,
and salt fish was a constant part of the diet although
'fresh fish are so abundant in London as to be the
cheapest article of animal food'. 2 As many as 1,100
men were living at the barracks at the peak times of
the year, 3
 and the Committee made four recommendations.
They suggested the building of a new establishment near
the East India Docks with stricter supervision, and
more effective legislation to enforce repatriation.
The issue of clothing on board ships should be recorded
to check the sale of it by lascars ashore. Men left
at outports should be sent to London, while abuses of
the serang 4 system should be tackled by the Indian
1. Beds consisting of a wooden frame on low legs with
string criss-crossed to hold a thin mattress or rug.
2. RCLAS 1814-15 221.
3. RCLAS 1814-15 220. The arrival of tea cargoes, in
particular, gave rise to spectacular increases in
the number of lascars housed ashore.
4. Lascars were recruited as gang labour by contractors
called 'ghat serangs' and supervised on board by
serangs and. deputies called tindals. Corruption was
endemic, with these petty officers handling the wages
of the men and transmitting orders to them from
European officers. The Committee were 'unwilling to
dwell on the abuses incident to this system' and
thought it 'capable of improvement'. RCLAS 1814-15
220-224. Appendix Twelve gives lascar ranks and the
European equivalents.
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administration. The Gravesend lascars were from private
ships rather than those of the East India Company, and
many of theni would have been deserters, for Hilton
Docker had been complaining since 1812 that
lascars desert ... and being found
wandering are sent to the ... house,
and from the difficulty of language
the name of the ship in which they
came to England is seldom ascertained.
There were, of course, manifest economic advantages in
crewing a ship with lascars because their wages were
so much lower than those of European seamen, 2 but a
larger crew was generally considered necessary and it
was widely believed that they could not stand up to
rough and cold weather as well as their European counter-
parts. 3 The compulsory provision of warm clothing,
bedding and suitable food was an additional disincentive,
and after 1815 it seems to be the case that only two
categories of shipowners in eastern trades had an
interest in crewing ships with lascars - the wholly
responsible and the totally irresponsible. In the first
1. IOL Marine Miscellaneous Correspondence, Lascars
1783-1818, 902; letter dated 5 March 1812.
2. About a ninth of the European rate. First-class
lascars - equivalent to ABs - were paid some eight
to ren rupees a month in 1814.
3. Joseph Sonies, a shipowner with eastern interests,
told the 1844 Select Committee on British Shipping
that it was generally held that lascars were 30%
less efficient in cold weather and that in northern
latitudes three lascars might do the work of two
European seamen. As he put it: 'when the frost
takes them they are good for nothing'. Report from
the Select Committee on British Shipping, BPP 1844
(545) VIII QQ. 618-631. Referred to hereafter as
RSCBS 1844.
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class comes the East India Company, which continued to
run a home for Asiatic seamen in New Road, St. George's-
in-the-East, until it effectively lost its charter in
1833, while less scrupulous owners tended to house
their men in sheds on shore when the ships went into
dock and were unconcerned if they drifted away thereafter.
It was in recognition of this situation that the 1823
Act, which implemented some of the recommendations of
the 1814-15 Committee on Lascars, removed the duty of
maintaining lascars ashore from the private owner.
The 1823 Act' abolished the bonding system
set up in 1814 and made the East India Company responsible
for shipping home all stranded Asiatic seamen. Lascars
were said in this Act 'not to be equal in Strength and
Use to Europeans' 2 although s.22 permitted their recruit-
ment for service in British-registered ships whenever an
insufficient number of white seamen were available at ports
in British India. They were held not to be British sea-
men for the purposes of satisfying the manning require-
ments of the Navigation Acts in peacetime, but might
count as such in times of war. 3 This legal dichotomy
1. 4 Ceo 4 c 80. The Act remained in force until 1963.
2. Section 21 of the 1823 Act. The corollary that
Asiatic seamen might be superior in tropical waters
was never put on record in the nineteenth-century.
3. Until mid-century, British ships had to have a British
master and be manned by a crew that was at least
three-quarters British - except in times of war. The
provision originates with s.7 of the 1660 Navigation
Act.
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meant that while lascars were disadvantaged as regards
pay and recruitment their continuing protected status
while serving afloat and overseas conferred some
material advantages. In the first half of the century
they were still generally subject to East India Company
regulation: after the Mutiny s.21 of India Act 1 of
1859 governed their diet and specified the number and
tasks of the crew.' British seamen had no statutory
diet scale until 1906, and there was no statutory scale
of manning or restriction on working hours in the period
studied. The response of the Indian administration to
an acute labour shortage had been a forced response:
the home government had relied on market forces to
bring in more sea labour, and with the coming of peace
in 1815 the demand for labour fell away abruptly, with
the industry going into a decline for almost a quarter
of a century.2
The end of the wars with Napoleon soon brought
about chronic unemployment among merchant seamen, and
many were speedily reduced to beggary. 3 Existing
1. The EIC lost its commercial function in 1834 and its
administrative function in 1858. It was dissolved
in 1874. Brian Gardner, The East India Company
(1971) 202-204 and 290-298.
2. See Appendix One. The figure for United Kingdom
registered tonnage in 1816 was not surpassed until 1839.
3. Instances of seamen begging in the streets of
London may be found in the Minutes of Evidence
taken before the 1815 Committee on the State
of Mendicity in the Metropolis, BPP 1914-15 (473)
III 246, 249, 276, 277 and 281.
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charities were quite incapable of coping with the
crisis, 1
 and in the hard winter of 1817/18 the prolonged
distress of the unemployed sailors was noted by William
Wilberforce and Zachary Macauley. 2
 They set up a Fund
for the Relief of Distressed Mariners, but the committee
of philanthropists that managed it soon caine to realise
that money doles were a mere palliative and that what
was needed was comprehensive care for sick, diseased,
injured and ill-nourished seamen. 3
 It was also appreci-
ated that the nature of their occupation isolated sailors
from the shore community and made them suspicious of
shore institutions - notably hospitals. At a meeting
held at the City of Lon.don Tavern on 8 March 1821 the
problem was put in the following terms:
Sailors in general are bred up to their
occupation from early youth and retain
1. For example, although Trinity House maintained 144
almshouses and paid 7,012 pensions it was incapable
of any rapid expansion, having built only twenty-
eight houses in seven years. Accounts relating to the
Trinity-House of Deptford Strond, BPP 1816 (408) XIX
152. The Merchant Seamen's Fund had no unemployment
provisions, and pensions tended to be too small for
even mere subsistence. The Keelman's Hospital on the
Tyne and Trinity House at Hull had strictly local
applications.
2. William Wilberforce, (1759-1833), philanthropist and
humanitarian, is best remembered for his work in con-
nection with the abolition of slavery. Zachary
Macauley, father of the great historian, was an ardent
evangelical and a former governor of Sierra Leone.
3. This group of philanthropists also founded the
Destitute Sailors' Asylum in a Dock Street warehouse
in 1827. This later became the Well Street Home, and
then the Red Ensign Club. The institution, known to
generations of seamen as 'Jack's Palace', closed in
1974 when the governing body negotiated a merger with
the Marine Society - founded by Jonas Hanway in 1756
- and the Seafarers' Education Society.
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few of the habits of persons employed
on shore. Their great failing and
principal occasion of all their mis-
fortunes is an almost total absence of
foresight and consideration for the
morrow. They appear to have no con-
ception of the possible approach of
misery until it is too late to escape
it and when at length they become
subject to its visitation they are
appalled and sink beneath tts weight.
If informed of or directed to hospitals,
asylums, or other places of relief
ashore ... they are unwilling to approach
them and will submit to such receptacles
only by extreme misery. A sailor, rather
than repair to an hospital on shore will
strip almost the last rag off his back
for the means of obtaining a cure
they will at any time prefer to remain
on board their ships, even approaching
death, rather than consent to being taken
to an hospital on shore, although with
the prospect of returning health.1
The solution was a floating hospital moored in
the Thames, and the newly-formed Seamen's Hospital
Society induced the Admiralty to provide the Grampus
for use as a hospital hulk. The ship was moored at
Greenwich, and received its first ten patients on 25
October 1821. The accommodation soon proved insufficient,
and in 1831 Grampus was replaced by Dreadnought, a
Trafalgar veteran with room for 400 patients. The
finances of the Society were put on a sound footing in
1832 when it received a legacy of £58,000 by the will of
John Lydekker, a Lloyds broker, and its legal entity
was established when it was incorporated in 1833.2
1. Minute Book of the Seamen's Hospital Society, 1821.
Referred to hereafter as MBSHS with volume number
and appropriate date.
2. By 3 Will 4 c 9.
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In the following year, Parliament conferred quasi-
official recognition by granting the Seamen's Hospital
Society 5% of the income received by the Merchant
Seamen's Fund.' The Dreadnought's position in the tide-
way off Greenwich had been carefully chosen so that
sick men could be taken aboard from ships passing up-
river, 2 and her sides were inscribed in large letters:
'Seamen 's Hospital
Supported by Voluntary Contributions
For Seamen of All Nations'
while she had special permission to fly the Jack and
Pendant of a Royal Navy ship. 3 Admission was on the
basis of medical need alone; there was no discrimination
on the ground of nationality or race, and no patient
was discharged unless provision had been made for his
future. Successive secretaries of the Seamen's
Hospital Society were obliged to compile a statistical
record of patients so as to show that these aims were
being observed, and an edited version appears in Appendix
Six and serves as source material for observations on
the ethnic composition of the workforce in this and
1. It amounted to about £450 a year and was authorised
by 4 & 5 Will 4 C 52.
2. A.G. McBride, The History of the Dreadnought Seamens
Hospital at Greenwich (SHS pamphlet, 1970) 9.
3. A privilege granted by Admiralty warrant in 1822.
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later periods. In essence, it can be said that benign
neglect by government was counterbalanced by philan-
thropic endeavour in the matter of hospital care at
Britain's largest port, and it should be noted that
when government associated itself with the Seamen's
Hospital Society in the inid-1830s it cost nothing at
all, for the £450 allocated annually thereafter from
the Merchant Seamen's Fund came from the increased
contributions of seamen themselves.'
In the twentieth-century we have become
accustomed to seeing case-law and union representations
playing an important part in determining conditions at
work, and in the first third of the nineteenth-century
it is possible to discern the early threads of the
process. In general, as late as 1838, the powers of
a ships' master were held to be akin to those of a
despot, 2 while the right to administer corporal punish-
ment to maintain discipline was upheld in Lamb v. Burnett
in l83l.	 However, some limit on arbitrary power over
subordinates must always be desirable, and in Aitken v.
Bedwell in 1827 a master and mate who ill-treated a
sick seamen and hastened his death were convicted of
manslaughter. 4 The bare recital of the facts conceals
1. Seamen's sixpences, deducted from pay since 1696,
became seamen's shillings in 1835, and masters had
to pay two shillings monthly.
2. R. v. Leggett (1838) 8 C & P. 191, 194.
3. Lamb v. Burnett (1831) 1 Cr. & J. 291.
4. Aitken v. Bedwell (1827) 1 Moo. & M. 68.
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rather than reveals the true import of these cases, for
while they may seem to contradict each other a closer
scrutiny removes doubt. In Lamb v. Burnett, a seaman
who interfered when a shipmate was being flogged was
himself beaten, and his suit for assault was dismissed
because discipline had been threatened by reason of his
interference. In the case of Aitken v. Bedwell discipline
was not a strong factor because the sick man could not,
rather than would not, obey and the action of the
officers was mere brutality. Disciplinary requirements
were paramount, but the Courts rejected tyranny. A
different kind of discipline characterised the early
efforts of coal-trade seamen to achieve standard wages,
a 'closed shop' and a strong union in the decade after
Waterloo.
Collier seamen were the only organised group
of seafarers at the close of the Napoleonic wars when
thousands of former naval men swelled the labour market
and wage rates began to fall, and during the 1815
strike they stood out successfully for £5 a voyage and
a manning scale of five men and a boy for every hundred
tons of shipping. 1 The secretary of the Newcastle
Ship-Owners Society testified in 1825 that the Tyne men
had adopted 'sit-in' tactics by boarding their ships in
port and letting go the anchors so that the vessels
1. See Stephen Jones, 'Community and Organisation -
Early Seamen's Trade Unionism on the North East
Coast, 1768-1844' Maritime History III No. 1
April 1973 for the background to the 1815 strike.
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could not be moved. Shipping was held up for six weeks,
and the authorities felt insecure enough to send for
ten warships, 500 marines and four regiments of soldiers
in support of the civil power. 1
 The explanation behind
this early successful exercise in industrial militancy
is that in the north-east coal ports seamen tended to
be a large element of the workforce and their role was
crucial to the local economy. For example, in South
Shields during the nineteenth-century half the labour
force was engaged in coal-handling, a quarter were
seamen, a tenth was engaged in shipbuilding and another
tenth in allied trades. 2 Overt unionism was not
possible, but sheer numbers won the day in 1815. One
witness, a shipowner, told the 1825 Select Committee
on the Combination Laws that the success of the 1815
strike had given the men confidence and a situation
whereby there was no violence but 'a degree of regularity
and quietness about the seamen in all their contests
now which I never saw before'. 3	The 1815 wage demand
had been conceded, and the message for future generations
was that in a close-knit community where seamen were
one of the principal classes of workers and the brevity
of voyages made united action possible, wage concessions
1. Report of the Select Committee on the Combination
Laws, BPP 1825 (437) IV 499. Minutes of Evidence,
166-167. Referred to hereafter as RSCCL 1825.
2. J. Foster, 'Nineteenth-century towns: A Class
Dimension'. Reproduced as chapter eight in the M.W.
Flinn and T.C. Smout (eds.) Essays in Social History
(Oxford, 1974) 187.
3. RSCCL 1825, Minutes of Evidence 90.
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could be obtained from employers with long-standing
contractual obligations. 1
 Other seafarers, notably
those in long-distance trades, were employed atomistically
and tended both to be out of touch with other seamen
and sources of information ashore. They might be at
sea for months, or even years, and were in the same
position as agricultural labourers on isolated farms -
a class of worker notoriously difficult to organise.2
Mass unionisation of these seamen could not take place
until the steam vessel grouped them in large numbers
and permitted sufficient time ashore between voyages
for making contact with union officials, comparing wages
and conditions, discussing grievances and planning
campaigns.	 Factory	 building was to be an essential
element in forming unions ashore: the large steamship
was its floating equivalent.
The repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824
meant that the existing informal unions could have an
open and legal entity, and the principal organisation
1. Numbers were crucial to the success or failure of
strikes in this period. The strike of Post Office
packet crews at Falmouth in 1810-11 was easily broken
by the authorities who arrested two delegates sent to
London and took the packet ships to Plymouth. The
hundreds of ships and thousands of crewmen involved
in the 1815 dispute made that type of solution imprac-
tical. See A.H. Norway, The Post Office Packet Service
(1895) 206-221, for the background to this strike,
which arose chiefly through attempts to check private
trading by seamen.
2. '... they cannot combine to raise wages because they
are scattered, and if one alone refuses to work for
low wages there are dozens out of work, or supported
by the rates, who are thankful for the most trifling
offer'. Frederick Engels, The Condition of the Working
Class in England (1974 edition) 290.
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that emerged at the north-east ports was the Seamen's
Loyal Standard Association. The Tyne and Wear branch
members paid an initial subscription of l/2d, an annual
subscription of 1/- a year and id apiece whenever there
was a claim. Widows of drowned seamen got a grant of
£5, as did shipwrecked men who had lost all their
clothes and effects. The Sunderland branch had more
generous benefits, for after paying an initial sub-
scription of 1/3d and the annual fee of 1/- members
contributed 3d a man to provide £10 for widows or members
losing their possessions by shipwreck. The Seamen's
Loyal Standard Association was nominally a friendly
society operating on orthodox lines, but there is evi-
dence that it also enforced a 'closed shop' and advocated
work-sharing. Some examples follow, all taken from the
1825 Select Committee Report. The majority of the crew
of the Friendship refused to sign articles when two
non-union men from Hull came aboard, and the matter was
only resolved when they joined the union, while the son
of the owner of the Emerald had to join the union when
he sailed as mate in his father's ship. The union
instructed men not to heave ballast, trim cargo, rig
the ship or clean her bottom without extra pay, and
circulated a pamphlet saying that ballast-heaving at sea
was not only dangerous but took away the living of other
workpeople, while trimming the cargo in port meant that
the lighterman's livelihood was at risk. In short, the
Seamen's Loyal Standard Association behaved very much
as unions do in the twentieth-century, and the owners'
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complaints also have a modern ring to them. They speak
of wages being paid 'under intimidation of the union
society', of being 'apprehensive that they (the unions)
will increase in their demands every year' and that 'in
consequence of the union of seamen we are not the
directors or managers of our own property in any
respect'. 1
 The principal difference between then and
now was that there was no open collective bargaining,
for in these close-knit communities the men were always
aware of current union-recommended wage rates.2
Officials of the unions regularly gave evidence to
committees of enquiry set up by central government,3
and towards the end of the century a national union
emerged from one of these local unions on the north-east
coast.
Sustained public and Board of Trade interest
in the lot of merchant seamen can be dated from 1832
when The Nautical Magazine began to reproduce data on
the number and frequency of shipwrecks. This publication
was not presenting new information but information in a
new form, for the distinctive feature was that the
1. RSCCL 1825 529-530, 547-548 and Minutes of Evidence
8 7-114.
2. A shipowner testified in 1825: 'It is not known with
whom these demands originate, there is the mystery;
but the demand is general on the part of seamen'.
RSCCL 1825, Minutes of Evidence 88.
3. Several gave evidence in 1825: Henry Woodruffe,
secretary of the South Shields branch, was a
particularly effective witness in 1836 when he
appeared before the Select Committee on Shipwrecks.
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wreck list that appeared monthly between March and
December 1832 gave a consecutive number to each loss.
When the December issue showed that 404 British ships
had been lost in ten months it became apparent to the
reading public that losses were disproportionately
heavy - particularly as The Nautical Magazine followed
the practice of printing the table of wrecks adjacent
to a table of new constructions, and the latter was
always smaller than the former. An article in the
Edinburgh Review gave further publicity to the problem,'
and when marine losses showed no sign of falling there
was a call for a Select Committee enquiry on the subject.
Fifteen members were appointed, and they included James
Silk Buckingham, the reform Member for Sheffield, and
Aaron Chapman and George Frederick Young representing
the interests of shipowners.
The evidence given before the Committee was,
to say the least, sensational, and the ensuing report
extremely comprehensive. 2 Henry Woodruffe, secretary
of the South Shields branch of the Seamen's Loyal Stan-
dard Association, said that one in four of all Tyne
colliers had been lost in the preceding four years, and
he blamed poor construction, overloading, the ineptitude
of the numerous part-owners of vessels and the inexperience
1. 'On the Frequency of Shipwrecks' Edinburgh Review
LX, 1834-35, 339-340.
2. Report of the Select Committee on Shipwrecks, BPP
l836 (567) XVII 373. Referred to hereafter as
RSCS 1836.
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of some masters for these losses. He cited the case
of a butcher's assistant sent as master of an Archangel-
bound ship, and the case of the Nathaniel Graham which
was so poorly constructed that her cargo had to be
jettisoned on the maiden voyage. This ship could not
be caulked, and it later foundered with the loss of
forty-one lives. 1
 George Coleman, a teacher of navi-
gation, gave evidence that the 279-ton ship Headleys
on the Belfast-Quebec run had been commanded by a
fourteen-year old boy, while another witness testified
that a warehouse porter had been selected by owners
to conuuand a sea-going ship. 2
 A naval officer, Captain
Edward Brenton, quoted an instance of a ship's master
who asked for a man to be sent aboard to take an
observation of the sun, there being no competent navi-
gator in the crew. Captain Brenton asked why this was
so, and received the brusque reply 'you can have no
profit if you do not run risks'. 3
 The Select Committee's
principal conclusion was that although the number of
person drowned at sea was about the same in 1833-35 as
in 1816-18, the number of shipwrecks in which all hands
had been drowned had risen from forty-nine to eighty-one.
Marine disasters, it seemed, were more complete in the
1830s, and the cost to the nation was estimated to be
1,000 lives and £3m a year.4
1. RSCS 1836 408 and 411.
2. RSCS 1836 431 and 395.
3. RSCS 1836 592.
4. RSCS 1836 376.
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Ten reasons were given in the Report of this
Committee for the excessive number of shipwrecks.
Only two of them related directly to crew conduct -
the incompetence of masters and mates and the drunken
habits of officers and men 1 - but when it cane to
remedies the majority were directed towards the
'improvement' of the calibre of seamen, their moral
character, education, technical competence, sobriety
and discipline. The Report had wandered away from the
problem of shipwrecks, and Peter Parkhurst's (1962)
interpretation of the evidence was that there were four
principal causes of shipwreck, which wer•e:
(1) Defective construction.
(2) Inadequate equipment.
(3) Imperfect state of repair.
(4) Improper and excessive loading.2
1. Captain Edward Brenton thought that 95% of all
punishments awarded at sea arose from drunkenness,
and believed that a third of all merchant ship
crews were 'disabled' by drink. The dockinaster
at Liverpool had formed the opinion that nine-
tenths of all shipping losses were due directly
or indirectly to intemperance while John Pym,
a shipping agent, testified that many seamen were
brought to their ships in carts on sailing day,
being too drunk to walk. Frequently, so many out-
ward-bound seamen were paralytic through drink
that it was a common practice for a scratch
crew of riggers to take a ship out and anchor
her while the crew sobered up. RSCS 1836 595,
588 and 603.
2. P.C. Parkhurst, Ships of Peace (New Maiden,
1962) 133.
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Parkhurst seems to have missed the fifth cause -
deficiencies in the system of marine insurance - and
the Committee members also brushed it aside. The case
against the insurance of unsurveyed ships had been put
convincingly by James Ballingall, a surveyor, to the
Select Coumiittee, and in 1837 he made his points again
in a contribution printed in The Nautical Magazine.'
They were three in number, First, that although 100,000
tons of shipping had been lost in the last quarter of
1833 neither the underwriters nor the owners were out
of pocket because the loss was passed on to the public.
Second, that in many cases merchant ships were built so
that they might speedily be lost and provide a quick
profit. Third, that abuse of the marine insurance
classification system accounted for three-quarters of
all shipwrecks. The Committee appears to have taken the
view that ships could not be refurbished as easily, and
as cheaply, as men, and in the two decades following
the 1836 Report most of the recommendations involving
the workforce were put into effect. 2 Savings banks for
the thrifty, the formation of a Marine Department at the
Board of Trade, the certification of ships' officers and
a tighter code of discipline all sprang from the 1836
Select Committee on Shipwrecks, although the early
reformers found many obstacles in their way when they
1. James Ballingall, 'Report of the Committee on Ship-
wrecks' The Nautical Magazine, May 1837, No. 5, 313-315.
2. The notable exceptions were the compulsory uniforming
of merchant service officers, a universal law of the
sea and prohibition.
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sought to implement the reconunendations.
Buckingham submitted a Bill in 1837 to this
end, but soon came to realise that he faced fierce
opposition from both Poulett Thomson, President of the
Board of Trade, 1
 and the shipowners. Thomson did not
oppose the Bill at its first reading, but said obliquely
that it dealt with matters not susceptible to the legal
process. Aaron Chapman and George Frederick Young
objected to intervention by government in general,
with Chapman deprecating the 'personal attachment of
Honourable Members to Quixotic views' - a barbed reference
to Backinghani's impassioned approach to the subject.2
While the Bill was before the House the shipowners held
their annual general meeting where Young spoke at great
length to the effect that 'compulsory regulations
would be subversive •,. to the best interests of maritime
commerce'. 3
 At its second reading on 7 June 1837 Bucking-
ham's Bill was defeated by 150 votes after Poulett Thomson
had spoken in support of the shipowning interest.4
1. Charles Edward Poulett Thomson, (1799-1841), was MP
for Dover and then Manchester from 1826-39. A
passionate free-trader, and described in his DNB
entry as both complacent and vain, he was bri1Ty
Governor-General of Canada immediately prior to his
death. Poulett Thomson is best remembered for
establishing a statistical department at the Board
of Trade in 1832.
2. 1-lansard 3 38 164-191.
3. The Times, 22 March 1837.
4. Hansard 3 38 1222-1227. This episode gives support for
a contrary view to that of Lucy Brown, who believed
that the shipowners were quiescent between 1835 and
1844. See her The Board of Trade and the Free Trade
Movement (1958) 176.
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Reform, when it came, was compelled by events which had
the effect of shocking the early Victorians into an
acceptance of government intervention in the interests
of safety at sea, rather than in consequence of measured
argument and leisurely debate.
This chapter has developed the theme that in
the first third of the nineteenth-century the attitude
of government towards the merchant service and its work-
force was one of benign neglect. Some of the factors
creating this attitude were exogenous - a general
recession and a surplus of tonnage worldwide - and some
reflected the prevailing view of the relationship between
master and man. The administration's interest in the
lot of merchant seamen was at a low level because of
split departmental responsibility and Parliamentary
quiescence. On the surface, the Navigation Acts with
their characteristically inercantilist flavour dominated
the world of shipping, but the creed of free trade - a
dogma with much appeal for the dominant class of the
first industrial nation - was in the ascendant. Where
there were exceptions to the non-interventionist spirit
of the times these exceptions have the character of
special cases rather than significant departures from
a trend. The protection given to lascars was a forced
response, and although the 1836 Select Committee on
Shipwrecks was a triumph for public opinion it was not
possible to convert the good intentions it engendered
into action. The law was strictly keyed to enforcing
discipline, and unions could have only limited success
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in special circumstances. The one important exclusion
from this theme of benign neglect is the vigorous
response of philanthropists to need, but that response
owed nothing whatever to government.
75
CHAPTER THREE
SIGNS OF CHANGE, 1838 to 1851
The early years of Victoria's reign are
commonly thought of, in G.N. Young's tart (1934) phrase,
as an Age of Acquiescence where 'it seenis as if all
speculation had ceased; that there is an answer to
every question, and usually the answer is no', 1 but
the glib assurance implicit in the comment obscures the
reality that this was a newly-literate society with
strong emotions deriving from revived religiosity; that
it was peculiarly susceptible to shock information, 2 and
that it was capable of reacting vigorously given the
right stimulus. In the last chapter it was shown that
the 1836 Report of the Select Committee on Shipwrecks
did not give rise to legislation immediately: in this
chapter the point that first requires emphasis is that
the instant reaction of Parliament and public to the
recommendations made in the Report of the Select Committee
on Shipwrecks of Timber Ships in 1839 has a one-word
explanation - cannibalism.. That a thousand men should
drown was not particularly remarkable, but that one
of God's creations should be so reduced by hunger as to
1. G.M. Young, Victorian England; Portrait of An Age
(Oxford, 1934) 17.
2. As, for example, presented to the reading public in
the works of Charles Dickens.
3. BPP 1839 (333) IX 223. Referred to hereafter as
RSCSTS 1839.
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eat another stirred the early Victorians to swift action.
The background information that led to both the 1836
Select Committee on Shipwrecks and the 1839 Select
ComnLittee on Shipwrecks of Timber Ships was of the same
type: the results were markedly different.
Alexander Becher, the energetic editor of The
Nautical Megazine, had continued to give publicity to
losses at sea in the late 1830s, and in 1838 published
an account of the wreck of the timber ship Caledonia the
previous year. Ships in the North and Central American
timber trade tended to sail in waters not used by other
vessels, 1 and one result was that if they became water-
logged so that the crew had to take shelter in the rigging
it might be weeks or months before help came, and much
suffering ensued. Becher gave the story of cannibalism
in the Caledonia restrained treatment, but the eye-
witness account of the wreck of the Whitby ship Earl of
Moira2 printed in the Commercial Gazette for January 1839,
and later reproduced in the 1839 Report, 3 was most
explicit. The relevant extract reads:
I am sorry to have to report a most
melancholy spectacle I witnessed on
board the Earl Moira of Whitby, timber
laden; we fell in with this vessel in
lat. 45 deg. north, and longitude 21
deg. 54 mins west on the 19th of this
month, water-logged and with only one
mast standing; although there was a
considerable sea at the time, we managed
to get a boat alongside of her, and on
1. For example: from Nova Scotian ports such ships would be
north of the usual Atlantic trade routes, while those from
Belize with mahogany would be to the southward.
2. In some accounts the name of the vessel is given as the
Earl of Murray.
3. RSCSTS 1839 293.
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going on board of her, found four men
quite dead in a sail which they had hung
up under the main-top to shelter themselves
from the weather, Besides these, there
was part of another cut up in pieces, and
hung up just like meat in a butcher's stall.
No doubt these poor fellows must have under-
gone the extremity of hunger before they
were reduced to a necessity so revolting
as to devour a fellow creature
The story was later confirmed by the master of
the Sarah who told George Charles Smith, the secretary
of the British and Foreign Seamen and Soldier's Friend
Society, that he had sighted the Earl of Moira on the
30 November 1838 when
there were eight persons alive in the
maintop; but the most horrible sight was
one swinging and hung by the neck evidently
as food for the rest. He had black
whiskers, and his intestines had been taken
out, and a piece of the shoulder was cut
off.1
The crew of the Sarah had been unable to get alongside
to rescue these survivors, and two of the eight had
been drowned before their horrified gaze as they tried
to swim to safety.
A Select Committee was appointed on 9 April
1839 and it recommended on 18 June 1839 that deck-loads
should be forbidden on vessels in the North Atlantic
timber trade and that all merchant ships should be
surveyed. The evidence regarding crew conditions and
the state of vessels employed was such that this type of
recommendation could hardly have been avoided. Charles
Walton, a shipowner, testified that a tier of timber
1. RSCSTS 1839 Q.976.
2. Hansard 3 46 1302-1303.
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was actually loaded into fo'c's'les in some vessels
so that the crew had to sleep on wet wood, and Captain
William Davis confirmed that this was the case in
telling the Committee - 'Sailors do not like to go on a
timber voyage if they can get a Mediterranean voyage on
account of the wood coming into the bows of ship where
the men lodge and their lying on wet timber'. 1
 Seamen
had only four feet of headroom in the fo'c's'les of
many timber carriers: they could not sling their
hammocks, and to save space the ships' stores were often
crammed into the fo'c's'le as well as spare rope and
ships' gear. Deckloads reached to the top of the bul-
warks so that men moving about had to hold onto ropes,
or spars jammed into the cargo, to keep a foothold.
Seamen in the trade received an extra fifteen shillings
a month because of 'hardship and suffering', and the
casualty rate for vessel 's clearing loaded with timber
from North American ports was 4% per voyage in 1836, 3%
in 1837 and 6% in 1838.2 The reasons for the high rate
were that, as one shipowner admitted, 'the ships that
go in the timber trade are worn out in other trades',3
1.	 RSCSTS 1839 Q.614 and QQ.756-758. This is a
reference to bow ports which opened to receive
timber cargo, and which were often inadequately
caulked.
2.	 RSCSTS 1839 QQ.818-819, 534, 562 and iv. An
examination of the Lloyds' List statistics for
the period shows that the timber ship casualty
rate was more than double that for all British
merchant vessels.
3.	 Evidence of Joseph Soines. RSCSTS 1839 Q.892.
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and that they were under-ballasted, overloaded, held
together with chains and cranky at sea because of
excessive deckloads. Many were old East and West
Indianien long past their prime, and when deck cargoes
were lashed down to ringbolts and made fast by ropes
secured through the washports any heavy sea had the
effect of lifting the planking and straining the bulwarks
so that these vessels tended to leak inordinately in all
weathers. From the economic point of view, a deckload
was always a gamble on a North Atlantic passage; if it
could be brought home there was up to 10% additional
profit, if it had to be jettisoned to save the ship in
a gale of wind the whole enterprise could fail.1
A Bill was brought in shortly after the publica-
tion of the 1839 Report, and the Timber Ships British
North American Act 2 was passed on 17 August 1839 - just
eighteen weeks after the matter had been first raised
in the House. The matter of compulsory and universal
survey had been quietly dropped, as had a total ban on
deckloads, and the Act was wholly concerned to prohibit
the carrying of deckloads across the North Atlantic
in the months of winter. During the next year a similar
prohibition was made in respect of timber cargoes from
Central America, 3 and these minor pieces of legislation
represent the first safety laws put into effect to
1. RSCSTS 1839. Notably QQ.890-941 and Q.535,
2. 2 & 3 Vic C 44.
3. 3 & 4 Vic c 36.
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protect British seamen. Comprehensive reform was not
politically acceptable in the late 1830s, but early
in the next decade a shift of informed opinion can be
detected, for which credit must go to Robert Fitzroy
who was particularly concerned about the professional
expertise of deck officers.' In 1842 Fitzroy led a
deputation of Members of Parliament to meet the Earl
of Ripon, then President of the Board of Trade, to urge
the certification of ships' officers - as recommended
in the 1836 Report of the Select Committee on Shipwrecks
- but was told that further evidence would be required
before any measure could be considered. 2 Nothing daunted,
he introduced a Bill on 28 July 1842 outlining a system
of examinations for merchant ship officers, but this
time William Ewart Gladstone, the Vice-President of the
Board of Trade, 3 said that the shipowners were divided
on the issue and the Bill was merely printed and cir-
culated as a discussion document. 4 On 24 February 1843
Fitzroy tabled a question in the House as to whether any
legislation was pending on certification, and Gladstone
replied that the Select Committee on Shipwrecks, set up
1. Vice-Admiral Robert Fitzroy, (1805-65), had commanded
the Beagle during Darwin's expeditions and was MP for
Durham from 1841. According to his DNB entry, he was
arrogant, dictatorial and had an excTible temperament.
2. The Times, 14 March 1842.
3. William Ewart Gladstone, (1809-1898), the well-known
statesman, was a Tory at this time, but is best
remembered as an outstanding Liberal Prime Minister.
4. Hansard 3 65 764-767.
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eight days earlier, would be in a position to consider
the inatter) Fitzroy was not satisfied with this
answer and determined to obtain data to back his call
for compulsory certification. He induced a friend,
James Murray, who was a Foreign Office official, to put
out a circular letter to British consuls abroad seeking
their opinion of British shipinasters.
This circular letter 2 was couched in terms
calculated to produce the desired result, for part of
it read -
I am particularly desirous of gaining
information in regard to instances
which have come under your observation
of the incompetency of British ship-
masters ... My object is to show the
necessity for authoritative steps
The officials responded predictab1y. Consul Crowe at
Hainmerfest thought that British merchant captains were
'the most ignorant, illiterate and brutal set to be met
with', while his colleague at Danzig reported that
'Only recently a master left his vessel, which was loaded
with a valuable cargo and ready for sea, and was, after
several day's search, found in a brothel.'' The Consul
in the Azores supplied a table that attempted to show
that visiting shipmasters could be classified under
four headings ranging from 'of sober habits and
acquainted with the mode of ascertaining longitude'
down to 'of intemperate habits and not acquainted with
1. Hansard 3 66 1277.
2. Papers relating to the Commercial Marine of Great
Britain, B?? 1 g 47-48 (913) LIX 141. Referred to
hereafter as Murray's Circular 1843.
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the mode of ascertaining longitude', but the value of
his contribution was diminished by the revelation that
the sober navigators had lost four ships in the past
four years while the drunken incompetents had suffered
no losses,' Consul Hunt's table proved only that
smaller vessels tended to be commanded by drunken
incompetents. The representative at Genoa said that
it was quite common for a visiting captain to 'take up
his abode in a tavern', 2
 but agreed with his colleague
in the Cape Verde Islands that as a general rule a
sober master made for a sober crew. Consul Scott at
Bordeaux reported that the master of a Yarmouth schooner
had been jailed for robbing a woman of the town, while
his opposite number in Rio de Janeiro cited the case
of a master who drank himself to death in the space of
four months. 3
 The whole mass of material was sent by
Murray to Charles Canning, the Foreign Secretary, with
a covering letter dated 1 January 1844 urging the
creation of a single regulating board for the merchant
service with the duty of examining officers as to their
competence.
Murray's papers circulated among members of
1. Murray's Circular 1843, 17, 30 and 79.
2. Murray's Circular 1843, 79-81. Frank Bullen quotes
a case where the master of a ship in the colonial
trade not only spent all his time in port lodging
in a public house, but also tried to bilk the land-
lady and was forced to pay up by a bailiff. Frank
T. Bullen, The Log of a Sea-Waif (1910) 274-275.
3. Murray's Circular 1843, 79-81 and 128.
4. Murray's Circular 1843, iii.
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the government, and although the Admiralty found the
consul's reports over-pessimistic 1 Gladstone had to
bow to pressure from Fitzroy's lobby in March 1844
when he agreed to look into the question of legislation.2
When another friend of Fitzroy's, Lord Ingestre, asked
in the House of Lords on 9 August 1844 if it was
intended to introduce a measure for the examination of
masters and mates of merchant vessels, the reply was
that the Admiralty intended to set up an examination
board 'inunediately'. 3 Meanwhile, the Board of Trade
was examining the evidence given in the 1843 First
4Report from the Select Committee on Shipwrecks, which
contained arguments for both voluntary and compulsory
examinations and certification. The key witnesses
were Alexander Becher of The Nautical Magazine and
Captain John Washington, commander of a survey vessel.
Becher proposed voluntary graded examinations for the
various positions of responsibility in merchant ships
to be conducted by experienced shipmasters based at
the leading seaports. Captain Washington was asked
'have you any suggestion to offer for the prevention of
shipwrecks?' and produced the shortest and most succinct
1. Admiralty letter to the Board of Trade dated 20
February 1844 and quoted by Peter Parkhurst in
Ships of Peace 149-150.
2. The Times, 28 March 1844.
3. Hansard 3 76 1996.
4. First Report from the Select Committee on Shipwrecks.
BPP 1843 (549)IX 1. Referred to hereafter as
FRSCS 1843.
Return of Masters and Mates
examination and obtainin g C
2.
cation,
84
reply in the form of - 'To make masters and mates pass
an examination'. The Select Committee recommended
local, voluntary tests of competence, and an Order in
Council instituted a system of voluntary examinations
conducted by local boards in August 1845.1
It soon transpired that the voluntary
examination system was a failure. A mere handful of
deck officers sat these examinations in 1846 and 18472
and the Board of Trade asked the Foreign Office to
conduct a second p011 of consular officials on the
lines of Murray's Circular of 1843.	 The consuls
reported that the situation was little changed, 3 and at
this juncture the Fitzroy faction acquired an unexpected
ally. Henry Labouchre, 4 who became President of the
1. FRSCS 1843 Q.150 and iv.. PRO BT/1 473. Patrick Col-
quhoun, the founder of the Thames police force, had
been advocating tests for competency at the beginning
of the century. See his A Treatise on the Commerce
and Police of the River Thames (1800) 164. The East
India Company had examinations for officers, as did
the Royal Mail Line. Sunderland was one of the north-
east ports that conducted local, and informal, tests
of competence before seafarers were advanced to a
higher rank - see FRSCS 1843 43 and 121. Voluntary
examinations were no novelty, and there was no opposi-
tion to the scheme. It was to be a different story
when examination became mandatory and the jobs of
the unqualified were at risk.
Only three of the sixty-five consuls contacted saw any
signs of improvement. Their replies are contained in
the same volume as the replies to Murray's Circular
1843 - BPP 1847-48 LIX.
4. Henry Labouchre, (1798-1869), MP for Taunton, was a
landowner of Huguenot descent who is chiefly remembered
for bringing about the repeal of the Navigation Acts
in 1849.
3.
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Board of Trade for the second time in July 1847, was a
late convert to the doctrine of intervention, having
come to appreciate that reform of the merchant service
was a necessary adjunct to maintaining the nation's
competitive edge in a developing free trade situation.
At his instigation, the Permanent Secretary of the
department drew up a memorandum recommending, among
other things, that no ship of 250 tons and upwards
should be granted clearance unless it had certificated
officers on board.' This recommendation was embodied
in the 1850 Act, 2
 with s.7 establishing Local Marine
Boards with the duty of examining masters and mates and
issuing certificates of competency. The link between
deckload legislation and the certification of ships'
officers may, at first, appear to be tenuous, but the
recommendations of the First Report from the Select
Committee on Shipwrecks in 1843 had centred on these two
issues. The Report had concluded that the 1839 and 1840
legislation on deckloads in timber ships had saved
about 200 lives, and it suggested an extension of the
1. Peter Parkhurst's (1962) interpretation was that this
memorandum was a Trevelatjont to Labouchére, but the
internal evidence is that the latter instigated the
document, Free trade demanded discipline from its
participants, and Labouchre himself had 'no abstract
reverence for a system of centralization' but wished
to 'elevate the position and raise the character of
sailors'. Peter Parkhurst, Ships of Peace 154-166:
Hansard 3 112 111 (20 June 1850), and Hansard 3 108
676 (11 February 1850).
2. 13 & 14 Vic c 93. The measure is commonly referred
to as the M&Fcantile Marine Act, 1850.
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ban on cargoes of this type together with the certifica-
tion of masters and mates to save many more. 1
 G.M.
Young's Age of Acquiescence was over, and had given way
to an era of enlightened self-interest where a future
Prime Minister with landed interests could declare that
commerce was the emancipator of the age. 2
 Humanitarian
and practical considerations had come together, but
the irony is that Robert Fitzroy, who had begun the
agitation for certification, had the mortification of
seeing his ideas implemented by others and his material
used by Labouchre to persuade the shipowners to accept
the repeal of the Navigation Laws.3
At this point in the study it is necessary to
pause and acknowledge that while the groundswell of
informed opinion was reformist in character the reformers
did not have it all their own way. Successes in areas
such as certification and deckloads must be balanced by
losses and retreats in other spheres, and the mutability
of the decision-makers may best be demonstrated by
looking in detail at the Act of 1844 and seeing what
happened to the Merchant Seamen's Fund. It will be
1. FRSCS 1843 iii.
2. Hansard 3 75 170. 3 June 1844. The speaker was
Lord John Russell, (1792-1878), a Whig politician
whose handling of the Irish famine, the unrest of
1848 and the Crimean War brought him little approval
from contemporaries and historians. His father was
the Duke of Bedford.
3. Labouchre's publication of the consular material
of 1843 and 1847 was to this end. See Hansard 3
96 671-672. 15 February 1848.
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recalled that welfare provision for old, sick or disabled
sailors was, in general, achieved through the medium of
payments from the Merchant Seamen's Fund. Founded in
1747,1 the Fund was 'beset by financial and adininistra-
tive difficulties' in the early decades of the nine-
teenth-century 'and as the seagoing force grew larger
it became increasingly unable to cope with the demands
made upon it'. 2 The workforce grew by about a third
between 1836 and l846, and although seamen were paying
a shilling a month into the Fund after 1835 instead of
the traditional sixpence it became actuarially unsound
for three main reasons. The Act of l834 made Scots
and Irish seamen eligible for pensions, and granted
awards to widows so that by 1843 seamen's widows com-
prised over half of the pension list. 5 Money was col-
lected centrally, but disbursed locally, so that the
greatest demand, and the smallest pension payments, were
at the north-east ports where ageing seamen and young
boys manned the coal fleet. Third, the Fund's greatest
1. By 20 Geo 2 c 38.
2. Jon Press, 'The Collapse of a Contributory Pension
Scheme: The Merchant Seamen's Fund, 1747-1851'.
The Journal of Transport History (New Series) V, No.
2 (September 1979) 94.
3. Appendix Three shows that the (corrected) rise in
the workforce between 18Z6 and 1846 is of the order
of 32%, from some 121,000 in the former year to
almost 160,000 in the latter.
4. 4 & 5 Will 4 c 52.
5. Report of the Select Committee on the Merchant Seamen's
Fund, BPP 1844 (431) VIII 437-440. Referred to
hereafter as RSCMSF 1844.
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deficiency was that it was unable to provide pensions
sufficient to maintain even the most modest standards
in old age. Evidence given to the 1840 Select Committee
on the Merchant Seamen's Fund had made this last point
clear. The secretary of the Seamen's Loyal Standard
Association at South Shields thought that £20 a year
was the least sum on which a retired seamen could
subsist, while William Watson, the secretary of the
Merchant Seamen's Fund, testified that the London level
of pensions was of the order of £10 a year for a retired
master, between £4 and £7 for disabled seamen and £2-lOs
to £4 for widows. 1
 In the outports pensions were less
generous. Dartmouth seamen got £1-lOs a year, and the
highest recorded amount was £13 a year. 2
 The coasting
ports, particularly those in the north-east, had a pay-
ment level of around 3/- a month, and although the
Select Committee condemned unequal payments it did not
recommend corrective legislation and the Board of Trade
did not initiate any.3
On 5 February 1844 Gladstone, by now the
President of the Board of Trade in Peel's administration,
launched a further enquiry into the state of the Fund.
He said in the House of Commons that seamen were at one
1. Report from the Select Committee on the Merchant Sea-
men's Fund, BPP 1840 (617) XIII Q.855 and QQ.l2-20.
Referred to hereafter as RSCMSF 1840.
2. RSCMSF 1840 Q792 and ix.
3. RSCMSF 1840 xi. In the 1844 debate, Labouchére was
to claim that he had wanted legislation in 1840, and
he urged the Peel government to take up its respons-
ibilities. Like many politicians before and since,
Labouchere had a conveniently short memory.
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and the same time a class which had strong claims on
the sympathy of Parliament but were least in the habit
of approaching it with an expression of opinion. 1 He
indicated that the basic financial structure and
administration of the Fund was deficient, and much of
the evidence to the 1844 Select Committee tended to
confirm that judgement. Contributors were said to be
'in no better position than paupers who have not con-
tributed to any fund', and James Fildes, a former mate
and secretary of the Shipmaster's and Seamen's Guardian
Society at Glasgow, made the significant observation
that from the sailors' point of view there was little
check on the proper use of the money collected and
disbursed. This early advocate of workers' control
alleged that evasion was widespread, cited a case of
fraud where a master had made deductions from his crew's
wages for four years and pocketed the proceeds, and
urged that the Fund be managed by contributing members
- as with friendly societies such as the Druids and
Oddfellows - rather than by committees consisting largely
of shipowners and merchants. 2 Some simple calculations
an b made to estimate the parameters of evasion and
1. Hansard 3 72 257-260.
2. RSCMSF 1844 Q.375 and QQ.1702-1844. The John and
Mary fraud to which he made reference is one of the
few cases on record, but it will be shown that,
despite the claim of Ralph Davis in his (1956)
article on 'Seamen's Sixpences' published in
Economica that 'It is difficult to see why evasion
should have been widespread', evasion was indeed
quite extensive.
90
fraud. In 1838 the Fund received £47,285,1 and as it
is known from other sources that at this period a
seaman could only rely, at best, on getting nine
months of work a year 2 the maximum size of the work-
force should be of the order of 105,000 men. In fact,
the (adjusted) figure for 1838 is around 125,000 men,
and by those criteria the extent of fraud and evasion
may be put at about 16%. In 1844 the government
actuary said that the average contribution made by mer-
chant seamen was five shillings a man a year, 3
 and as
he was employing the Board of Trade's figure of 175,691
men to obtain this mean it can be said that the Fund was
producing just under £44,000 in that year. The (adjusted)
workforce total for 1844 in Appendix Three is just under
150,000 men, and with 98,000 full contributions received
the maximum shortfall is about a third. The best
estimate, therefore, of fraud and evasion in relation
to Merchant Seamen's Fund contributions is that perhaps
one in four payments was either not made or not trans-
1. RSCMSF 1840 Q.317.
2. William Watson, secretary of the Merchant Seamen's
Fund, had said so in 1840 - RSCMSF 1840 Q.237 - and
the actuary who drew up a report in 1850 that led
to the winding-up of the Fund was also emphatic on
the point. 'This contribution, from the nature of
the service, is in practice payable but for nine
months of the year, the sailor, on an average, being
employed for no longer period of the twelvemonth'.
Report from A.G. Finlayson to the Right Honourable
Henry Labouchre on the Merchant Seamen's Fund, BPP
1850 (178) LIII 367. Referred to subsequently as
Finlayson's Report 1850.
3. RSCMSF 1844 Q.473.
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nutted to the Fund's officials.
The Report cf the 1844 committee was more
forthright than that of 1840. It was suggested that
two types of pension be paid in futvre - one of about
£4 a year for men able to work ashore although disabled
for sea service, and one of about £12 a year for men
over sixty-three years of age and unable to work at
all. It was acknowledged that a shilling a month
provided an inadequate basis for a pension scheme, and
the remedies suggested were to tighten up accounting
procedures and make apprentices pay sixpence a month.1
Legislation was recommended. However, by the time the
Royal Commission of 1847/48 had finished its work the
whole attitude of government towards the scheme had
changed. It was now generally agreed that the 1erchant
Seamen's Fund was inequitable, inefficient and under-
financed, and that bankruptcy could not be staved off
for long. As an interim measure, an annual payment of
a shilling per registered ton by shipowners to Trinity
House was proposed so that the Fund could be kept going
for the five years considered necessary to wind it up.2
1. This would have raised just under £5,000 in 1845 if it
is assumed that all apprentices contributed for twelve
months of the year - see Appendix Five. That sum
could not have saved the Fund from insolvency.
2. Report of the Royal Commission on the Merchant Seamen's
iind. BPP 1847-48 (931) XXVIII vii. Referred to hereafter
as RRCMSF 1847-48. Peter Parkhurst believed that the
Fund had been almost totally supported by shipowners
since the 1830s and the change to ownership by limited
companies ruined the scheme, but he does not back his
contention with evidence, and the (1979) view of Jona-
than Press that the Fund failed because the number of
seamen - and contributions - went up by about a third
between 1833 and 1843 while the number of claimants in-
creased by 121% seems more credible. See Parkhurst's
Ships of Peace 130 and the Press article 'Collapse of
a Contributory Pension Scheme' 94-95.
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The alternative after the Fund was wound up was, in
the best Samuel Smiles tradition, that seamen should
become contributors to a friendly society - the United
Seamen's, 1idows and Orphans Benefit Society, but it
transpired that while a few seamen - mainly masters -
joined the Society some 95% did not, and a welfare
gap was created that was not wholly bridged until 1911
when s,48 of the National Insurance Act established an
insurance and pension scheme for all seafarers. The
demise of the Merchant Seamen's Fund was inevitable
because it was a scheme with an employee contribution
of merely 2-3% of gross income, and when the government
actuary reported in 1850 on the Fund he emphasised
the point strongly. 1 The Finance Department of the Board
of Trade took over the administration of pensions being
paid to existing beneficiaries, 2 and the Seamen's Fund
Winding-Up Act of l85l formally ended this early
pension scheme that had been in existence for just over
a century.
While the Merchant Seamen's Fund was dying a
lingering death, the Peel administration was piloting
1. Finlayson's Report 1850 4-6. Alexander Glen Finlayson
(or Finlaison) was employed by both H.M. Customs and
the National Debt Office at the time.
2. The Board of Trade managed the Fund with some skill.
In 1863/64, for example, they had managed to peg
the rates at £6-16s a year for a retired master and
£l-2s for orphaned children. Papers Relating to the
Merchant Seamen's Fund, BPP 1965 (271) L 270.
3. 14 & 15 Vic C 102.
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through a measure that may fairly be described as the
last of the Acts effecting the sailors' lot based on
eighteenth-century concepts. The 1850 Act was a
pragmatic recognition that 'the regeneration of our
mercantile navy had become absolutely necessary': 1 the
1844 Act 'to amend and consolidate the laws relating
to Merchant Seamen; and for keeping a Register of
Seamen' 2 was the last in a series with the primary
intention of ensuring that merchant seamen could be
called on readily for naval service in times of war.
It was the Admiralty's last major legal intervention,
for in 1853 it introduced continuous service with the
result that merchant ship crews were no longer regarded
as the fleet's chief recruiting ground. By s.20 of
the 1844 Act all seamen had to hold register tickets,
and the issue of discharge certificates was made manda-
tory so as provide a check on the authenticity of
register tickets. 3 There was a switch of responsibility
to the Admiralty in the field of welfare, with that body
given the duty of devising a scale of medicines to be
carried in merchant ships, of relieving lascars in
distress and paying the running costs of the General
Register Office of Seamen set up by Graham's Act of 1835.
1. Hansard 3 108 678. From W.S. Lindsay's speech on 11
February 1850 during the debate on the 1850 Bill.
2. 8 Vic c 112.
3. The first sentence of the model discharge certificate
reproduced in Schedule E of the Act had a space for
the insertion of the register ticket number.
4. Sections 18, 64 and 19 respectively of the 1844 Act.
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The old device of compulsory apprenticeship, so typical
of previous Admiralty-inspired legislation, was revived
by ss. 32 and 37, and s.6 said that failing to join a
ship, or deserting from one, were now equally punishable
by thirty days' imprisonment. The whole tone of the Act
was, with one exception, regressive, but within the
decade that followed practically every one of its
provisions was either amended, modified or repealed.
The register ticket scheme was an almost
immediate casualty. Seamen traded their tickets freely,
changed names with every voyage and gave false particulars
as a matter of course. The register tickets were issued
without check or query so that in an 1850 debate a Member
could say that 'tickets might be got of any crimp for
half-a-crown' and not be contradicted by an official
spokesman.1 Consequently, s.32 of the 1850 Act gave
the Board of Trade power to wind-up the register ticket
scheme, and in 1853 the Board abolished it. Compulsory
apprenticeship provisions were widely evaded, 2 and
desertion soon became a serious problem for mainly economic
1. Hansard 3 112 1372-1375.
2. William James Lamport, the Liverpool shipowner,
testified in 1860 that when he had been at sea it was
common practice to borrow 'mock-apprentices' to
exhibit at the Custom House or produce old indentures
to persuade officials that ships' boys were genuine
apprentices. Report from the Select Committee on
Merchant Shipping, BPP 1860 (530) XIII QQ.2601-2621.
Referred to hereafter as RSCMS 1860. A glance at
Appendix Five will confirm that the number of
indentured apprentices fell dramatically once the
legal constraints were removed on owners.
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reasons. In 1847, when the American-Mexican war was
at its height, seamen arriving at New Orleans were
being offered bounties of $70 in gold pieces to serve
as soldiers in Mexico - an event immortalized in a
shanty which records the eagerness of seamen to reach
that fabled land:
So we'll heave her up, and away we go.
Heave away, Santy Anno.'
Heave her up and away we go,
All on the plains of Mexico.
while the discovery of gold in California and Australia
between 1849 and 1852 led to mass desertion in both
countries. 2 However, this type of desertion was atypical
because it sprang from temporary temptation: far more
important in the long run was desertion from one ship
to join another at higher wages, for this factor will
be shown to be paramount when seeking to establish why
men deserted andwhere the act generally took place.3
The disparity between wages in British and
1. General Santa Anna led the Mexican forces at the
battles of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo during the
war with the United States. Seamen have always
believed that when they pulled on a rope someone at
their destination was pulling at the other end -
hence the enduring expression that 'the Liverpool
girls have the tow-rope' employed by homeward-
bounders today.
2. In mid-1850 some 500 ships were iimnobilized in San
Francisco Bay because the crews had gone off to the
diggings. San Francisco Examiner 13 July 1850.
3. 'By and large, desertions occurred in areas where
wages bffered to crew were higher than average'.
Lewis Fischer, 'A Dereliction of Duty: The Problem
of Desertion on Nineteenth-Century Sailing Vessels',
Rosemary Ommer and Gerald Panting (eds.), Workin
Men Who Got Wet (St. John's, Newfoundland, l981.
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North American ships was considerable, and arose from
two main causes. There was a greater overall demand
for labour in North America, and the boom in soft-wood
shipbuilding there led to a strong demand for crews to
deliver these newly-constructed vessels to the European
market. In 1847 a British official told the Royal
Conunission on the Merchant Seamen's Fund that 'Nearly
all the men who now go to Quebec and New Brunswick
desert: they get £12 to £14 for the voyage home per
month',' The Report of the Royal Commission said that
three-fifths of all deserters 'ran' in North America,2
and the Canadian authorities set up a shipping office
in Ouebec in 1847 to combat the problem. It had almost
instant success, with the desertion figure at the port
of Quebec falling from 3,058 men in 1847 to 1,333 in
l849, but the wage disparity in a 1:5 or 1:6 ratio
continued to provide a powerful incentive to the would-
be deserter. Appendix Seven shows that the desertion
rate between 1845 and 1855 was remarkably unaffected
by any government measures, for although the penalties
for desertion were tripled in 1850 and signing-on
1. RRCMSF 1847-48 QQ.26-27. The usual transatlantic rate
for ABs was £2-5s a month at this date - see PRO BT/l 479.
2. RRCMSF 1847-48 Appendix Seven.
3. Figures given by Labouchre to the House of Commons
during the debate on the first version of the 1850
Mercantile Marine Act. Hansard 3 108 674-675.
4. By s.70 of the Mercantile Marine Act of 1850 the maximum
penalty for desertion was raised to twelve weeks' impri-
sonment. During the debate on the Bill the President of
the Board of Trade, Henry Labouchre, had rejected an
attempt to substitute fines for imprisonment, saying
that fines were useless because they would be paid out
of the greatly enhanced earnings to be gained by
deserting British ships in order to sign on colonial
vessels. See Hansard 3 112 1444-1452 and CJ 105 538.
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at Mercantile Marine Offices became the co]mnon practice
in the same year, the desertion rate remained, apart
from explicable 'peaks' in 1847 and 1853,1 at around
10,000 desertions a year. Seamen were responding to
the push and pull of supply and demand, and the industry
in which they were employed was about to respond simi-
larly to the end of centuries of protectionist legis-
lation based on defence needs and to enter a new era
of unbridled competition.
The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 18492 has
generally been interpreted as either the triumph of the
Whigs over the Tories or of free trade over protection-
ism, 3 but its importance in the present context is that
it fundamentally changed the ethnic basis of the work-
force. From 1660 shipowners and masters had to crew
their vessels, except in wartime, with a minimum of
75% of British seamen, 4 but with the dawning of the
second half of the nineteenth-century all such restric-
tions were removed. It will be shown that at the end
of the century labour dilution was considerable, 5 but
1. The Mexican-American war and the Australian gold-rush
may be held to account for the higher figures during
these years.
2. It was not a total repeal: the coasting trade remained
protected until 1854, and the inan.ning requirement did
not disappear until 1853 when it was formally abolished
by s.31 of 16 & 17 Vic c 131.
3. The first interpretation is that of R.H. Thornton in
British Shipping 42-43: the second is that of Asa
Briggs in The Age of Improvement (1974 edition) 393.
4. By s.7 of the 1660 Navigation Act.
S. The 1901 Census showed that 35% of the seamen employed
on a particular day were lascars or foreigners.
Return of the Number, Ages, Ratings and Nationalities
of the Seamen employed on the 31st day of March 1901.
BPP 1902 (Cd.1342) XCII 283.
98
it must first be established that the Navigation Laws
had worked in the way that was intended prior to the
middle of the nineteenth-century. There are no official
statistics for the number of foreign seamen serving in
British ships before 1851,1 but a random sample of seamen
seeking hospital treatment in London has been extracted
from the records of the Seamen's Hospital Society, which
date from 1821. In Figure 1.1 overleaf it may be seen
that in the period 1821-31 some 79% of the sample were
of British origin; 'others' amounting to 21%. In
Figure 1.2 dealing with the period 1871-81 the British
component of the sample amounts to 59% and 'others' to
4l%.2 Such a sample is, of course, not perfect, 3
 but
it shows that about four out of five hospitalized seamen
in the port of London were of British origin in the 1820s
and that the Navigation Acts had succeeded in their pur-
pose of keeping up the number of such seamen for defence
reasons. Similarly, the percentage fell to three out
of five when the requirement was withdrawn. Quantity
could be assured by legislation: quality was another
matter, and in the years following 1849 that aspect
1. See Appendix Three.
2. The figures have been extracted from the Annual
Reports of the Seamen's-Hospital Society, and are
reproduced in Appendix Six.
3. It would include British seamen serving under a
foreign flag and foreigners- serving under both
British and foreign flags, but in the latter case
the sample overestimates the number of foreign
seamen and does not weaken the principal conclusion.
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became of great concern to the legislators and civil
servants, At mid-century, the quality can only be
described as indifferent. Two Maltese officials,
reporting in 1849, struck just the right note in
referring to the 'recklessness of sailors, their
ignorance and credibility, their want of forethought
added to habits of dissipation (which) render them
liable to every species of loss and robbery?,' while the
1847-48 Report of the Royal Commission on the Merchant
Seamen's Fund believed that there was 'a necessity for
treating them as if they were children of the State',2
and even William Schaw Lindsay - ever a friend to the
British seaman - thought that seamen behaved childishly
because they tended to 'roam from one ship to another,
not always tempted by an increase in wages, but often
incited by a pure love of change'. 3 A package of
remedies to cure these ills was prescribed in the Mer-
cantile Marine Act of 1850, and as that measure may
fairly be described as the first of the significant
pieces of maritime labour legislation in the nineteenth-
century it will be looked at in some detail.
1. Report of the Superintendent of Quarantine and
Marine Police and the Inspector of Charitable
Institutions and Prisons to the Governor of Malta.
Dated 27 July 1849: a copy may be found on PRO BT/1
477 561/1850.
2. RRCMSF 1847-48. Paragraph 26 of the Report.
3. RSCMS 1860 xxx.	 This phrase was drafted by Lindsay,
and it appears unchanged in the Report.
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The repeal of the Navigation Acts and the
passage of the Mercantile Marine Act of 1850 were both
attended by remarkable Parliamentary activity and
extensive debate. 1
 In the latter case, the Act that
eventually emerged was a second version with fifty
altered clauses, seven deleted clauses and thirteen
new ones. 2
 When Henry Labouchre introduced his amended
version on 20 June 1850 he emphasised that it now 'had
the support and consent of the great body of ship-
owners' and that its purpose was principally to super-
vise ships' officers more strictly, control the engage-
ment of crew through shipping offices 3
 and prevent
desertion. 4
 The preamble to the Act showed its stern
intentions. 'Whereas it is expedient', it began, 'to
make Provision for improving the Condition of Masters,
Mates and Seamen,' and then the blunt purpose: 'and for
maintaining Discipline in the British Merchant Service'.
The Act's iniproveinental aspect was limited. It authorized
1. The third reading of the Navigation Bill gave rise to
a Lord's Protest - a rare expression of strong feeling.
Prepared by Lord Stanley and supported by forty-two
peers, the Protest was to the effect that repeal would
weaken the navy because 'the royal navy is mainly
dependent for its efficiency on the commercial marine'.
The date was 12 June 1849, and Hansard 3 66 22 and
James B. Thorold Rogers' Protests of the Lords (1885)
iii 263 should be consulted for a full account.
2. The first Bill, introduced by Labouchre on 11 February
1850, was withdrawn on 20 April 1850. CJ 105 243.
3. S.7 established Local Marine Boards at ports with more
than 30,000 tons of registered shipping, and s.35 gave
Boards the responsibility for opening shipping offices.
4. Hansard 3 112 108-121.
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the establishment of sailors' homes on shore - as
recommended in the 1836 Report of the Select Committee
on Shipwrecks - and set a minimum standard for living
space. 1
	The Board of Trade took over nominal
responsibility for medicine chests from the Admiralty,2
and the compulsory certification of ships' officers may
be seen as conferring on them an enhanced status. How-
ever, the means by which certification was to be accom-
plished can hardly be put into an improvemental category.
Voting for membership of Local Marine Boards, who would
have the duty of conducting examinations and granting
certificates of competency, was partly contingent on
ownership of registered tonnage, for half the seats
were filled by votes at elections where each voter had
to show ownership of 250 tons of shipping, and the owner
of 2,500 tons had ten votes. Local Marine Boards would
also control the shipping office where men signed-on,3
and s.28 gave these Boards the right to suspend or
cancel officers' certificates. A great deal of power
was placed in the hands of shipowners, and it was re-
inforced by increases in the maximum penalties for
desertion, stealing stores, broaching the cargo, damaging
the vessel, assaulting officers, continued wilful dis-
obedience, neglect of duty, impeding navigation or de-
laying the voyage. For all these offences, the full
1. SS. 43 and 63.
2. By s.6l. As will be shown later, it would be many
years before the Board of Trade took up its full
responsibility in respect of the supply of medicines
on merchant ships.
3. SS. 9, 24, 26 and 35.
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penalty became twelve weeks' inlprisonment)
The reaction to the 1850 Bill was initially
universally hostile, with the owners claiming that it
was too lenient and the men that it was tyrannical.
The Glasgow Shipowners Association wanted to retain
register tickets and increase the maximum penalty for
desertion to six months' imprisonment with hard labour,2
while the Liverpool Ship Owners Association objected to
the Board of Trade's new powers, to shipping offices,
to over-documentation and to the clause giving men
twelve superficial feet of living space. 3 Some 6,000
shipowners, masters, mates and seamen from Liverpool
later petitioned for the repeal of the Act, complaining
that the new legislation bore 'very hardly on old masters
and mates, who have been for 20 or 25 years in the ser-
vice ... and are now liable to be examined in matters
relating to their profession by persons they remember
coming to sea as boys'. 4 On the north-east coast
objections were principally directed against shipping
offices, and there was a prolonged strike. The commander
1. S. 78 of the Act.
2. PRO BT/l 477 1367/1850. The official at the Board
of Trade dealing with the file wrote in the margin:
'Most certainly not. The clause is harsh at present'.
3. PRO BT/l 477 643/1850. They had their way over the
last item. S.63 of the Mercantile Marine Act gave
seamen 'Nine Superficial Feet' of living space.
4. This petition quoted by Lord Stanley in his speech
to the House of Lords on 5 May 1851. Hansard 3 116
501-510. A good explanatory account of the episode
may be found in The Annual Register for 1851,
chapter six.
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of a warship sent to Sunderland in support of the civil
power reported that 'the seamen here, though quiet,
seem determined to hold out ... to resist the new
Bill',' while on 26 March 1851 the inhabitants of
Sheffield sent a petition to Whitehall protesting at
the 'harsh and tyrannical provisions of the Act' whereby
'thousands of proverbially honest British sailors, with
their innocent wives and children, are bordering on a
state of starvation'. 2 The opposition to the Mercantile
Marine Act faded gradually, and in the case of the ship-
owners disappeared completely in 1852 when Disraeli
relaxed or abolished light dues and passing tolls.3
Ships' officers who were serving as such when the Act
became law were entitled to Certificates of Service,4
and although the owners and workforce grumbled away for
many years to come, 5 the 1850 provisions were consolidated
1. PRO BT/l 483 615/51.
2. PRO BT/l 483 764/51.
3. See Hansard 3 223 838-847. Benjamin Disraeli, (1804-
81), the future Prime Minister, was Chancellor of the
Exchequer in the Derby administration at the time.
Light dues and passing dues were a form of tonnage
tax levied on vessels passing a certain point, and
the money was used to build or maintain harbours,
lighthouses and ports of refuge.
4. By s.27. They were, however, generally considered
inferior to Certificates of Competency obtained by
examination,
5. A petition of the 'merchants, shipowners, master
mariners, mates, engineers and others' of the port of
Southampton dated 13 May 1857, was sent to the Board
of Trade in that year and called for an end to certi-
fication, and other reforms. It was suggested in the
petition that these matters were best handled by local
interests, but the official dealing with it wrote
tartly that the idea that 'laws affecting Trade should
be dealt with exceptionally or placed in the hands of
a little Parliament of Traders is simply absurd'.
PRO BT/l 543 910/57.
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in 1854 and gained a grudging acceptance.
In this period, significant change has been
observed, although it must be said that the pace of
change was slow, the direction uncertain and that a
paternalistic approach was generally adopted. The deck-
load legislation of 1839/40 and the staged certification
of ships' officers may be categorised as progressive,
while even the 1844 Act with its generally regressive
tone had at least one good feature. 1 The demise of the
Merchant Seamen's Fund left a welfare vacuum, while the
1850 Act, coming as it did on the heels of the repeal
of the Navigation Acts, is a splendid example of govern-
mental ambivalence - of an administration waving the
free trade banner with one hand and passing parental
legislation with the other. R.H. Thornton believed that
the new wine of laissez-faire could hardly be poured
into old bottles, 2 but insofar as the seaman's contract
with his employer was concerned this was precisely what
happened. Trade restrictions were ripped away to expose
Britain to the cold blasts of competition, but the work-
force was subjected to enhanced penalties for desertion
although leaving his ship was the only way by which a
sailor could niaximise income and take advantage of the
wage disparity in ports abroad. A government attempt
to protect seamen from exploitation by crimps was
1. S.57 laid down the first complaints procedure. Where
three or more members of a crew complained of bad
food or water to a Consul or Collector of Customs,
the latter could order a survey.
2. Thornton, British Shipping 45.
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ineffective, 1
 the interests of the Admiralty received
undue attention from the governing class, while self-
help was seen as panacea for social ills.
	 The new Local
Marine Boards were resented because they replaced older,
and less formal, institutions where owners, master and men
had been able to jrQfl out local difficulties face to face.2
Most of important of all, slow progress towards reform was
a function of Britain's continuing reliance on a sailing
merchant fleet - for a glance at Figure Two will show that
sail was dominant for most of the nineteenth-century.3
Improvement in the sailors' lot, enlightened legislative
and administrative measures and technological advance go
very much hand in hand in the latter years of that century.
1. The 1845 'Act for the Protection of Seamen entering on
board merchant ships' (8 & 9 Vic c 116) had been intended
as an anti-crimping measure, but the penalties were far
too slight to have any impact.
2. See F.W. Beechey 'A letter to the Master Mariners and
Seamen in the ports of Shields and Sunderland on the
subject of the Mercantile Marine Act' bound into the
volume of The Nautical Magazine for 1851.
3. See also Appendix Thirteen (A) which shows that in terms
of numbers the steamship did not overtake the sailing
vessel until the first decade of the twentieth-century.
The break-through in tonnage terms was in 1883 - see
Appendix One (ii).	 In 1842 only one ship in twenty-
seven was a steamer - Shipping Returns, BPP 1843 (207)
LII 393-408.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MID-VICTORIAN SIMPLICITY
The years between the opening of the Great
Exhibition and the laying of the first Atlantic tele-
graph cable are a period when the 'simple Victorian
passion for gadgetry'' seized Britain's governing class,
and so far as the country's merchant seamen were con-
cerned the principal manifestation of this passion was
the passing of the enormously comprehensive Merchant
Shipping Act of 1854.2 It was a mammoth enactment
occupying a fifth of the statute book for the year, and
was in eleven parts, of which part three relating to
seamen is most relevant to this study. The equally
massive Act of forty years later 3 was based largely
on the 1854 measure, which attempted to codify and
rationalize all shipping legislation with the exception
of Acts relating to Customs duties, harbours and emi-
grant ships. Quite simply, the mid-Victorians con-
vinced themselves that shipping law was in a mess, and
that there was an overwhelming necessity to cut through
a thicket of close-growing legislation by means of a
single sharp and shining instrument of their own forging
for, as a back-bencher had proclaimed in 1850,
1. MacDonagh, A Pattern of Government Growth 1800-60 247.
2. 17 & 18 Vic C 104.
3. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 (57 & 58 Vic c 60)
appeared as a booklet of 324 pages.
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they were tired of a 'mode of legislation by patches'.1
A claim is sometimes made that codification became
necessary because of the bulk of the amending legisla-
tion required in relation to the Mercantile Marine
Act of 1850,2 but it seems more likely on the evidence
that Parliament wanted, in W.L. Burn's vivid (1964)
phrase, 'to create ... a dramatic dnouement'. Only
later, of course, was it discovered that they 'had
done nothing of the sort or had only created a second
abuse to replace the first'.3
Size and comprehensiveness were two characte-
ristics of the 1854 Act: the third was the remarkably
low level of debate that accompanied its passage.
Labouchére congratulated the House of Commons on the
'absence of party spirit', 4 and while the Economist
complained that the measure was 'disgraceful to the
legislature' 5 it did not meet with the fierce opposition
1. Hansard 3 112 1070.
2. For example, R.G. Newey's thesis Government interven-
tion in the British merchant service in the nineteenth
century 37-38, (Exeter MA, 1970), takes the line that
the Mercantile Marine Amendment, Steam Navigation and
Seamen's Fund Winding-Up Acts of 1851 had so muddied
the waters that codification became necessary. A
detailed examination shows, however, that only the
Mercantile Marine Amendment Act (14 & 15 Vic C 96) is
linked directly to the 1850 Act: the others are in a
different line of descent, and although the Steam Navi-
gation Act was repealed in 1854 its principal provisions
as to boats, lights and surveys derive from the earlier
Acts of 1846 and 1848. (9 & 10 Vic C 100 and 11 and 12
Vic C 81).
3. W.L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise (1964) 50.
4. Hansard 3 130 246.
5. Economist No. 555, 15 April 1854, 395.
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that had faced the 1850 Bill. Two reasons may be
advanced for this state of affairs. The creed of free
trade was now more generally acceptable, and many of
the deep-seated fears of shipowners had been soothed
away by a reassuring document put out by Thomas Henry
Farrer, the Assistant Secretary at the Board of Trade.1
Farrer and a barrister called Henry Thring had collabo-
rated to produce an explanatory pamphlet entitled 'Memo-
randuin on the Merchant Shipping Law Consolidation Bill',2
and in it called attention to areas where the authority
of owners was not eroded. For example, Farrer and
Thring emphasised that ss.116-124 enabled the Board of
Trade to remove unsuitable officials, while s.221 which
outlined the seaman's right to complain was itself
modified by s.232 which said that the complainant could
only go ashore to make such a complaint if doing so was
consistent with his duty to the ship. The pamphlet laid
stress on the absence in the Bill of any manning scales
- the phrase used being that 'the proper number of a
crew is not considered a subject for compulsory
legislation'. 3 Farrer and Thring also gave an explanation
1. Thomas Henry Farrer was a barrister who served at the
Board of Trade for almost forty years. Later raised
to the peerage, he was a life-long advocate of
laissez-faire and put his views plainly in a book
entitled The State in its Relation to Trade. According
to his obituary in The Times of 18 March 1890, he was
'the last of the Cobdenites'.
2. A copy may be found at BPP 1854 LXIX 1. This document
is referred to hereafter as Farrer and Thring 1854.
3. Farrer and Thring 1854 22.
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of the new legal situation whereby wages supposedly
stopped with hipwreck. Prior to 1854 the situation
had been confused, with owners claiming that as the
voyage had not been completed no liability to pay wages
existed,' while seamen had tended to refuse duty when
shipwreck seemed imminent unless extra inducements were
offered, 2 S.183 appeared to say categorically that
wages stopped with shipwreck, but the meinoranduni called
attention to the proviso that the seaman claiming wages
up to the moment of shipwreck must have 'exerted himself
to the utmost', 3 and indicated that a lack of zeal
would sanction the withholding of a sailor's pay. This
escape clause was to be a continuing source of friction,
and the matter was not wholly settled until the First
World War when, under pressure from Welsh seamen, the
Board of Trade decreed that shipwrecked merchant seamen
should have either a months' pay or their wages until
the date of their return to the United Kingdom, which-
ever was the greater.4
1. This attitude was an extension of the principle
drawn from the Laws of 0lron that 'freight is the
mother of wages', and its legal basis was the case
of Cutter v. Powell, (6 T.Rep. K.B. 320), dating
from 1795. A man who signed-on as a mate for the
voyage from Jamaica to Liverpool died a few days
before reaching port, and the owners refused to pay
his wages as the contract was not fulfilled. His
executrix sued, but the Court decided that nothing
was payable for part service.
2. As in the Jane and Margaret case detailed in RSCCL
1825, Minutes of Evidence 92-98.
3. Farrer and Thring 1854 24.
4. See Chapter Seven.
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With the fears of the shipowners allayed,
the 1854 Bill passed the Commons at a single sitting)
Labouchre, now out of office, had worked with Joseph
Henley 2
 on consolidating the existing legislation,
with Edward Cardwell as President of the Board of
Trade supervising both of them. 3
 These two arch-
conservatives and a champion of free trade found them-
selves in almost complete agreement, 4
 and substantial
penalties were brought in for those type of offences
that restrained trade. S.239 made it a misdemeanour
(with a maximum term of two years' imprisonment) to
endanger a vessel, or life, by drunkenness, neglect
of duty or acts of sabotage. The Westnioreland case of
1841 had given an excellent definition of desertion for
legal purposes, and the 1850 penalty of twelve weeks'
imprisonment was retained. 5
 Both factions in the IVhig-
1. Hansard 3 133 571-585.
2. Joseph Warner Henley, (1793-1884), was MP for Oxford-
shire from 1841-78. He was briefly President of the
Board of Trade in 1852, and again in 1858-59. An
Oxfordshire country gentleman whose father had been a
shipowner and coal merchant, Henley was an arch-con-
servative.
3. Edward Cardwell, (1813-86), was MP for Oxford in 1854.
He had been unseated as Liverpool's MP in 1852 because
of his free trade stance and his support for the
repeal of the Navigation Laws.
4. Labouchre was slightly less enthusiastic about the 1854
legislation than either Henley or Cardwell, and at this
time was more interested in the Coasting Trade Bill.
He told the House that 'the most important of these
two measures was undoubtedly that one which proposes
to admit foreign ships to the coasting trade of this
country'. Hansard 3 130 246.
5. In the Westmnoreland case, Dr. Lushington said that to
amount to desertion 'there must be a complete abandon-
ment of duty without justification on the part of
mariners; and such abandonment must, moreover, be by
quitting the ship' - 1 W & Rob 216. S.243 of the 1854
Act gives a penalty of twelve weeks' imprisonment for
desertion.
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Peelite coalition seemed content with the comprehensive-
ness of the 1854 Act, and the only significant recom-
mendation of the 1836 Report of the Select Committee
on Shipwrecks remaining unimplemented was that relating
to Seamen's Savings Banks. First suggested by a Mr.
Symons of the Thames Police Office in 1821,1 mentioned
in the Annual Report of the Well Street Home in 1830,
recommended by the 1836 Select Committee and urged by
the Emigration Agent at Liverpool in 1850,2 the concept
was put to the House by W.S. Lindsay on 18 May 1854.
Lindsay was told that the government intended to launch
a comprehensive Savings Bank Bill that would embrace a
Seamen's Savings Bank, but in the event progress was
slow and his efforts led to a separate Seamen's Savings
Bank Act in 1856.
	
Parallel agitation by Lindsay led
also to the establishment of the Seamen's Money Order
scheme in 1855.	 These measures were not initially
important in term.s of sums saved,S but in the long run
proved to be valuable weapons in the battle against
crimping.
The role of the Board of Trade during the 1850s
1. MBSHS (1). Entry dated 6 July 1821.
2. NMM SAH/60/l and PRO BT/1 476 302/1850.
3. Hansard 3 133 571-585. The reference for the Seamen's
Savings Bank Act is 19 & 20 Vic c 41.
4. By s.2 of the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, 1855.
18 & 19 Vic c 91.
5. In 1864 Seamen's Savings Bank deposits amounted to
less than 3/8d a head, while as late as 1889 deposits
were under £1 a head. See Seamen's Savings Bank, BPP
1865 (272) L 333 and BPP 1890 (356) LXVI 126.
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and early 1860s may be described as one of cautious
and hesitant involvement in the shipping industry
despite D.L. Keir's claim that it was an example of
the 'significant ... expansion of administrative
services' in the period. 1
 Indeed, in looking at the
work of the Board in the second half of the nineteenth-
century as a whole it appears that the (1969) view of
Henry Parris that institutions respond to changes in
society is more correct. 2
 In the years from 1851 to
1866 it may be said that its attitude to the workforce
was conditioned by the anti-interventionist stance of
two civil servants who were themselves much influenced
-by the prevalent view of the governing class that labour
was a commodity, and that the success of free trade
depended on a limitless, cheap supply of that commodity.
Thomas Henry Farrer, co-author of the 'Memorandum on
the Merchant Shipping Law Consolidation Bill' that had
proved so effective in disarming the shipowners in 1854,
was one of these civil servants: Thomas Gray the other.
Gray had joined the Board of Trade as a boy clerk in
1851, and in the 1860s was head of the Marine Department
under Farrer, the Board's Assistant Secretary. Gray
was a 'new' civil servant - a product of the reforms
deriving from the publication of the Northcote-Trevelyan
1. D.L. Keir, Constitutional History of Modern Britain,
1485-1915 (1953 edition) 419-420.
2. Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (1969) 282.
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Report of 18541 - and, as the doctrine of non-involvement
governing the public life of present-day civil servants
did not obtain in the 1860s, Gray made no attempt to
hide his beliefs. On 21 February 1866 he addressed
the Society of Arts, 2
 taking as his principal theme the
advice of the 1860 Select Committee on Merchant Shipping
to the effect that undue interference with the industry
should be avoided. He attacked the Steam Navigation
Acts of 1846, 1848 and 1851, the Merchant Shipping Act
of 1854 and the Chain Cables and Anchors Act of 1864 as
over-meticulous, and suggested the abolution of all
safety legislation relating to boats, safety valves and
anchor chains. 3 The United Service Gazette of 24
February 1866 thought his criticisms destructive rather
than constructive, while the Saturday Review of 10 March
1866 described Gray as a self-appointed martyr to
laissez-faire theory. This latter contemporary view of
1. The Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil
Service actually came out in November 1853, but as
E.N. Gladden points out in his Civil Services of the
United Kingdom, 1855 - 1970 (1967) 19 it is usually
described as an 1854 publication.
2. The title of his paper was 'On Modern Legislation in
regard to the Construction and Equipment of Steam
Ships'.
3. The Enineer of 23 February 1866 approved his thesis,
and said that 'government interference may become
vicious if it attempts to attain an end by official
inspection and supervision instead of appealing to
the self-interest of the trader'. The Shipping and
Mercantile Gazette of 22 February 1866 has the full
text of Gray's paper, which contains his view of
safety legislation in the phrase 'it had not been
shown that government supervision ever did save life,
or that it ever will do so'.
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Gray seems accurate, and in looking at the work of the
Board of Trade between 1851 and 1866 a case may be
made out that an over-zealous adherence to the laissez-
faire ideal led to an almost total failure to improve
the lot of merchant seamen. As will be shown, the
Board failed to control crimping, check desertion or
even maintain health standards, while Parliament actually
repealed the only safety measure on the statute book.
Legislation against crimping in 1835 and 18451
had been of limited effect because the penalties were
extremely small, 2 and the 1854 Act did not increase
them. A £20 fine for supplying seamen without a licence
was a ludicrously low penalty when the crimp was making
a double profit on each seamen - first by cashing a
seaman's advance note at a discount of up to 50%, and
second by delivering drugged or drunken seamen to a
ship for 'head money'. The bullies who worked for
crimps were also subject to extremely light penalties
on conviction. They were forbidden by ss. 237-238 of the
1854 Act to go aboard a ship without permission, or
solicit a seaman to lodge ashore, but as the maximum
penalty was a mere £5 fine it was no real deterrent.
There are many contemporary accounts detailing the
behaviour of crimps' runners who swarmed aboard docking
ships to carry off the crew with promises of good times
1. 5 & 6 Will 4 C 19, s.lO and 8 & 9 Vic C 116, s.1.
2. Maximum fines of £10 and £20 respectively.
3. Labouchre's speech in the House on 11 February 1850.
Hansard 3 108 676.
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or steady jobs ashore, 1
 and masters had to pay for
new hands, who might be green landsmen, or even dead
bodies soaked in rum to simulate a drunken sailor.
Liverpool crimps always tribd to get their victims to
sign wills so that they could claim the dead man's
wages if he died at sea, 2 while American ships arrived
with one kidnapped crew and departed with another
obtained in the same way. The process was described by
James Smith, chairman of the Liverpool Shipowners
Association, in his evidence to the 1860 Select Committee:
We have on many occasions in Liverpool
heard of the captains of American ships
being brought up on a summons before the
magistrates by men who have been kidnapped
on the other side of the water.
They have been got by these crimps into a
boat and put on board a ship; men who have
never had a foot on board a ship before;
and then comes into use what I think are
called brass knuckles. In Liverpool he
(the American captain) does not ship seamen
through the shipping office .., he gets his
men through a set of crimp's men who make a
business of it ... there is a continual
change of men, and it gives employment to
a large number of crimps •••'
1. For example, in the 1860s at Cardiff twenty or thirty
runners would board an incoming vessel and take the
men off. Evidence of the Superintendent of Missions
to Seamen based at Portishead before the Select
Committee on the Merchant Shipping Bill. Report from
the Select Committee on the Merchant Shipping Bill,
BPP 1878 (205) XVI QQ.3541-3551. Referred to here-
after as RSCMSB 1878.
2. Evidence of Henry Richard Williams, accountant at
the Board of Trade, to the 1859 Commission of Enquiry
into Manning the Navy. RCMN 1859 Q.ôlll.
3. RSCMS 1860 QQ,2522-2523.
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Crimping was big business at home and abroad.
At Quebec where new ships were built for the European
market, crimps were engaged by the builders to find
passage crews for the delivery voyage. 1 At Callao an
artificial shortage of seamen was maintained by crimps
who held back the supply of men in the interests of
sustaining demand, 2 while the Dublin Ballast Board
wrote to the Board of Trade in 1863 indicating that
crimps had found a way round the 1850 Act and describing
what happened after men had signed-on at a shipping
office.
a months' wages are then advanced to
each man to enable him to get his outfit,
but is generally spent on profligacy and
debauchery, and parties (termed pimps)3
are always on the watch to pick up and
secrete any good sailor ... and in lieu
they send down to the pier ... the worst
description of person they can pick up,
and the vessel that is all ready to sail
must either take these 'substitutes',
as they are termed, or go to sea half-manned.
Some captains ... prefer to arrange with the
parties who have secreted the men before
referred to, and to give a certain sum per
head for every man they supply.4
1. The techniques employed by the Quebec crimps ranged
from the subtle legal manoeuvres of John Wilson, an
attorney, to the more traditional forceful methods
of the notorious James Ward. See PRO BT/l 479 2425/
1850, Frederick W. Wallace, Wooden Ships and Iron
Men (1973 edition) 102, and The Shipping and
Micantile Gazette of 24 September 1852.
2. PRO MT/9 31 M.443/l867.
3. The writer of the letter has evidently confused
the protectors of prostitutes with the suppliers
of sea labour - although in some cases they were
one and the same.
4. Shipping of Crews (Liverpool), BPP 1863 (464) LXIII
876.
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The general tendency among masters was to
recruit selectively when seamen were plentiful, go
to the shipping office when times were normal and
resort to crimps when demand exceeded supply. 1
 The
1854 Act had associated shortcomings in relation to
the payment of seamen, and these contributed to the
continued prosperity of the crimping interest. The
pay-off period in foreign-going ships was, by s. 187
of the 1854 Act, within three days of cargo delivery
or five days of discharge, and this had the effect of
keeping seamen in the dock area for some time before
being paid in full. The Merchant Shipping Amendment
Act of 18622 actually had the effect of increasing
the hold of crimps over British seamen abroad because
s.22 said that only those seamen who could be shown as
having not misconducted themselves or jumped ship could
be sent home as distressed British seamen, and others
with a flawed record were compelled to resort to crimps
to get a 1rth. Two years earlier, T.H. Farrer had
testified that although crimping was 'full of evil' he
could see no remedy because he would not interfere with
a contract between master and man. 3 He took a similar
attitude in 1866 when an enquiry was initiated into
crimping at Cardiff following the publication of an
1. See letter to the Board of Trade from the Chairman
of the Local Marine Board at Liverpool of 11 June
1863 on BPP 1863 LXIII 879.
2. 25 & 26 Vic C 63.
3. RSCMS 1860 QQ.5805-5823.
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article in the Cardiff Times on 2 March. This article
was a development of allegations by the city's mayor
that the 'lowest scum of the town made a living by
practising on the credulity of sailors' and that 'it
was practically impossible to obtain a conviction for
crimping'. A Board of Trade inspector reported on 8 May
18661 and recommended the abol?tion of advance notes and
the licensing of boarding houses: Farrer took the view
that although advance notes led to crimping they were
issued by shipowners, and therefore the remedy lay with
the shipowners. In the following year he minuted a
file dealing with crimping abroad to the effect that 'a
perfect remedy seems almost hopeless'. 2 It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that Farrer was bunkered by his
over-meticulous adherence to legal forms, his view of
the sacred nature of contract and his strongly-held
belief in laissez-faire, for it will be shown in the
next chapter that the crimping problem was tackled
successfully through the initiative of a number of junior
officials who were both closer to the problem and unen-
cumbered by a rigid attitude concerning the relationship
of master and man.
The signing-on of men at shipping offices had
been intended as a device to cut crimps out of the
recruiting process, but the system of advance notes -
which the 1854 Act did nothing to regulate - ensured
1. PRO MT/9 26 M.103O/1866.
2. PRO MT/9 31 M.443/1867.
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that a seaman often had to go to crimps or their agents
to get them cashed. 1 As a consequence, masters had to
go to crimps for a crew, and what was supplied tended
to be the useless 'substitutes' or noisy and refractory
drunkards. In 1863 Captain John Herron of the Agamemnon
complained bitterly to the Local Marine Board at Liver-
pool that this practice endangered ships because their
masters had insufficient capable crew to work the vessel
in confined waters. 'The men', he wrote,
are all strangers to the captain; most
frequently go aboard in a state of
intoxication; and are often so diseased
as to render them not only useless in
the navigation of the ship, but so reckless
and refractory that they will neither work
themselves nor allow others to do so.2
The advance note also operated as an incentive to
desertion abroad. A seaman bound away on a relatively
short voyage to North America who had received (and
spent) his advance had little incentive to serve out
his time in his present ship when high wages could be
earned by returning to the United Kingdom in another.
He had, as the saying went,'worked off the dead horse'3
and had nothing to lose by deserting. T.H. Farrer
appreciated this point well enough, but his suggestion
to the 1860 Select Committee that if all engagements were
for a single voyage between ports desertion would cease
1. 'These notes are generally cashed by the boarding-
house keeper or some clothier'. Letter to the Board
of Trade from a Liverpool official on BPP 1863 LXIII
878-879.
2. BPP 1863 LXIII 874.
3. That is, repaid the sum advanced by his labour.
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to be a problem was not adopted. 1 It was the perfect
laissez-faire solution, 2 but the shipowners who
dominated the 1860 enquiry declined to take the matter
further.
The relationship between sailors and crimps
was a close one for three reasons. Most crimps were
former seamen who had a common vocabulary and shared
experience, while the nature of the seaman's trade had
cut his links with ordinary society. Seamen were almost
a different species, and Geoffrey Rawson's (1958) comment
was:
In those days of long slow voyages, when
the seamen returned after a long absence
to their native habitat, they found them-
selves in a strange world and in a strange
society. They were unaccustomed to terra
firma. They walked with rolling gait on
the firm ground, they uttered a strange
argot, they were simpletons out of their
element, and easy prey.3
Consequently, faced with this hostile shore environment,
there was a tendency for sailors to put themselves
voluntarily in the hands of crimps from whom some sort
of temporary welcome was assured - a process described
in the traditional shanty 'Get up Jack, John sit down'.
1. RSCMS 1860 Q.5840
2. Joseph Henley proposed an alternative solution that
desertion be reduced to an offence of absence without
leave punishable by a fine in 1850 - Hansard 3 112
1444-1452 - and the suggestion was considered by the
Pearson Committee in 1967, being finally embodied in
the 1970 Merchant Shipping Act. See also F.J.J. Cad-
walladers' article 'Discipline in British Merchant
Ships' Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce II
(1970-71J 147-164.	 -
3. Geoffrey Rawson, Sea Prelude (1958) 99.
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When Jack's ashore he beats his way to
some boarding house;
He's welcomed in with ruin and gin, likewise
with port and scouse.
He'll spend and spend and never offend till
he lies drunk on ground:
For when his money is gone, t'is the same
old song;
Get up Jack, John sit down.
Third, there was the function of the crimp as an employ-
ment and loan agent for those classes of men who would
have difficulty in finding work in the ordinary way -
the old seamen, the diseased, the mentally ill and the
greenhorns. For this type of labour 'credit was an
absolute necessity', 1
 as the market for their services
was both marginal and volatile and the crimp might have
to maintain his lodgers for some time before a berth
could be found. The crimping industry survived as long
as it did for four main reasons. Voyages were long,
and seamen became detached from the mainstream of shore
life. The advance note compelled them to resort to
crimps, while wage disparity abroad encouraged desertion.
The state was unwilling, for ideological reasons, to
control the supply of labour or monitor arrangements for
pay-off and discharge. With the passage of time, the
rise of the steam vessel was to act on the first factor
and unionisation on the third. Only a retreat from
laissez-faire could effect changes in the second and
fourth areas.
The failure of the Board of Trade to safeguard
1. J.R. Bruijn, 'Seamen in Dutch Ports: c. 1700 - c.
1914' The Mariner's Mirror 65, No. 4, November 1979,
331.
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the health of merchant seamen, or curb the rising death
rate in this period, may serve as an indictment of the
prevalent laissez-faire attitude of legislators and
administrators. The first statistical point that must
be made is that the annual rate of fatal industrial
injury and death by disease in the shipping industry
rose from about l% in 1852 to over 2j% in 1868.
Further, in the same period, some 3,360 seamen died, on
average, annually and between 75% and 90% of these
deaths were due to drowning or disease. 1 Very few
deaths were accidental in the proper sense of the word
- the majority being preventable by legislative measures
or medical advance. The problem of unseaworthy ships
and the toll of life due to wrecks will be dealt with
later, and the emphasis here put on the additional risks
faced by a class of young workers in a strenuous occupa-
tion with considerable climatic variations.2
1. See Appendices Three and Eight (A) and (B).
2. Statistics presented to the Select Committee on the
Merchant Seaman's Fund in 1844 show that 95% of all
men before the mast were under 35 years of age,
RSCMSF 1844 Q.306. As late as 1858, six seamen were
employed in sailing vessels for every one in steamers
- see the Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation
for 1858, BPP 1859 (2562-Sess.2) XXCIII 440-441.
A twentieth-century analysis of seamen's patterns
of sickness reproduced as Appendix Nine (A) shows
that in Mediterranean climates the injury rate more
than doubles, while in the tropics the skin disease
statistics more than treble. Seamen themselves refer
to their work as 'all sweating and freezing', and
Thomas Oliver describes it thus. 'His work is inter-
mittent, consequently his intervals of rest, broken
by sudden and severe exertions, throw undue and
violent strain on the circulatory and respiratory
organs'. Thomas Oliver, Dangerous Trades (1902) 103.
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The 1835 Act suffered from a good deal of
loose drafting, and nowhere is this deficiency more
apparent than in the bland and unqualified statement
that a 'sufficient' quantity of medicines should be
carried in British merchant vessels.' • The 1844 Act
went a little further in saying that this supply of
medicines should be in accordance with future Admiralty
directions, and it also introduced a minimum scale of
anti-scorbutics to be served out after ten days on
salted provisions. 2 The 1854 Act repeated the foregoing
word for word, and made no addition or amendment. In
the 1850s the principal fatal sea diseases were typhus
(often recorded as 'intermittent fever' or 'calenture(s)'3
in official papers), yellow fever and cholera. No
certain cure was available for yellow fever, and the kind
of preventive medicine which might have checked the
incidence of typhus and cholera was in its infancy.
Apart from the killing diseases, the principal medical
preoccupation was with scurvy and syphilis, and it is
paradoxical that while considerable resources were
mobilized to deal with the former - for which the cure
had long been known - virtually nothing was done about
the latter where a small research investment might have
1. 5 & 6 Will 4 c 19, s.18.
2. 8 Vic C 112, s.18. The recommended amounts were half
an ounce of lime or lemon juice a day with sugar and
half a pint of vinegar a week.
3. From the Spanish 'calentura' meaning fever.
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produced spectacular returns.' In assessing the
scale of both syphilis and scurvy the official
statistics are of little help. A typical year might
show eighteen deaths from venereal infections and
thirty from scurvy, but many more are either recorded
euphemistically under 'debility', 'insanity' or 'brain
fever', or took place ashore and are not recorded in
the correct context. 2 The mid-Victorians published
no data on the incidence of venereal infection, but
information from an earlier and a later source gives
an indication of the scale of the problem.
It seems likely on the evidence that some 11%
of British merchant seamen contracted a form of venereal
disease at some time during their service, 3 and what
contemporary confirmation exists comes as addenda to
other medical information. For example, the records of
the Seamen's Hospital Society often include a note of
venereal complications among scurvy victims. There were
three cases of scurvy in the Prince Oscar in 1865 and
Oland Knudson, the blacksmith, 'had the venereal'.
1. R.S. Allison in his Sea Diseases (1943) makes the
point several times that nineteenth-century British
seamen were treated for syphilis with mercury ointment
- a technique used in medieval times.
2. The figures in Appendix Eight, for example, refer to
shipboard deaths: deaths from disease contracted at
sea or abroad are not included if they took place
following discharge.
3. James Lind in An Essay of the Most Effectual Means
of Preserving the Health of Seamen in the Royal Navy
(1774) records that 11.3% of hospitalized seamen had
a venereal disease, while the Report of the House
Governor of the Dreadnought Seamen's Hospital for
1953 gives a remarkably similar figure of 11.29%.
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When three men from the Marlborough were admitted to
the hospital it was recorded that 'Jacob Creeby who
joined the ship in Calcutta had bubo of venereal origin'.
There were two cases of scurvy in the Oliver Cromwell
in 1866 and one was Thomas Bowlain who was suffering
from delirium tremens, scurvy and a venereal infection.1
It was certainly the popular view of the time that sea-
men were prime culprits in transmitting venereal disease.
There was, for example, the widely-held medical and
historical belief that syphilis had been brought to
Europe by Columbus' sailors in 1493,2 while Lowestoft
fishermen still use a net-hauling chant that indicts
the merchant seaman as a disease-carrier to be avoided.
Our sturdy salts,
Have sorry faults,
Beneath their tarry breeches.
They bring disease,
From overseas,
The mucky sons-of-bitches
Whatever view is taken of the conduct of seamen in a
period when long voyages and limited transport facilities
meant lengthy absences from home, it must be said that
the Board of Trade took no steps to assume its respons-
ibilities in respect of medical supplies inherited from
the Admiralty until March 1865, when the medical pro-':
visions of s. 224 of the 1854 Act were finally implemented.3
1. Correspondence on Scurvy, BPP 1867 (126) LXIV, 127,
133, 142 and 156.
2. This theory is now somewhat discredited. Calvin Wells
in his Bones, Bodies and Disease (1964) 100-105 believes
that syphilis existed in Europe and Africa before 1493,
but the absence of the disease in Egyptian munimies
remains puzzling.
3. The same section also deals with anti-scorbutics such
as limejuice and vinegar.
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The first list of medical stores reveals what little
thought went into its composition) It details
little more than first-aid provision, with castor oil,
prepared chalk, an enema and a catheter on the list.
Insofar as venereal disease was concerned, there was
no provision other than the catheter, and a seriously-
infected man or boy would soon lose his efficiency, as
Conrad Greenhow, the Mercantile Marine Office super-
intendent at North Shields, testified when giving
evidence to the 1860 Select Committee on Merchant
Shipping.
There was one boy who was sent to me
from Wales three years ago; as fine
a boy as I ever saw in my life; he
went on a voyage and caine home a fine
lad. His master spoke well of him, and
he received between £14 and £15. I lost
sight of him, he would not allow me to
send him to a good lodging, and he came
back a fortnight afterwards destroyed
for ever. The boy was diseased; he had
been drinking, and into all manner of
dissipation, having been introduced into
it by the crimps.2
A case can be made out that the Board of
Trade did its best in the light of the existing state
of medical knowledge respecting syphilis and gonhorrea,
but scurvy is in quite a different category because its
causes and cure were well documented in the 1850s and
1860s. It had been eliminated in the Royal Navy around
1795, and was virtually unknown in ships making voyages
1. A copy is on PRO MT/9 32 M.765/1867.
2. RSCMS 1860 Q.4238.
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of less than 100 days. The 1844 allowance of lime
or lemon juice 1
 was sufficient to keep a fit man
from scurvy if unadulterated and supplied regularly,
but when the 1851 Act 2
 permitted the substitution of
citric acid crystals and declared that the supply of
antiscorbutics was not compulsory in ships trading
in the North Atlantic there was an increase in the
incidence of the disease. This increase was added to
by the longer voyages occasioned by the Crimean War,
the expansion of the Far Eastern, Australian, West
Coast and South American trades where voyages of over
150 days were not uncommon, and a section of the 1854
Act which said that antiscorbutics need not be supplied
to the crew of vessels trading in the Atlantic, to ports
in Europe or the Mediterranean. 3
 The number of scurvy
patients admitted annually by the Seamen's Hospital Society
doubled between 1853 and 1854, and went up a further
28% in l855.	 The following year was the worst on record
with some 1.3% of the workforce dying of disease.5
1. Lime juice, from West Indian limes, is virtually use-
less as an antiscorbutic, but by long usage the name
is given to Sicilian lemon juice, which is most
effective. Orange juice is equally effective, but
more difficult to store for long periods.
2. 14 & 15 Vic c 96, ss. 18 and 19.
3. S.224.
4. See Appendix Nine (B).
5. See Appendices Three and Eight (A). Some 2% of the
workforce died from all causes in 1856, so that over
half of the deaths were attributable to disease.
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Clearly, some reinforcement of the existing law was
needed, and the ammunition for reform was supplied by
Harry Leach, the forthright and outspoken Resident
Medical Officer in Dreadnought.
Leach was able to ascertain that scurvy,
which is a vitamin deficiency disease arising from
lack of fresh vegetable food, impure water, poor
ventilation in living quarters, dirt, cold and damp,
was breaking out in ships where either the lime or
lemon juice was bad from long keeping and the crew
refused to drink it, or where salt beef or pork was
so long in the cask that it contained very little
nourishment, 1 or where the water was tainted. As a
result of the 1851 legislation permitting chemical
substitutes, much so-called lime juice was weak tar-
taric or citric acid with a lemon flavouring, and the
general public - already beginning to murmur about the
adulteration of foodstuffs sold ashore - began to
follow the debate. 2 Harry Leach came up with the
simplest possible solutions; an inspection of anti-
scorbutics for purity before shipping them and the
addition of spirit to lime or lemon juice to make it
more palatable. He was wise enough to say that while
1. In some cases the salt beef was so hard it had the
appearance of mahogany, and seamen carved it into
ornaments. Henry Moffat saw a Swedish sailor carve
a piece of salt beef so as to make a frame for the
ship's clock in the 1860s. See Conrad Dixon tThe
Hard Life and Times of Henry Moffat, Seaman' in The
Mariner's Mirror Vol. 59, No. 2 (1973) 200.
2. It began with a letter to The Times signed 'W.F.'
and printed on 28 August 1863.
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the addition of 10% alcohol by volume in the form of
rum or brandy would preserve lime juice, an addition
of 15% would ensure that the seamen always drank it)
Kemball Cook, Secretary of the Seamen's Hospital
Society, urged the Board of Trade from early 1864
onwards to have lime juice put into a number of small
containers rather than one large cask so that deteriora-
tion might be partial rather than total, and in December
of that year the Board of Trade issued a notice to
Local Marine Boards suggesting that they inspect lime
juice and investigate outbreaks of scurvy.
The Local Marine Boards parried this thrust
from central government in various ways. The London
Board replied that as scurvy was principally caused by
a lack of fresh vegetables it proposed to put treatises
on the subject in medicine chests, while Newcastle
replied then rum and mustard was an infallible cure.
Sunderland said that the real problem was that the men
hated the taste of the stuff, and threw it away when
the mate was not looking, while many Local Marine Boards
grumbled that it was all very well asking for the in-
spection of lime juice, but who was going to pay the
wages of the inspectors? 2 Public agitation increased,
and when another anonymous letter to The Times said that
'a large quantity of so-called lemon juice ,.. contains
no juice of lemon, it is manufactured in this country
1. Correspondence on Scurvy, BPP 1965 (404) L 277.
2. BPP 1965 L 277-331.
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from ... acids ... to imitate the genuine article','
Leach wrote to the Board of Trade citing it and added,
'I have had many samples analyzed, and found them so
to be made up'.. 2 In September 1865 the Board of Trade
went part way to meet the criticism, and while shying
away from compulsory inspection of lime juice felt it
proper to circularise shipowners to suggest that only
pure juice be obtained, that 10% brandy be added as a
preservative, and that the ration be increased to four
tablespoons a week after the first fourteen days at sea,
In 1867 Harry Leach got his way when s.4 of the Merchant
Shipping Act 3 decreed the addition of 15% proof spirit
to lime juice. Scurvy steadily declined after 1867,
but in assessing the ravages of the disease over the
last twelve years the Seamen's Hospital Society had no
doubt as to where to lay the blame.
The Merchant Shipping Act, as at present
constituted, affords no remedy for this
evil - and so our sailors go to sea, are
supplied with these useless mixtures
and on their return are hoisted into
Dreadnought, or are laid up in lodging
houses, helpless for the present and ruined
in stamina for the future.5
Between 1849 and 1866 this one hospital admitted almost
1. The Times 26 August 1864.
2. BPP 1865 L 290.
3. 30 & 31 Vic c 124.
4. See Appendix Nine (B). It was down 60% in terms of
Dreadnought admissions from the 1865/66 level by
1869.
5. Annual Report of the Seamen's Hospital Society for
1866.
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1,500 scurvy sufferers; 1
 men in the prime of life
suffering from a wholly preventable deficiency disease,
The legislature had quite failed to safeguard the
health of the seagoing workforce, and the executive
arm of government had displayed a remarkable reluctance
to interfere in a decisive manner.
Successive goverrunents may have been indifferent
to health problems, but from this period there was
increasing concern about 'deterioration' in the calibre
of the workforce, and it was popularly supposed that
this was either due to the influx of foreign seamen
after 1849 when all restrictions on their employment
were removed, or because traditional skills were lost
when experienced men, or new recruits, served in steamers.2
The recruitment of foreign seamen certainly had the effect
of keeping down wages and making sea employment generally
less attractive, where choice existed, and it is undeni-
able that men left sail for steam when the opportunity
arose, but the key to this question is the matter of
physical deterioration. It seems likely on the evidence
that in the mid-nineteenth-century the places of
1. Letter from Keinball Cook, Secretary of the Seamen's
Hospital Society, to the Registrar-General of Seamen
dated 16 November 1866. Correspondence on Scurvy,
BPP 1967 (126) LXIV 98-100.
2. For example, the Secretary to the Trinity House at
Hull told the 1860 Select Committee that 'steam
vessels (are) rapidly taking the place of sailing
vessels (and) the crew consists mainly of engineers
and firemen and very few sailors ... are to be met
with ... it is found in steam vessels boys are
taught little more than to polish brass work, carry
coals and do the work of a servant.' RSCMS 1860
Q.4493.
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residence of the workforce were changing and that
recruits were coming from the least healthy areas of
the country. Appendix Ten gives the figures for pauper
seamen in England and Wales in 1857, and Figure Three
has the same information in graphic form. It can be
seen that the London area and the north-east counties
are where the majority of seamen are living when they
require in-door or out-door relief, while the inland
counties have no significant numbers of paupers in this
category. The seaman/fisherman/agricultural labourer
type of worker who was popularly believed to be the
backbone of the merchant service is still well repre-
sented in Norfolk and Devon, but in 1857 the cities and
industrial and mining areas are supplying the bulk of
the workforce. Kent, Middlesex, Durham, Northumberland
and Yorkshire have more seamen paupers than the rest of
England and Wales put together, and it is in these areas
that health is poor and the rate of mortality high. In
1856 the county of Durham had the highest death-rate
in the United Kingdom because 'many of the governing
bodies have left the towns deplorably destitute of
satisfactory sanitary arrangements', while the high
death-rate in cities generally was the subject of special
adverse comment by a public health expert in the same
year,	 The (1978) research of Jonathan Press has shown
1, Nineteenth Annual Report of the Registrar-General,
BPP 1957-58 (2431) XXIII 19, and the paper by E.
Headlain Greenhow entitled 'On the Different Prevalence
of certain Diseases in different Districts in England
and Wales' at page 331 in the same volume.
136
that only 2.2% of the seagoing workforce had inland,
rural origins: 1
 the sample of destitute seamen given
in Figure Three confirms that, at maturity, the great
majority had settled in cities and industrial areas
where conditions tended to be least healthy. Deteriora-
tion continued to be a matter of heated debate for the
remainder of the nineteenth-century, but it was not
then appreciated that the sailor had become a town-
dweller between voyages 2
 and that his health had suffered
accordingly. Additionally, when statistical material
became available on the calibre of potential Boer War
recruits early in the next century it was seen that
the alleged 'deterioration' in seamen was merely part
of the poor physical condition of the working class as
a whole. Poor health tends to be associated with poor
feeding and impure water, and a further connection may
be established by looking at the legislative provision
made in this period.
The first regulation in respect of drinking
water dates from 1844 when, consequent on the cholera
scare of the previous year, a hasty addition to the 1844
Act gave crew members the right to ask for a survey of
1. Jonathan Patrick Press, The Economic and Social
Conditions of the Merchant Seamen of England, 1815-
!.J4 . (University of Bristol Ph.D. 1978) 21.
2. Sarah Palmer makes the point strongly that London
was 'home' to a great many seamen at this time, See
her 'Seamen Ashore in Late Nineteenth-Century London:
Protection from the Crimps' in Seamen in Society
edited by Paul Adam - the proceedings of the Inter-
national Commission of Maritime History conference
held at Bucharest in August 1980.
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drinking water, food or medicine.' This right was
exercised by complaint to a Consul or a Controller of
Customs, but there had to be at least three complainants
in the crew. When the provision was repeated in the
1854 Act it was qualified by another section of the Act
that said that if, following a survey by a Consul,
shipping master, Customs officer or naval captain, the
complaint was deemed frivolous the complainants could
be fined up to a weeks' pay. 2 As a consequence, very
few complaints seem to have been made in the period,
and generally the matter was only aired when desertion
or a refusal of duty compelled a response. Many owners
supplied water from questionable sources, or took little
care as to how it was stored. Henry Moffat describes
the filling of the casks in the brig Premium with River
Thames water at the half-ebb in this period, 3 while
Walter Runciman notes in the memoirs of his early life
that when he served in the Harperley the water casks were
either stowed on deck to face permeation by salt spray
or put in the hold on top of a coal cargo. 4 The Society
for Improving the Condition of Merchant Seamen called
for water to be stored in iron tanks rather than wooden
1. 8 Vic C 112, s.57.
2. 17 & 18 Vic c 104, ss.221-222.
3. Henry Moffat, From Ship's Boy to Skipper - with
Variations (Paisley, 1910) 42.
4. Walter Runciman, Before the Mast - and After (1924)
49. He was the father of Walter Runciman (1870-1949),
a shipowner and Liberal MP who was President of the
Board of Trade in 1914-16 and in the 1930s.
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casks, 1
 but there was no legislative change in this
period. The only executive action by the Board of
Trade was the issue in 1865 of a circular condemning
the supply of condensed water to seamen in steamers
and reminding shipowners of their statutory obligation
to provide 'a good supply of fresh water'. Under the
1854 Act the maximum fine for omitting to provide such
a supply, after a survey, was £20.2
Prior to the development of refrigeration late
in the nineteenth-century, the problem of shipping
consumable stores had been largely solved by the provi-
sion of salted, dried and liquid foodstuffs headed-up
in casks for longer keeping. There was a considerable
variation in the food supplied to merchant seamen in
the 1850s and 1860s, but two conunon factors were 'bread'
- which was a type of hard-grained, flinty biscuit -
and salt meat. The normal allowance of the former was
a pound a day, 3 and while the ration of the latter com-
prised about 1 . pounds of meat on the bone before cooking,
the seaman generally got about jib of stringy gristle
in his pannikin liberally garnished with marbled fat.
Oatmeal, rice and dried peas were commonly supplied in
1. Report of the Committee of the Society for Improving
the Condition of Merchant Seamen, PRO MT/9 M,5489/
1867.
2. S.212.
3. Enlightened owners, such as Money, Wigram and Sons,
posted diet scales in the fo'c's'ie, and their 1866
scale included the phrase 'Allowance not limited:
no Waste allowed' under the heading for bread. From
a diet scale in the private collection of the candi-
date.
1.
2.
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small quantities; there was a weekly ration of flour
for making duff and of sugar for sweetening tea. In
steamers and the better class of sailing ships about
half a pound of tinned meat (known as 'Harriet Lane'
after a notorious Liverpool prostitute who was murdered
and dismembered by a client) might be doled out on
Sundays with a half-ration of salt meat. Appendix
Eleven has details of nine diets, including CD) and (F)
relating to the 1860s. These diets are markedly inferior
to even the naval provision scale of 1785 at (A), being
both monotonous and grossly deficient in vitamins A, C
and D. They contain no fresh food at all, and one
contemporary medical opinion was that this type of
feeding was a principal cause of scurvy in merchant
vessels.' The legal position was that 'a scale of
provisions' was one of the items agreed to by signatories
to crew agreements, 2 and in theory the provision scale
was subject to negotiation. In practice, seamen had
little chance of bargaining: the words 'Liverpool Scale'
or some other formula being stamped or written-into the
agreement beforehand. In the next chapter it will be
shown that although great pressure was brought upon
Board of Trade officials by the medical experts to
endorse a higher standard of nutrition, the former
The view of Dr. Walter Dickson, a Customs employee,
who allied himself with Harry Leach to improve
sailors' diet. BPP 1867 LXIV 93-96.
A point established by s.46 of the 1850 Act and
confirmed by s.149 of the 1854 Act.
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succeeded in both avoiding a statutory solution and
a confrontation with the shipowners who wished to
preserve the status quo.
In the field of welfare this was a barren
period, and the welfare gap that existed between the
winding-up of the Merchant Seamen's Fund in 1851 and
the founding of the Royal Alfred Aged Merchant Seamen's
Institution' in 1857 was virtually absolute in the
national sense because charities catering directly
for the needs of seamen in distress tended to be either
religious in character or local in operation. The
British and Foreign Sailors Society, 2
 created in 1833
through a merger of the Port of London Society with
the Bethel-Union Society, was primarily concerned with
spiritual welfare and moral improvement, 3 while the
Keelman's Hospital on Tyneside, Trinity House at Hull
and the Sailors' Children's Society, founded in 1821,
had strictly local applications. The Royal Alfred was
greatly restricted in the amount of relief it could
give, and it may be said that for all intents and pur-
poses there was no comprehensive provision for old,
1.	 Renamed The Royal Alfred Merchant Seamen's Society
in 1950 when a royal charter was granted.
Originally an offshoot of the Shipwrecked Mariners
Society, the patronage of Prince Alfred, second
son of Queen Victoria, was an essential element of
its success. See A. Stewart McMillan's The Royal
Alfred Story (1967) 12-16.
2.	 Now the British Sailors' Society.
3.	 The provision of clubs and hostel accommodation
came late in the nineteenth-century, although the
organisation continues to have a strong religious
element.
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sick or disabled seamen between 1851 and the first
decade of the twentieth-century when the Liberals laid
the foundation of the welfare state. The Merchant
Seamen's Fund had been paying over 7,000 pensions in
1848, and while they were generally inadequate as a
sole means of livelihood, running as they did at an
average rate of £6-lOs a year, these pensions neverthe-
less represented a reasonable supplement to a family
income in an age when the extended family was more
common than latterly. 1 Greenwich Hospital, only
available to merchant seamen who had also served in
the Royal Navy, was phased out in the l860s when over
1,000 inmates with service in merchant vessels were
pensioned-off. For the great majority of sick, disabled
or elderly meTchant seamen the usual provision there-
after was the workhouse, or those institutions in the
larger cities given the name of Asylums for the Homeless
Poor. The reconstitution of the Merchant Seamen's Fund
was suggested on numerous occasions, but it was never
implemented. 2
In the field of safety the year 1862 marked
a retreat from the deckload legislation of 1839, and
here the responsibility lies with Mimer Gibson, who
was President of the Board of Trade between July 1859
1. RRC1SF 1847-48, Appendix 4.
2. The nearest the suggestion came to implementation
was in 1880 when Joseph Chamberlain promised to
introduce a short Bill for the purpose, but the
promise was not kept. See Hansard 3 252 955-974.
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and July 1866.1 He had permitted the repeal of the
1839 Act that prohibited winter deck-loads in the
North Atlantic on the grounds that the lengthening
of poops and the construction of spar-decks 2
 hd
enabled timber ships to carry de-facto deckloads
without contravening the Act, while the loading of
timber in America rather than Canada had led to a loss
of revenue by the Canadian authorities. 3 During his
time in office, the rise in the number of shipping
casualties was a cause for public concern, and in 1866
it was reported that 'half (of the casualty list) is
represented by the unseaworthy, overladen or ill-found
vessels of the collier class chiefly employed in the
coasting trade. 4 The reality was that economic forces
were compelling the employment of the largely unsurveyed
sailing fleet in bulk trades where the strain on hull
and rigging was greatest, and while surveys to ascertain
1.	 Thomas Mimer Gibson (1806-1884) was MP for
Ashton-under-Lyne, and a Cobdenite and free-trader.
He is best remembered for his opposition to
Britain's involvement in the Crimean War and for
seconding Cobden's motion of censure of Palmerston's
China policy in 1857.
2. In sailing ships, a framework structure above the main
deck to hold spare masts and spars.
3. Information from T.H. Farrer and reproduced at BPP
1873 (C.853) XXXV1 809, the Preliminary Report of
the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships (referred
to hereafter as PRRCUS 1873). The repeal of the
1839 Act was by 25 & 26 Vic c 63, s.2,
4. Remarks to accompany the Wreck Return of the Board
of Trade for 1866, BPP 1867 (19671) LXIV 381.
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the condition of a ship for insurance purposes,
were common practice, and surveys on the basis of
complaints by crew members not unknown, there was no
compulsory, periodic survey of vessels - except in the
case of passenger-carrying steamers and emigrant ships.
The protection given to miners and factory workers by
the Mines and Factory Acts was not available to mer-
chant seamen, and whereas a miner could leave an unsafe
pit and a iniliworker could quit his workplace if the
machinery was defective or dangerous, the seaman who
had signed to make a voyage faced imprisonment for
doing so. Gibson's action over deckloads, and the
Liberal ministry's inaction over shipping losses, were
to have consequences that would trouble successive
administrations for almost thirty years.
The theme of this chapter that the mid-
Victorian simplicity of the governing class and the anti-
interventionist attitude of officials depressed the lot
of seamen must be modified to some extent by noting
measures, administrative acts and local initiatives that
were contrary to this general trend, and by taking
account of changes in the social status of ships' officers
and the effect of technological advance. For example,
by 1852 steam shipowners had statutory obligations in
respect of fire hoses,' compass adjustment, distress
signals, lifesaving equipment, watertight bulkheads and
1.	 9 & 10 Vic c 100, s.5.
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safety valves, 1 Steamers, which in 1843 had generally
comprised river passenger vessels and a mere few
hundred at that, had by 1866 come to make up 15% of
the net registered tonnage of the United Kingdom.2
Steamers made shorter voyages and paid better; 3 a
seaman serving in one had more time at home, was better
fed and was much cleaner because waste hot water was
plentiful in a steam-propelled vessel while water of
any kind was scarce in sailing ships. A new rating of
donkeyman-greaser evolved to deal with steam machinery
in deck officer's territory: the carpenter lost status,4
while the superior types of Able Seamen became quarter-
masters and were the first deck personnel to benefit
from the four hours on - eight hours off watch system
pioneered by the firemen. In 1862 every steamship that
was required by law to carry a certificateI ' master had
also to carry certificated engineers, 5 for while the
1. 14 & 15 Vic C 79, ss.3-21.
2. See Appendix One (ii).
3. See Appendix Fifteen (A) which shows that ABs in
steam vessels consistently earned more than ABs in
sailing ships, and Appendix Fifteen (C) which shows
that officers and petty officers were also con-
sistently better paid in steamers.
4. The practice of carpenters acting as second mates
in sailing ships did not spread to steamers, and
naval carpenters actually refused advancement to
officer status at this time.
5. If the engine generated over a hundred horsepower
there had to be two engineers - one with a first
and one with a second class certificate. 25 & 26
Vic C 63, s.5.
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free-traders in Parliament objected that these provisions
might equally well be extended to cover traindrivers
and engine-minders in cotton mills the counter-argument
of public safety won the day. 1
 The social status of
ships' officers improved, with deck officers being
admitted to the Royal Naval Reserve in 1861, and
engineers in 1863.
The Board of Trade did its best to raise
standards among certificated personnel, and seems to
have followed a policy of favouring Certificate of
Competency Officers over Certificate of Service officers
when enquiries were made into shipping disasters.
Twenty-three special enquiries were held in 1859: five
Certificates of Service were cancelled, but no Certifi-
cates of Competency. Three years later, five Certificates
of Service were cancelled and only one Certificate of
Competency. It is noticeable in these years that the
latter category tended to be admonished, reprimanded
or have their certificates suspended for short periods:
the Certificate of Service men either lost them or were
ordered to take the examinations for a Certificate of
Competency as a condition for reinstatement. 2 In 1865
the Liverpool Shipowners Association suggested univer-
sity degrees for navigating officers, and the Board of
Trade agreed in principle, although neither side
1. 1-lansard 3 164 1750-1751,
2. Wreck Returns, BPP 1860 (2623) LX 553-560 and BPP
1863 (6361) LXIII 244-254. Prior to 1866 the
Board of Trade fixed penalties, and occasionally
dissented from the decisions of enquiry boards.
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developed the idea further.' The first comprehensive
Collision Regulations and a rudimentary Rule of the
Road at Sea were included in the 1862 Merchant Shipping
Amendment Act, 2 and in the same year the Board of Trade
transferred to Local Marine Boards the major part of
the certification process. This early devolution of
central government power was carried a stage further in
1866 when, during the Deslandes Enquiry which dealt
with a grossly intemperate master, the principle was
established that the recommendations of Local Marine
Boards would generally be endorsed by the Board of
Trade.3
At the local level, three initiatives may be
singled out for comment. The 1850 Act had permitted
the establishment of seamen's homes in the larger ports,
and within ten years twenty-six such homes had been
built. 4 Central government had made little progress in
dealing with desertion and men failing to join ships
after contracting to do so, but the Local Marine Board
at Liverpool found a partial answer to the latter problem.
It was appreciated that masters who had left port short-
1. PRO MT/p 19 M.938/1865.
2. 25 & 26 Vic c 63, s.25 and Table C.
3. Papers relating to an Inquiry into Charges of
Misconduct and Drunkenness against Captain J.
Gordon Deslandes, late Master of the Ship 'Anne'
of Liverpool, BPP 1867 (127) LXIII 169.
4. Return of Sailors' Homes, BPP 1860 (562) LX 387-401.
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handed could not prosecute missing crew in person, and
an Out-Door Superintendent was appointed to track
down and deal with these offenders on the behalf of
owners and masters) The success rate was high, and
the number of such cases fell from 1,872 in 1854 to 517
in 1859. Nationally, however, the problem was 'little
abated'. 2 School ships, such as the Conway, were
founded in this period, 3 and the Report of the
Commissioners appointed to enquire into the best means
of Manning the Navy called for a fleet of twelve such
ships to train merchant service officers. 4 However,
it must be said that a career at sea had few attractions
for those potential entrants with free choice, for only
two training ships for officers came into being and the
1. 1ot all missing crew could be categorised as deserters.
For example, where clothing was left on board
desertion could not be assumed. The Agincourt case
of 1824 (1 Hag. Adm. 271, 281) and the Ealing Grove
affair in 1826 (2 Hag. Adm. 15,22) had established
that absence on a drunken spree did not amount to
desertion.
2. RSCMS 1860 xxxix.
3. In all, twenty-one training ships were established
between 1856 and 1885, but only the Conway and
Worcester trained future officers. Some, like the
Akbar, were reformatory ships, and some, like the
}ormidable at Bristol, were industrial training
schools. For an account of a typical school-ship
in the latter category see Alston Kennerley 'Navi-
gation School and Training Ship: Educational Pro-
vision in Plymouth for the Mercantile Marine in
the Nineteenth-Century 1 in Stephen Fisher (ed.)
West Country Maritime and Social History: Some
Essays (Exeter, 1980) 53.
4. RCMN 1869 xvii.
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number of apprentices signing indentures declined
steadily from 1854 to the end of the century)
Conditions of employment and the standard of living
lagged badly when compared to those ashore, and in
large part that lag may be attributed to the simplistic
mood of the legislature and the doctrine of determined
non-intervention followed by senior executives.
1.	 See Appendix Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE AGE OF REFORM, 1867 TO 1883
Changes in living and working conditions are
almost invariably associated with larger events, 1 and
in looking at improvements in the sailors' lot between
1867 and 1883 it is important not to place too much
emphasis on the work of individuals such as James Hall
and Samuel Plimsoll, Harry Leach or Walter Dickson, but
to appreciate that larger forces are at work. In the
period under review it is possible to list three factors
that permitted, or encouraged, change. The first is an
improved economic climate during the early part of this
period which, despite the impact of the so-called
'Great Depression' of 1873-96, resulted long-term in
a doubling of Britain's foreign trade by value in the
forty years between 1870 and 1910. Second, and probably
the most important in the present context, is the
decline of sail tonnage from 1865 and the marked increase
in steam tonnage. 2
 Steamships were safer, 3 tended to
1. For example, large-scale provision of municipal housing
in Britain can be dated from the 'homes-fit-for-heroes'
agitation consequent on World War One, while silicon-
chip development arising out of space exploration pro-
grammes is leading to a re-examination of hours of work,
work-sharing and the problem of enforced leisure in the
1980s.
2. Rowland describes the 1860s as a 'decisive decade' and
holds that the 'eclipse of the sailing vessel was
due ,.. to the re-introduction of the compound engine
adapted for driving a screw propellor'. This technique
saved between 30% and 40% of the fuel costs incurred by
a single expansion engine of the same power. K.T. Rowland
Steam at Sea: A History of Steam Navigation (Newton
Abbot, 1970) 119-120.
3. See Figure Four.
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have better accommodation, made shorter and more
regular voyages and supplied waste hot water in
quantity for washing purposes. During the years
covered by this chapter steam tonnage quadrupled while
sail tonnage fell by a quarter. Numerically, the
picture is somewhat different with the number of
steam vessels not overtaking the number of sailing
vessels until 1904, so that the general overview in the
last third of the nineteenth-century is one of a rela-
tively large, but steadily declining, fleet of small
sailing ships and a smaller, but rapidly rising,
number of larger steamers) These large steamers
demanded large crews with new skills, and in particular
brought in an element in the workforce that had under-
gone a shore apprenticeship and had the expectations
of skilled land workers. 2
 The third factor is an
administrative response to just grievances resulting
in changes in legislation and in attitudes to the sea-
going workforce. At first, this response was wholly
legalistic in character, as may be shown by examining
the questions of accommodation for seamen and their
victualling.
Historically, seamen had been expected to
1. See Appendices One and Two.
2. A point given emphasis by H. Campbell McMurray in
his 'Ships' Engineers: Their Status and Position
on Board, c. 1830-65', Stephen Fisher (ed). West
Country Maritime and Social History: Some Essays
(Exeter, 1980) 91.
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work, eat and sleep above decks,' and when in the
seventeenth-century they had been permitted to sleep
below they were first accommodated in the orlop, 2 and
then in the fo'c's'le. The fo'c's'le was triangular
in shape and of little use as cargo space: being at
the forward end of the ship it could not be fitted
with large portholes and hatches, and it was often
necessary for anchor chains or warps to pass through
it for storage in the chain locker.. Consequently,
fo'c's'les tended to be damp, dark, dirty and ill-
ventilated. Accommodation was not covered by legis-
lation prior to 1850 when s.63 of the Mercantile Marine
Act stipulated that each seaman who was named in the
agreement should be allowed 'nine superficial feet'
of living space, which was also to be well-ventilated
and unobstructed by stores. 3 In 1854 this provision was
le Sir Walter Raleigh believed that 'Cabins are but
sluttish dens which breed sickness' and kept his men
out in the open air. Quoted by F.P. Ellis in 'The
Atmospheric Environment Between Decks in the Royal
Navy' British Medical Journal, 1966 No.1 1057-1060.
In the late eighteenth-century there was no below-
deck accommodation for the crews of slavers during
the Middle Passage - see HCSPEC 72 309 - and Schedule
A of 32 Geo 3 c 52 specified that a deck shelter
should be provided for crew when the ship was full of
slaves.
2. The fore upper part of the hold. Seamen were also
accommodated at other parts of a ship where no cargo
or stores could be stowed such as the steerage, or
tiller flat, and the half-deck at the break of the poop.
3. Originally, the clause had called for twelve super-
ficial feet, but the Liverpool Shipowners Association
used the 'hot bunk' argument, saying that twelve feet
was excessive because 'not more than half the crew
are ever below at one time'. PRO BT/1 477 643/1850.
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extended by s.231 to give each man nine superficial
feet if sleeping in a hammock and twelve superficial
feet if sleeping in a bunk. There was to be six feet
of headroom in sleeping places, which were to be kept
free from stores and 'properly caulked'.' Each seaman
was to have fifty-four cubic feet of space if sleeping
in a hanunock and seventy-two cubic feet if sleeping in
a bunk. At first hearing this seems adequate, but
seventy-two cubic feet represents a space some six
feet by six feet by two feet, and as the minimum base
area of a bunk is six feet by two feet it was necessary
for builders to fit double, or even treble, rows of
bunks to the curving inner timbers of the wettest part
of a ship in order to get any space for movement in a
fo'c's'le. 2 It was recognised that this provision was
sub-standard, 3 and when collier seamen made a direct
complaint the Board of Trade was able to conduct an
investigation and suggest new legislation.
1. This provision was a dead letter, and the rigging
of waterproof sheets over hammocks was commonplace.
See Walter Runciman, Collier Brigs and Their Sailors
37 and Merchant Seamen's Accommodation, BPP 1867
(125) LXIII 352.
2. Bunks that are to be used during a voyage cannot be
fitted athwartships as they will pitch the occupant
out when the ship rolls in a sea. Hence, in sea-
going vessels, the necessity of fore-and-aft con-
struction following the curve of the bow.
3. One ardent reformer, Captain Henry Toynbee, read a
well-reasoned paper entitled 'The Social Condition
of Seamen' at the United Service Institution on 16
July 1866 and suggested an increase to fifteen super-
ficial feet of living space and regular inspection of
accommodation. Text at PRO MT/9 26 M.3049/1866.
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While the seamen's strike of 1866 was drawing
to a close the Seaham men petitioned the Board of Trade
to allege that their ships were under-manned, worn-out
and had leaky and cramped fo'c's'les. They demanded
parity of conditions with factory hands ashore, and
while TH. Farrer took his usual line when replying
to the effect that 'it is impossible for the law to
determine the number or quality of the crew necessary
to man different ships' and 'no seaman is obliged to
engage for a ship which he knows to be unseaworthy',
he did agree to send a surveyor to Seahani to investigate
complaints about accommodation. 1 The surveyor reported
that the fo'c's'les of the ships in question had the
requisite cubic capacity but were half-filled with
warps, had only three and a half feet headroom in
places and leaked inordinately. 2 Enquiries at other
ports brought confirmation that the 1854 minimum stan-
dard of accommodation was now thought to be inadequate.
The surveyor at Leith said bluntly that nine superficial
feet was insufficient for men sleeping in hajnmocks,3
and called attention to the case of coasters which
1. BPP 1867 LXIII 339-341.
2. BPP 1867 LXIII 348-349.
3. The problem is that it is the stretchers inserted
in the outer hammock strings that give a hammock
width and comfort. A hammock is six feet long,
and the strings should be at least three feet
to the hook to let the stretchers do their work.
A hammock slung in nine feet would be constricting
for the sleeper, who would find himself in a U-
shaped posture for much of the time.
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anchored almost daily and thus could not caulk the
hawseholes each time so as to protect the sleeping
crew from wind and water. The Port of London surveyor
pointed out that the 1854 Act had not legislated for
the lighting of crew accommodation and that the 'well-
ventilated' proviso dating from 1850 was being breached
where fo'c's'les had only a two-foot square scuttle to
supply fresh air. He went on to suggest the provision
of privies for crew because the heads were unsafe in
bad weather. 1
 The Board of Trade surveyor at Glasgow
reported that a seaman living in cramped conditions
tended to give up his seachest - which took up valuable
floor space - and put his effects in a bag stowed at
the foot of his bunk. The consequence was that
Long ere the expiry of a voyage out of
the home trade his entire outfit of both
wet clothes and dry, dirty and clean, are
either tossing about the bed or bundled
up in one incongruous mass into this bag,
his only receptacle.
The same official suggested that officers fared little
better than men.
I entered the stateroom where a first
and second mate had to lie, and when both
were standing neither could take a single
step in any one direction and I could well
1. BPP 1867 LXIII 352. W.R. Thrower describes the 'heads'
thus. 'The normal place for voiding in a ship was
called the heads: this was in the bows where 'seats
of convenience', consisting of spaced planks, were
provided. The seats on one side were used by the
officers and those on the other side by the crew.
But it was only possible to use them in fine weather
the bilges of these sailing ships always con-
tained plenty of human excrement'. W.R. Thrower,
Life at Sea in the Age of Sail (Chichester, 1972) 82.
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believe that only one could dress at a
time.1
Politically,it was a good moment for new
legislation. The outgoing President of the Board of
Trade, Mimer Gibson, had been unable to get a Merchant
Shipping Bill through on 19 July 1866, and two days
previously an attempt to set up a Royal Commission on
the deterioration of British seamen had been abandoned.2
The new Tory administration was determined to show it
could do better, and the Merchant Shipping Act, 1867
went through virtually unamended under the guidance of
Sir Stafford Northcote and the Duke of Richmond. 3 In
moving the Second Reading in the Lords the Duke of
Richmond made an emphatic reference to the new principle
that crew spaces were to be exempted from tonnage dues
- a matter of some importance in the immediate future
for the advantage it gave Board of Trade officials when
dealing with shipowners. 4 The 1867 Act 5 contained
1. BPP 1867 LXIII 364, 371.
2. CJ 121, 457 and 464.
3. Sir Stafford Northcote was President of the Board of
Trade between July 1866 and March 1867. Charles
Henry, Sixth Duke of Richmond (1818-1903) held various
cabinet offices in the Conservative governments of
Lord Derby, Disraeli and Lord Salisbury.
4. Hansard 3 188 850. A letter from the Board of Trade
dated 4 March 1869 instructed the Liverpool surveyor
as to how he should deal with an uncooperative owner,
'The creation of privies is not compulsory, but if
they are not provided then no deduction can be allowed
from tonnage on account of crew spaces'. Merchant
Ships (Seamen's Accommodation), BPP 1868-69 (375)
LV 444.
5. 30 & 31 Vic c 124. The Merchant Shipping Act of
1867 was not repealed until 1949.
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minimum remedies for the four major problems of the
last decade - poor accommodation, scurvy, medical
stores and sanitary arrangements. Section 9 of the
Act increased the minimum living space slightly to 12
superficial feet or 72 cubic feet per man, and this
standard obtained until 1906 when it was further
raised to 120 cubic feet for existing vessels and 15
square feet per man in new ships. 1 Section 4 reflected
the persistent lobbying of Harry Leach described in
the previous chapter, with its emphasis on litnejuice
being obtained only from bonded warehouses, stored in
glass bottles and containing 15% alcohol. Medicines
and a book of medical instructions were henceforth to
be carried in accordance with a Board of Trade scale,
and privies were to be constructed for the use of sea-
men by section 9(3). Compulsory medical inspection,
which had been urged seven years before by the influ-
ential Liverpool Mercantile Marine Association, 2 was
1. It is difficult for twentieth-century man to appreciate
how minimal these revised standards were, although a
comparison with eighteenth-century prison conditions
may be helpful. In 1773 the great prison reformer,
John Howard, fired public indignation with his descrip-
tion of conditions in York Prison, A cell - described
as 'horribly small' - had a space of 414 cubic feet,
about six times greater than the minimum space granted
to seamen by the 1867 Act. See Hepworth Dixon John
Howard and the Prison World of Europe (1850 edition) 136.
2. RSCMS 1860 QQ.2962-2964. The Liverpool Mercantile
Marine Association, founded in 1857, had over 1,000
members who were principally masters, engineers,
merchants and shipowners. It was an informal officer's
trade union, had a reading room for members near the
docks and managed the school-ship Conway.
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instituted by s.1O. Section 7 was a major defeat for
the anti-interventionists. A sick seaman, whose illness
or disability arose from the neglect of the owner or
master, was to have his hospital expenses paid by them,
and this section reflects the wishes of the Seamen's
Hospital Society who had been complaining bitterly for
years that niggardly masters kept men on short conunons
during a voyage and then sent them to Dreadnought on
returning to England in a weak or diseased state.
Employer's liability lay in the future, but s,7 is an
early indicator as to which way the wind of public and
informed opinion is blowing.
The 1867 Act had two wholly new features -
lavatories and medical inspection - but it must be
stressed that diffusion in respect of the former and
comprehensive performance in the case of the latter
provision was achieved in a leisurely way. Conscientious
surveyors toured the shipyards chalking diagrams on
bulkheads in order to instruct foreman shipwrights as
to the fitting of privies, 1 but the Act did not apply
to existin ,g vessels and in at least one instance the
delay in diffusion can be put at twenty years. 2 Medical
1. BPP 1868-9 LV 521-523. Letter from the Chief
Shipwright Surveyor to the Board of Trade dated
10 May 1869.
2. Captain Thomas Garry Fraser sailed for the first
time in a ship provided with crew lavatories in
1887, having kept a detailed account of his voyages
since 1865. Margory Gee (ed.) Captain Fraser's
Voyages (1979) 180.
158
inspection was of the simplest kind, with doctors
instructed to look primarily for signs of scurvy,
dysentery and venereal disease. Harry Leach, the
resident medical officer in Dreadnought, wrote to
the Board of Trade on 15 February 1868 to observe
that 'Many men make good sailors who limp in their
gait, are deformed, and have deficiencies in their
sight, speech and hearing', and Inspectors Circular
No. 4 issued in March 1868 echoed the sentiment, added
a bureaucratic safeguard, and duly instructed port
doctors that 'Deformities, or deficiency in sight or
hearing, although they may not, in the opinion of the
Inspector, render the Seaman unfit for duty at sea,
should be recorded by him in his report'.' At the
end of the century medical inspection was still cursory,
and sometimes non-existent, as Thomas Oliver's major
study of conditions in dangerous trades indicates.
Much ill-health and disease would be
avoided if more care were exercised in
the selection of men for the Mercantile
Marine. The Merchant Shipping Act
(section 10) provides for the medical
inspection of seamen if required, but as
a matter of fact, this provision is prac-
tically a dead letter, and men are allowed
to sign on without any enquiry as to their
physical fitness for their occupation.2
However, while formal medical inspection in
port may have been somewhat of a charade, the 1867 Act
did make a significant impact in respect of health care
1. PRO MT/9 40 M.2328/1868.
2. Thomas Oliver, Dangerous Trades 189.
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during a voyage. Harry Leach produced the first
edition of the Ship Captain's Medical Guide in 1868,1
and a revised scale of medicines required to be carried
in British merchant vessels was published. 2
 Deaths
from disease fell by a third in the decade from 1867
to 1876,	 There was less success in countering the
incidence of venereal disease among seafarers in this
period when prophylactic measures that might have
curbed the spread of syphilis and gonhorrea were not
put into effect because of a division, or evasion, of
responsibility between government departments, Dr.
Walter Dickson called for the compulsory examination
- and detention - of prostitutes working in dock areas:
in other words an extension of the Contagious Diseases
Act to cover merchant seamen, but received a dusty
answer from the Board of Trade. T.H. Farrer minuted
the file - tthis matter is one which the Board of Trade
as a department are unable to deal' - and sent the
papers to the Poor Law Board. The latter department
made no reply. 4 The s.7 requirement on owners to pay
1. It was sanctioned by the Board of Trade as an
authorised book of instruction on 4 February 1868,
and a copy may be found at PRO MT/9 39 M.l11l/1868.
The Ship Captain's Medical Guide used simple language
and gave clear instructions. The entry for treating
sunstroke is as follows. 'Send your patient at once
into the coldest place that you can find, get his head
shaved, apply cold to it, and give an ounce of castor
oil immediately, repeating the dose until the bowels
are freely and thoroughly voided four or five times'.
2. London Gazette (3812) 7 July 1868.
3. See Appendix Eight (B).
4. PRO MT/9 39 M.137l/1868.
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the hospital expenses of men whose disability was
attributable to ship conditions was to be tested many
times in the years between 1867 and 1906, with the
tide of legal opinion and practice moving very slowly
in the seaman's favour. Initially, there was a
tendency for masters to record that injuries or disease
were in a non-attributable category, to deduct 'reason-
able expenses' from the man's account until hospital
expenditure was greater than wages due, and then enter
a discharge by 'mutual consent' in the log, leaving
the man stranded.' This device became shopworn, and
then a standard three shillings a day 2
 was deducted
from the wages of sick seamen left abroad to pay for
hospital care and travelling expenses while coming home
as Distressed British Seamen, which usually left them
either destitute, or, as J. Havelock Wilson the great
union leader notes in his autobiography, a few shillings
in debt. 3
 In the field of civil law, it was later
1. As in the case of George Reid. Reid was discharged
from the Burton in Oslo on 18 July 1870 suffering
from scurvy. He had £6-ils wages due, but the
account showed there to be hospital expenses of
£1l-l8-9d and the log showed a discharge by mutual
consent. Reid's protest failed, and the Board of
Trade put out Circular 527 in January 1872 reminding
Consuls abroad that limejuice must be supplied to
seamen on the basis laid down by s,4 of the 1867 Act,
thus obviously giving a heavy hint that where sharp
practice of this kind was employed Consuls would do
well to look at areas where the practitioner was
himself vulnerable. See PRO MT/9 58 M.4420/l871.
2. A figure fixed by the Board of Trade in 1874, See
Distressed Seamen, BPP 1875 (108) LXVIII 69.
3. J. Havelock Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life
(1925) 82.
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confirmed that an owner had an obligation to provide
medical attention until a home port was reached,' but
before 1906 only men who had received 'hurt and injury
in the service of the ship' 2
 could take advantage of
s.7: the remainder suffering from illness or disease
had to see their hard-earned wages go in hospital and
travelling expenses before the owner, or the state in
the form of the Board of Trade, made a contribution.
In the last chapter it was shown that the
seaman's diet was monotonous, deficient in vitamins
and chiefly made up of the coarsest kinds of salted
and dried food, and in looking at the administrative
response to complaints about diet from the mid-1860s
it will be shown that a fine legalistic attitude emerged
which deferred the institution of a statutory diet
scale for forty years. In 1867, many leading British
shipowners victualled their men by reference to the
Liverpool Scale, 3 which was basically a pound of hard
biscuit 4 and a pound and a half of salt meat a day.5
1. Anderson v. Rayner (1903) 1 K.B. 589.
2. This is the phrase used in s.207(1) of the 1894 Act,
which repeated the s.7 provision of 1867.
3. See Appendix Eleven (F).
4. To make them more palatable, biscuits were often
pounded to dust in linen bags and then mixed with
jam or treacle to make 'dandyfunk'. A mixture with
salt meat was called 'lobscouse', and a kind of sea-
pie was often concocted by baking layers of crushed
biscuit, salt meat and peas in a pannikin on the
galley stove.
5. That is, before cooking. After cooking, the portion
might be about three-quarters of a pound by weight.
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The Board of Trade was well aware of the shortcomings
of the Liverpool Scale through the lobbying of the
Seamen's Hospital Society, and in February of that
year issued a circular to Marine Boards inviting
comment on the diet of seamen. Newcastle had no
comment to make, believing that it was 'an open matter
to be agreed when the articles are signed' and Sunder-
land Local Marine Board thought that 'it would scarcely
do in these days of freedom to have recourse to a
compulsory dietary scale'.' These were typical replies
from Local Marine Boards, and as the Boards were
dominated by cost-conscious shipowners it is hardly
surprising that there was a general agreement for no
change. Seamen's organisations and individual spokesmen
took a contrary view. The Seamen's Parliamentary Commit-
tee wrote to the Board of Trade saying that they wanted
a statutory diet scale and the regular inspection of
food, 2 while the Society for Improving the Condition
of Merchant Seamen called for the addition of fresh
potatoes to the diet and the supply of clean water and
biscuits in airtight tins. 3 Harry Leach suggested that
the salt meat and dried peas component in seamen's diets
be reduced and replaced by additional fresh water,
1. Correspondence on the Subject of Dietary Scales on
board Merchant Ships BPP 1867-68 (407) LXIII 161-184.
2. Based at 163 Duke Street, Liverpool, this was an
organisation of serving seamen, and T.H. Farrer noted:
'This is worth reading - not because it is new but
because it comes from the seamen'. Their memorandum
at PRO MT/9 40 M.2495/l868 and dated 6 February 1868.
3. From a shilling pamphlet entitled Report of the Committee
of the Society for Improving the Condition of Merchant
Seamen on PRO MT/9 36 M.5489/l867. The Committee
included Harry Leach, Thomas Gray, the shipowner Robert
Wigram and Edwin Chadwick, the poor-law and public
health reformer.
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potatoes, pickles and preserved meat. 1
 The material
was considered by Thomas Gray, whose anti-interventionist
views have already been referred to, and Gray made it
clear at an early stage that he saw an approved scale
of provisions merely as a suggestion to shipowners, or as
one which was to apply 'only to those cases where
the dietary scale is not filled in (on agreements) or
is obscure or incomprehensible'. 2 He was determined
to avoid a situation where the Board of Trade could be
called on to arbitrate between owners and seamen over
items of diet.
In January 1868 Thomas Gray wrote to Harry
Leach and Dr. Walter Dickson asking them to draw up a
scale of provisions for merchant seamen. Initially, the
two medical men sent in separate replies. Leach gave
each seaman a gallon of water a day, unlimited bread
(biscuit), an additional pound and a half of preserved
meat weekly together with a half pound of preserved
vegetables, half a pound of dried fruit and a quarter
pound of butter. Dr. Dickson produced a fortnightly
scale based on preserved meat, salt meat, soup and
bouilli 3 and a water ration of one and a half gallons
a day. 4 Thomas Gray was testy about these divergences.
1. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 166.
2. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 163.
3. From the French: stewed or boiled meat. The nearest
modern equivalent would be tinned pie filling.
4. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 166-167.
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'Two scales', he wrote, 'will give the Board a very
great deal of trouble and will still leave the question
open ••, '2 On 13 February 1868 Dickson and Leach
produced a combined scale, and it appears in full as
Appendix Eleven (H). Gray then circularised this
scale to Local Marine Boards and canvassed their reaction.
Hull thought it was too generous, and Belfast wanted to
keep the water ration down to a gallon a day. Leith
rejected the scale outright, while London objected to
a water allowance for washing as 'there is always plenty
alongside', 2 The publication of this scale followed,
but the legal situation was not altered in any way,
and the scale was in no sense a statutory one. Section
149 of the 1854 Act was still operative, and while a
'scale of provisions' corresponding to that in Gray's
circular was to appear on crew agreements for almost
the next forty years the Board of Trade was always able
to take the line that it was a scale agreed between
master and man, Indeed, when giving evidence in 1873
Thomas Gray vehemently denied that he had in any way
'recommended' this scale, 3 and the assessment must be
that while the Board of Trade had been manoeuvred by
the anti-scurvy lobby into publishing a scale of
victualling for the information of shipowners, the latter
were not compelled to take any notice of it. What
1. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 168.
2. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 173.
3. PRRCUS 1873 QQ.11,420-11,428.
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happened in many cases was that the old Liverpool
Scale, plus rice and extra sugar, continued to be
supplied. 1
 As a convinced anti-interventionist, Thomas
Gray had intervened to the least of his ability. The
Board of Trade victualling scale that he sanctioned
was a cosmetic exercise with the appearance, but not
the substance, of legality.
In Chapter Three the point was made that
exceptional shipping losses in the 1830s and l840s
had led to enquiry and reforms in a number of areas,
and in this chapter the same process will be followed
in respect of the period from the late l8ôOs to the
early 1880s. The seminal change from sail to steam
propulsion forced the ageing sailing fleet into the
less profitable bulk trades where standards of upkeep
tended to be low, and losses rose. Appendix Thirteen
shows that sailing ship losses peaked numerically in
the two decades between 1861 and 1880, with steamship
losses highest in the l880s. Figure Four shows losses
as a percentage of ships registered, and it may be
seen that sail losses were invariably higher and that
the trend towards an overall reduction in losses of
all kinds does not begin until the 1890s. It will be
1. In the Pole Star in 1881 the so-called Board of
Trade Scale was identical with the Liverpool Scale
except for rice and fourteen ounces of sugar a week.
Captain E.W.C. Beggs 'Looking Back' Transactions of
the Liverpool Nautical Research Society VIII (1953-
54) 7.
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shown here that the legislation of 1871, 1873 and 1875
was well-meaning, but not very effective, and in the
next chapter that the 1876 Act with which the name
of Samuel Plimsoll is associated was not wholly effec-
tive until strengthened by further legislation in the
1890s. There is, however, quite a good correlation
between the coming into effect of these laws and a
reduction in crew deaths by drowning, so that reforms
in the area of ship safety can be regarded as conferring
a permanent gain.
The Board of Trade had been aware of the
dilemma facing merchant seamen who had contracted to
sail in unseaworthy ships since the 1850s,' and in 1864
put out a circular to magistrates recommending that
Board of Trade surveyors be employed whenever men
appeared before the Courts on disciplinary charges and
cited unseaworthiness as the reason for refusing to sail.2
At the same time, there was public concern over the rise
1. A petition to Queen Victoria in 1855 complained
that seamen were being compelled to sail in
unseaworthy ships under threat of imprisonment.
The Board of Trade obtained a legal opinion to the
effect that seaworthiness was implied when a man
signed-on, but that proof of unseaworthiness lies
with the man who refuses duty - PRO MT/9 60 M.70151
1871. The civil liability of a shipowner to pro-
vice a seaworthy ship was finally established by
Steel v. State Line Steamship Co. in 1877 (3 App.
Cas. 72).
2. Circular 192 of 29 November 1864. Copy on BPP
1873 (82) LIX 288.
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in shipping losses,' and confirmation from Board of
Trade enquiries as to the causes. Generally, they
were that vessels were old, leaky, over-insured,
heavily loaded or unrepaired after damage, A typical
case was that of the Elizabeth which was lost in 1869.
The Elizabeth was a wooden sailing ship,
schooner rigged. She was 43 years old
and was insured upon an annual policy in
the Dundee Clubs in the sum of £550 and
had been so insured for 11 years. For
some years she had been employed in the
coal trade between Dundee and Sunderland,
and had become so weak and leaky, probably
from her great age, that it was found
necessary to pump her every hour while in
harbour, and light and constantly when at
sea. In the early part of 1868 she struck
upon some stones at the entrance to Dundee
Harbour, but was assisted off, and it
appears that she had not been taken into
dock or received any material repairs subse-
quent to that casualty. On the 16th April
1869 she left Sunderland with a crew of
five hands all told, for Dundee, having on
board a full cargo consisting 180 tons of
coals. On the following day, in the after-
noon, the wind began to blow heavily, and
it kept increasing until 4am of the 18th,
when a heavy sea struck the ship, carried
away the port bulwarks and the boat, threw
her on her beam-ends, and in all probability
1. Briefly, this concern sprang from the heavy losses
of ships in 1866, the case of the Utopia in 1867
(see PRO MT/9 36 M.5156/1867) which was ventilated
in The Nautical Magazine, and the article 'Our Ships
and Seamen' which appeared in the Newcastle Daily
Chronicle and the Shipping Gazette and Lloyds' List
in November 1867. The author was James Hall, a
Tynemouth shipowner and philanthropist. Hall's
arguments for introducing legislation to prevent
unseaworthy ships being sent to sea were later
adopted by Samuel Plimsoll, the energetic and some-
what unscrupulous MP for Derby. Hall's initiative
is acknowledged in the NNM monograph by Neville
Upham entitled The Load Line - A Hallmark of Safety
published in 1978.
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started her covering board. She
never righted, and three hours after-
wards, notwithstanding the pumps were
kept constantly at work, she went down.
The crew jumped into the sea. Two of
the men were rescued by a passing steamer,
the Master, Mate and a seaman were drowned.1
The coinnient of the court of enquiry illustrates
the contemporary attitude towards losses of this type.
The court were of the opinion that the
loss of the Elizabeth might be attributed
to her great age, apparently inefficient
repairs, and to stress of weather when
deeply coal laden. While deprecating the
custom of employing old vessels of this
description in the coasting trade to the
manifest danger of life, the court pointed
out that the crews of ships are free agents,
and that in the absence of any statutory
enactment to the contrary the court could
do no more than call attention to the
practice.2
Seamen who had signed articles were not, as
the quotation above suggests, free agents, and they
could be imprisoned if they refused to sail in an unsea-
worthy ship. Moreover, imprisonment preceded survey
because the onus of proof lay on the defendant, 3 and
in many cases magistrates declined to call for a survey
at all, or the survey was a cursory one. Imprisonment
1. Wreck Return, 1869, BPP 1870 (300) LX 765.
2. BPP 1870 LX 765.
3. In 1873 TH. Farrer described the legal position
to the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships in
the following terms. 'Is the man who refuses to
go to sea in an unseaworthy ship a deserter? No,
but the burden of proof lies on him'.
PRRCUS 1873 Q.246. Farrer was quoting from the
legal opinion obtained by the Board of Trade in
1855 - PRO MT/9 60 M.7015/1871.
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had been the common response to a refusal of duty
since 1854,1 but it came to be appreciated that the
use of s.243 of the 1854 Act to punish what might be
a legitimate complaint was less than fair, and the
Board of Trade began to collect statistics about
imprisonment. In 1870 some 467 seamen were committed
to prison for refusing to proceed to sea, and unsea-
worthiness, insufficient accommodation, defective
equipment, overloading or under-manning was alleged
in 132 cases. 2
 In only one case in that year was a
defendant dismissed because proof of unseaworthiness
was readily available. 3
 Seamen refusing to sail were
dealt with in exactly the same way as deserters or
drunkards who had missed their ships, and a steady
stream of complaints reached the Home Office and the
Board of Trade from fellow seamen, prison chaplains and
those concerned with the welfare of seamen ashore.
James Hall had tried to introduce a Merchant Shipping
Bill in 1869, but it was stifled by the shipowners in
1. The Report of the Inspector of Prisons for Southern
and Western Districts in 1854 had revealed that in
Plymouth Gaol fifty-three out of 239 male prisoners
confined during that year had been seamen who had
refused to sail because of unseaworthiness or under-
manning. Twentieth Report of the Inspectors of
Prisons of Great Britain, BPP 1854-55 (2005) XXVI 77-78.
2. Return of Merchant Ship Crews Committed to Prison in
1870, 1871 and 1872 for Refusing to Proceed to Sea,
BPP 1873 (83) LIX 215-275.
3. A seaman from the schooner Margaret secured an
acquittal at Fraserburgh because evidence of unsea-
worthiness was readily available, while an Irish
seaman was discharged at Sligo because the case
hinged on a wage dispute rather than a refusal of
duty. See BPP 1873 LIX 271 and 275.
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Parliament, and Samuel Plimsoll's 1
 First Merchant
Shipping Survey Bill of 1871 - which was framed
specifically to institute a load-line and compulsory
survey - was condemned by Board of Trade officials2
and blocked in the House. The Gladstonian Liberals
were not insensitive to the tide of public opinion,
and in 1871 produced a Merchant Shipping Act 3 containing
their solution to the dual problem of unseaworthiness
and imprisonment for refusing to sail in an unseaworthy
ship,
Section 4 of this Act decreed that draught
figures be painted on the stem and stern of British-
registered ships, and s.5 that the draught must be
recorded. 4 Section 7 was the kernel of the measure as
far as crew were concerned, because it said that if 25%
of a crew, or at least five members of any crew over
twenty in number, complained that a ship was unseaworthy
and refused to sail in her a court could order a survey.
1. Samuel Plimsoll (1824-98), MP for Derby 1868-1880.
Eulogised by George Peters in The Plimsoll Line (1975),
characterised as a persistent social climber and self-
publicist by David Masters in The Plimsoll Mark of
1955 and described by a contemporary, Thomas Brassey,
as 'too eager to level his lance at all corners ... too
sensational, and not always accurate'. Papers and
Addresses (1894) 20. A powerful demagogue who lacked
scruple, he nevertheless mobilized public opinion
behind a just cause.
2. Thomas Gray noted on the file: 'The Bill is too silly to
require minute examination', and added emphatically
(and incorrectly) that 'surveys don't prevent loss of
life'. PRO MT/9 60 M.1577/187l.
3. 34 & 35 Vic C 110.
4. It was this section that enabled Plimsoll to badger
the Board of Trade for large quantities of information,
as they had a record bf the draught of each ship
leaving a British port.
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This clause had been hotly debated in the House,'
with many members wanting a majority of the crew to
be complainants before a survey was ordered, but
Chichester Fortescue 2
 quoted the Balakiava case 3
 and
was supported by Joseph Henley, a former President of
the Board of Trade and member of a leading shipping
family, who suggested 25% as being sufficient to give
credence to a complaint. Section 10 of the 1871 Act
gave the Board of Trade power to declare a ship unsea-
worthy following survey, and s.11 made it a misdemeanour
for a shipowner to send an unseaworthy British vessel
to sea. Unfortunately, the 1871 measure did not specify
overloading as a cause of unseaworthiness, and while
the Act sufficed to deal with patently rotten ships
whose crews complained of the fact, it could not be put
into effect to prevent the sailing of grossly overloaded
ships whether they complained or not.
Consequently, the 1871 Merchant Shipping Act
did nothing to cut down either the number of men corn-
initted to prison for refusing to go to sea or the number
of allegations of unseaworthiness. In 1871 and 1872 a
1. Hansard 3 208 1062.
2. Chichester Samuel Fortescue (1832-98), was MP for
Louth from 1847 to 1874 and President of the Board
of Trade from 1871-74.
3. The Balaklava seamen had been sent to prison for
four weeks' hard labour by the Deal magistrates in
1871 for refusing to sail in her, and the ship
foundered shortly after their sentences began. See
BPP 1873 LIX 254.
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further 1,171 seamen were committed to prison for
offences of this kind, and while in 1870 some 28% of
them had alleged unseaworthiness and associated
deficiencies as the reason for refusing to sail the
figure rose to 32% in 1871 and 1872.1 The practical
application of the Act was in the hands of local
magistrates, who in port towns were often shipowners,
and the case of the seamen from the Elizabeth Knowles
in 1872 demonstrates how easily miscarriages of justice
could occur. This ship had put into Milford Haven in
a leaky condition, and four seamen who refused to sail
further in her were gaoled by the Milford magistrates
after a cursory survey by unqualified personnel who
declared her 'not unseaworthy'. 2 The four seamen wrote
to the Board of Trade from prison to ask for a proper
survey, and in the meantime the Elizabeth Knowles had
set off for South America, but was compelled to put
back to Milford Haven the same day with three feet of
water in the hold. The Board of Trade surveyor condemned
her, and the four seamen were released just before the
expiry of their sentences. In the same year the Tenby
magistrates imprisoned eleven men from the Harvest Home
under remarkably similar circumstances. Tenby was not
on the list for attendance by a Board of Trade surveyor,
and T.H. Farrer declined to intervene, minuting the
1. BPP 1873 LIX 245-275.
2. One of the 'surveyors' was a retired harbourmaster.
The reference for the Elizabeth Knowles case and
that of the Huntress is Merchant Ship (Surveys), BPP
1873 (82) LIX 283-312, while that for the Harvest
Home is PRO MT/9 74 M.5999, M.5946 and M.562411873
and Ships Detained as Unseaworthy, BPP 1873 (364)
LIX 447-455.
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file - 'I scarcely think this is case in which we
should interfere with the responsibility of the Home
Office'. The seamen served four weeks apiece at
Haverfordwest although it was admitted that the Harvest
Home had only six oars to propel two boats and was
making about an inch of water an hour in the hold.
In both cases there was no legal remedy for this
improper detention, and no compensation was awarded. A
further problem was that the 1871 Act applied solely
to British-registered ships. When, in 1873, the
Huntress was found unseaworthy at Cardiff her owners
sent her out of port under a foreign flag, and the port
officials were powerless to stop her.
Cases of this kind provided material for
Samuel Plimsoll, the Member for Derby. The publication
of Our Seamen: An Appeal in 1873 was well-timed, and
the book may be seen as a splendid propaganda coup,
but stripped of its rhetoric the work made three major
points. Plimsoll said that shipowners sent old and
unseaworthy ships out heavily insured in the hope that
they might founder and provide a profit; that masters
and men were 'over-persuaded' to sale in unsafe ships and
that the resulting loss of life meant that shipowners,
and underwriters were locked into what could be termed
a 'homicidal system'. In the event, only the first
item was pursued in Parliament by Plimsoll, who on 4
March 1873 called for a Royal Commission on 'coffin ships'.1
1. This phrase, with which the name of Samuel Plimsoll is
associated was lifted by him from a constituent's
letter.
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The specific issues he wished explored were
under-manning, bad storage, deck
loading, deficient engine power, over-
insurance, defective construction,
improper lengthening, want of repair,
the necessity for the employment of
certificated master in waters between
Brest and the Elbe,- rate of speed
lawful in fogs and a code of signals.2
4o mention was made in the House of excessive
persuasion being employed in support of a 'homicidal
system'	 - the emphasis being wholly on the safety
aspect where public interest could be relied on for
support. When the terms of reference for the Royal
Commission were announced they were still more narrowly
directed towards an investigation of unseaworthiness
arising from 'over-loading, deck-loading, defective
construction, condition, equipment, form of machinery,
age, improper stowage and undermanning'.3
While the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships
was sitting a piece of stop-gap legislation was rushed
through to placate the reformers. Described subse-
quently as 'tentative' in the Final Report of the Royal
Coinniission on Unseaworthy Ships, 4 the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1873 sought, by s.9, to make amends for the past
treatment of men who had refused to sail in unsafe ships.
1. The Home Trade limits as laid down by Schedule B
of the 1835 Act.
2. Hansard 3 214 1319-1330.
3. Hansard 3 215 299.
4. Referred to hereafter as FRRCUS 1874. The reference
here is BPP 1874 (C.1027) XXXIV vii.
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Compensation was henceforth payable to men imprisoned
for refusing duty when a subsequent survey exonerated
them, and the amount paid was to be fixed by the
Court dealing with the case. Section 12 gave the
power to detain and survey alleged defective or unsea-
worthy ships, and by s.13 the fees of the surveyors
were paid by the Board of Trade if the vessel proved
seaworthy, and by the owners if it did not. One
noticeable effect of the 1873 legislation was that the
number of unseaworthy ships ordered to be repaired or
scrapped rose, and when s.12 was reinforced by the
addition of the power of provisional detention in 1876
the figure rose again. A return of ships surveyed
under the provisions of s.l2 between 1 August 1874
and 31 December 1874 shows that all the 118 vessels
surveyed for defects during the period required repair,
and in the longer period from 5 August 1873 to 31
December 1874 only fourteen out of the 558 ships alleged
defective were found seaworthy. 1 This ratio of about
97% unseaworthy to 3% seaworthy continued to be the rule
during the remainder of the decade. In the last six
months of 1877 all but three of the 106 ships detained
as unseaworthy were found to be 	 and in the first
1. Return of Vessels Ordered to be Surveyed by the
Board of Trade, BPP 1875 (C.1152) LXVIII 341-354.
2. Return of Ships Provisionally Detained as Unsafe,
BPP 1878 (C.1940) LXVII 77.
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six months of 1879 out of 331 ships detained 319 were
found to have defects. 1
 In round terms, the number
of unseaworthy ships dealt with by Board of Trade
surveyors doubled between 1873 and 1879, from some-
thing under 300 a year to over 600 vessels a year
being surveyed. In the same years deaths of merchant
seamen by drowning fell from around 2,800 a year to
22,000 a year.
When the Final Report of the Royal Commission
on Unseaworthy Ships was published the principal con-
clusion was the rejection of compulsory and universal
survey. 3
 The reason given was that the Board of Trade
already had adequate powers to deal with unseaworthy
and overloaded ships, and for the same reason there
was no blanket prohibition of deck cargoes. There are
four key phrases in this Report which make clear the
line that the Commissioners were following. It is
stated that shipowners could 'reasonably complain that
they had been harassed' as 'many enactments ... have
been mischievious and should be modified or repealed'.
It was suggested that
enactments relating to the punishment
of the master or crew whose negligence
had occasioned loss of life or property
should be framed of a more definite and
stringent character than those in
existence,
1. Return of Ships Provisionally Detained as Unsafe,
BPP 1878-79 (C.2391) LXIV 191-198.
2, See Appendix Eight (B).
3. FRRCUS 1874 i.
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The Conunissioners believed that British seamen were,
in general, 'deficient in thrift, in sobriety, in
discipline', while the 'anxiety of Parliament to
protect the seaman, to treat him as incompetent to
take care of himself ... had exercised a bad influence
on his character'. 1
 The tone of the Report is remark-
ably similar to that of the 1836 Report of the Select
Committee on Shipwrecks, with the emphasis on the faults
of seamen rather than the deficiencies of ships. Only
three constructive suggestions are made in the Report:
that advance notes be made illegal, that compulsory
apprenticeship be revived and that some type of super-
annuation scheme be set up in place of the long-vanished
Merchant Seamen's Fund. The Final Report of the Royal
Commission on Unseaworthy Ships and ship losses in the
Black Sea grain trade did lead on to the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1875,2 and although this enactment was
in force for only eighteen months it has some interesting
features that require comment.
Between November 1874 and January 1875 five
Black Sea steamers laden with grain were lost through
cargo shifting, and Lloyd's approached the government
to suggest that the carriage of grain in bags might cut
down losses of this kind. 3
 Section 3 of the 1875 Act
1. FRRCUS 1874 ix-xv.
2. 38 & 39 Vic c 88. 'An Act to make further provision
for giving further powers to the Board of Trade for
stopping unseaworthy Ships'.
3. Correspondence between the Board of Trade and Foreig
Office and the Committee of Lloyd's on the subject o
Grain Cargoes, BPP 1875 (C.1353) LXVIII 153.
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was the response to this approach, and it said that
henceforth grain cargoes carried in British-registered
ships were to be conveyed in bags, barrels or sacks,
or if loaded loose were to be secured with shifting
boards. This useful safety measure was kept on the
Statute Book in various enactments until codified by
ss. 452-456 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, and
it undoubtedly saved many lives.' Section 5 of the
1875 Act decreed that deck lines were to be painted on
the hull showing where each deck was situated, and this
served to indicate to observers cases of gross over-
loading where the inherent buoyancy of a ship was en-
dangered. To the reformers, however, the 1875 Act was
a bitter disappointment. Section 6 directed shipowners
to paint on the hull a loadline indicating the maximum
depth to which it was intended to load a ship for a
particular voyage, and the feebleness of this provision
led a contemporary of James Hall to observe facetiously
that at least the mark would be 'well out of the water
under any circumstance of loading', 2 while one Welsh
owner was said to have painted the load-line on the
funnel. 3 Sections 1 and 2 of the Act merely repeated
1. It would be only proper to add that a contributory
cause in this case of losses among Black Sea grain
carriers was that they were loaded, and handled, in
the same way as the smaller sailing ships that they
superseded, and that increasing expertise of ships'
officers was a factor in saving life after 1875.
2. Quoted by Roger Finch in his Coals from Newcastle
(Lavenham, 1973) 184.
3. Neville Upham, The Load Line - A Hallmark of Safety
30.
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the provisions of the 1871 and 1873 Acts which gave
inspectors power to board, inspect and detain ships
for survey if a quarter of the crew alleged unseaworthi-
ness, but it did not give the power of provisional
detention that the reformers desired. Indeed, it went
nowhere near their expectations. Earlier, in the debate
on his second Merchant Shipping Survey Bill on 24 June
1874, Plimsoll had called for the survey of all unclassed
ships on a periodic basis without waiting for allega-
tions of unseaworthiness and had been told by Arthur
Peel, eldest son of Sir Robert and a future Speaker
of the House of Commons, that 'he could not but think
it was a strong thing to ask the House to give a public
department the duty of surveying all the ships on the
British register'. 1 Another speaker in the debate, Sir
Charles Adderley, 2 said categorically that surveys did
not diminish disasters at sea, but as he had voted two
years before for the annual mandatory survey of passen-
gers steamers his argument was a weak one. 3 Plimsoll's
1. Hansard 3 220 355.
2. Sir Charles Bowyer Adderley (1814-1905), was a Tory
landowner who was President of the Board of Trade
from 1874 to 1878. He was responsible for the 1875
Act, and was to claim some credit late in life for
Plimsoll's Act of 1876.
3. The annual survey of passenger steamers was
established by s.8 of the Merchant Shipping and
Passenger Acts Amendment Act, 1872 - 35 & 36 Vic c
27. Adder].ey was evidently an advocate of the
Freeside rules laid down many years before by Lloyd's
and the Liverpool Underwriters' Association whereby
the freeboard of loaded ships was set at about a
quarter of the depth of hold.
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Bill failed by just three votes in 1874, but in 1876
he was able to push his measure through at the cost
of substantial concessions to the shipowning lobby
over employers' liability in respect of injury or
death aboard ship.
The Merchant Shipping Act, 1876 (known as
Plimsoll's Act) 1
 was the outcome of thirteen days of
bitter debate, a number of divisions and a last-minute
attempt by the House of Lords to exclude coasters from
its provisions. 2
 It had six significant provisions.
By Section 4 it became an unqualified niisdemeanour to
send an unseaworthy ship to sea - all previous escape
clauses being deleted. 3
 Seaworthiness was implied
whenever a seaman signed articles (s.5), and a ship
alleged to be unseaworthy could be provisionally detained
pending survey under s.6(1). Winter deckloads of timber
were again banned; marine casualties were to be Investi-
gated by a Wreck Commissioner acting on behalf of the
Board of Trade and Section 26 provided for a form of
load-line to be painted on the hull. Some of these
provisions had not been seriously challenged - for
example Chichester Portescue, President of the Board of
Trade until 1874, had envisaged a return of the ban on
winter deckloads as far back as June l873, but the
1. 39 & 40 Vic C 80.
2. Hansard 3 231 1222.
3. Section 4(3) of the 1875 Act had made it an offence
for a master knowingly to take an unseaworthy ship to
sea, but proof of guilty knowledge is always difficult
to establish in a court of law.
4. Hansard 3 216 515.
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imposition of a compulsory and periodic survey was
strongly resisted, and the reformers did not achieve
their primary aim.
Plimsoll's Act was by no means the final
solution to the problems of overloading and unsea-
worthiness, for it was immediately found that there were
practical difficulties in reconciling this type of
legislation with the disciplinary restraints on seamen.
The affair of the Rock Terrace is a case in point.
Briefly, the facts were that all three mates and twenty-
two of the crew of the ship made a protest entry in the
official log to the effect that she was unseaworthy
through being overloaded, and the master countered
with allegations of incitement to mutiny, insubordina-
tion and combining to impede the working of the ship,
The Naval Court at Callao found that although the ship
had a list to port (the surveyors found 6' 4" of
freeboard on one side and 5' 3" on the other) and that
the master had bribed the port captain so that the
Peruvian loading mark could be moved up two feet, the
Mate was guilty of 'insubordination in extenuating
circumstances' and was dismissed the ship. At a second
trial of the remaining offenders at the British Con-
sulate at Callao on 11 September 1876 the Third Mate,
Cook and two seamen were sent to prison for periods
of from eight to twelve weeks. T.H. Farrer declined
to intervene when one of the seamen later appealed to
to the Board of Trade) The rights of merchant seamen
1. Merchant Shipping (Overloading), BPP 1877 (387)
LXXIV 339-366.
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in respect of overloaded and unsafe ships were still
regarded as subordinate to the requirements of
discipline. On the credit side, the whole unsea-
worthiness and overloading debate did give rise to
changes of a practical nature. Benjamin Martell, the
Chief Surveyor of Lloyd's, was instructed by his
Committee to produce tables of freeboard for all
types of vessel, and in 1882 the task was complete.
Captain Digby Murray of the Board of Trade had been
working on similar lines, and in 1882 he produced a
revised volume of Approximate Tables of Freeboard for
the guidance of shipowners and surveyors. Allegations
of unseaworthiness and overloading by seamen slowly
decreased as officials took over. In 1873 there were
107 allegations of this type; in 1877 the figure is
105. In 1890 there were only four such allegations,
and in 1901-02 there were none.' New legislation in
the l890s to bolster the 1876 Act may be held to be
partly responsible for the decrease in allegations by
seamen, but the prime reason seems to be that officials
adopted a more scientific approach and made fewer mis-
takes. In the period from 1876 to 1912 some 1,348
ships were reported to be undermanned or overloaded;
only eight were found to be safe. In the same years
985 ships were reported as having hull, machinery or
1. Returns in respect of unsafe and unseaworthy ships
and of crews committed to prison at BPP 1874 LX
313, BPP 1878 LXVII 99, BPP 1890 LXVI 115 and BPP
1902 XCII 255.
S
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equipment defects; eleven were cleared.. In the
whole period 95% of all allegations originated with
officials: 1 given the dramatic fall in allegations
by seamen at the end of the period it seems likely
that most of their protests were registered in the
early years when inspection and survey had not been
perfected.
The issue of safety at sea may not have
been completely resolved by 1883, but an almost
complete success may be recorded in the curbing of
two of the three main types of crimping 2 activity in
Britain in this period. Homeward-bound crimping -
which provided the most profit - almost ceased to
exist, while the activities of 'advertising' or
1. Return of Unsafe Ships, BPP 1912-13 (Cd.6371)
LXXVI 9.
2. Crimping is a phenomenon much described, but rarely
dealt with analytically. Sir Harry Calcraft, the
Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade in the
1890s, defined crimping as 'a system whereby certain
boarding house keepers, if unchecked, take advantage
of the weakness of seamen, and the peculiar cir-
cumstances of their lives, to obtain complete con-
trol of their liberty of action, and practically
control the supply'. Fifth and Final Report of the
Royal Commission on Labour, BPP 1894 (C.742l) XXXV
117. (Referred to hereafter as FFRRCL 1894). Peter
Kemp describes a crimp as 'one who makes it his
business to persuade seamen to desert from a ship
in order to sell them to another or deliver them up
to the press gang on payment of head money'. The
Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (1976) 2I3
Neither definition seems wide enough, and a suggested
comprehensive definition follows. 'A crimp is an
informal labour contractor who employs guile, force
or fraud to gain physical or financial control over
a seaman. His profit comes from the seaman's past
or future earnings, or from the employers of sea
labour when a seaman is delivered to a ship.
Crimping is the technique whereby physical or
financial control is achieved'.
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'outfitting' crimps were checked by firm executive
action. Outward-bound crimping at home, and all
varieties of crimping abroad, vanished more slowly.
The initiative for making an impact on homeward-bound
crimping in Britain came from Superintendent H. Evans
of the Thames Division of the Metropolitan Police
who submitted a report on crimping in the Port of
London on 13 May 1867.1 He noted that 'Thieves,
Bullies, Pugilists and others of the very lowest grade'
- known colloquially as 'Hammock Snatchers' - boarded
ships at Gravesend with bottles of spirits in their
pockets and induced seamen to lodge with their princi-
pals on arrival, These 'runners' received from eight
to ten shillings for each man from boarding-house
proprietors, and Superintendent Evans went on to suggest
that men be stationed at Gravesend, and at the dock
gates in London where the 'runners' had carts to con-
vey sailors' baggage, to check the traffic. The Police
Commissioner agreed, and Thames Division policemen
began to board ships in the Lower Hope 2 to stop the
runners climbing aboard and plying the seamen with
drink preparatory to taking them off to the crimps'
boarding-house. When Inspector Clarke reported in the
following year it was to say that 506 ships had been
protected in this way in the first year of the scheme.3
1. Crimping in the Port of London, PRO MT/9 42 M.4392/
1868.
2. The reach below Gravesend.
3. PRO MT/9 42 M.6635/1868.
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The provision of physical protection for
seamen from crimps at the end of a voyage was half
the answer to the problem of homeward-bound crimping:
the other half of it was to be the protection of
their earnings. The Thames Police scheme had con-
tinuing success, and in 1875 a small steamer called
Midge staffed by two inspectors and six constables
was solely employed on this duty. The Midge chased
away crimps trying to get out to ships in mid-stream,
put seamen on board outward-bound ships and escorted
men ashore after pay-off. In 1S78 Board of Trade
personnel took over Midge and there evolved the Trans-
mission of Wages, or Midge, Scheme) Officials would
board incoming vessels and ask the crew if they wanted
to have their pay forwarded to the Mercantile Marine
Office nearest their home. If the seaman agreed, he
would receive a small sum, usually a sovereign, and
a railway warrant, collecting the rest of his pay when
he reached home. The Transmission of Wages Scheme
spread to Liverpool, Glasgow, Newcastle and Hull in
1879, and was operating at most United Kingdom ports
by 1883. Crimping suffered a severe body-blow. What
had happened was that the crimp was deprived of about
half his income, for in economic terms the seaman
1. See S.S. 'Midge', BPP 1878 (220) LXVII 139, River
Thames (Board of Trade Staff), BPP 1878-79 (220)
LVIII 569, and the evidence of Captain Robert
Pitman reproduced in the 1878 Report from the
Select Committee on the Merchant Seamen Bill,
BPP 1878 (205) XVI QQ.4435-4446 (referred to here-
after as RSCMSB 1878).
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represented a dual product with one lot of profits
made helping the newly-landed man spend his wages on
drink, women, shoddy clothing and gambling; then
the second cut coining from discounting his advance
note for the next voyage and collecting 'head money'
or 'blood money' from the master or agent when the
seaman was shipped out. Where a man came ashore with
only a sovereign or so in his pocket it was not worth
while keeping him in food, drink and creature comforts
of a rough kind until he could be 'sold' to a new ship.
The Merchant Shipping (Payment of Wages and
Rating) Act of 18801 further diminished the power of
the crimps. Section 2 made conditional advance notes
illegal, 2
 and s.3 allowed a seaman to allot up to
half of his wages to his family when signing-on. The
period of waiting for full settlement of wages was
reduced to two clear days, 3
 and the penalties for
crimps' runners were increased. By s.5 they could now
be sent to prison for up to six months for boarding a
ship before the seamen had left it. Prior to the
abolition of conditional advance notes, crimps and
their associates had a vested interest in seeing that
their 'customers' got to sea, and Frank Bullen has
1. 43 & 44 Vic C 16.
2. A conditional advance note was a printed form which
promised to pay the bearer a certain sum, but only
after a period of time - usually three days - subse-
quent to a named sailor sailing in a named ship.
3. The time originally stipulated in the 1819 Act.
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penned a vivid description of joining his first ship
in the l870s where the crew of the Arabella:
hove in sight, convoyed by a motley
crowd of tailor's runners, boarding
masters and frowsy-looking women.
They made a funny little groups The
sailors were in the happy state where
nothing matters - least of all the
discounter of an advance note; hence
the bodyguard of interested watchers
who would leave no stone unturned to
see that their debtors went in the
ship ••
Advance notes were also believed to be the
cause of 90% of desertions in the 1870s, 2
 for while
earlier in the century most men deserted to get higher
wages, at the end of it most men left ships (or failed
to join them) because they did not like the prospect
of working three months to pay off an advance that
might have all gone on one night's debauch. A man who
signed-on and cashed his advance note had a very good
chance of escaping detection if he subsequently failed
to join a ship, 3 and multiple offences were not un-
common. In 1860, Conrad Greenhow, the Board of Trade
superintendent at North Shields, reported the case of
a man who signed for five ships in eight days and got
an advance in each case, 4 With risks of this kind
attached to them it followed that advance notes were
1. Frank T. Bullen, The Log of a Sea Waif (1910) 6-7.
2. Evidence of Colonel Edward Stock Hill. President
of the Cardiff Chamber of Commerce, to the Royal
Commission on Unseaworthy Ships. PRRCUS 1873 QQ.
8278-8285.
3. At Cardiff in 1872 only 10% of fail-to-join seamen
who had cashed their advance notes subsequently
appeared before a Court - see PRRCUS 1873 QQ.1447-1454.
4. RSCMS 1860 Q.422l.
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heavily discounted by those dealing in them. In
1850 Labouchre had put the discount rate at 50t:1
in the 1870s Frank Bullen thought it was 40%.2
Whatever figure is accepted the result was, as one
newspaper put it, that 'the sailor is fleeced to the
skin by those who cash the notes', 3
 and that as the
crimps and their agents were generally the only
persons willing to take these notes 'the sailors are
simply the slaves of the crimps'. 4
 Thomas Gray took
the view that if 'no Advance Note could be obtained
(by the crimp) his hold on the sailor would relax',5
and it was repeated by the Royal Commission on Unsea-
worthy Ships, 6
 Abolition of the advance note was seen
as somewhat of a panacea by the Local Marine Boards
when they were canvassed in l87O, although there were
warning voices. Liverpool thought it would be
impractical; Dublin that an advance note was a
necessity when a man had to get an outfit of clothes
together for a long voyage. The Superintendent of the
Cardiff Sailor's Home wrote in to make the same point,
1. Hansard 3 108 676.
2. Frank T. Bullen, The Log of a Sea Waif 5.
3. Western Mail, 13 January 1871.
4. President of the Cardiff Chamber of Commerce -
PRRCUS 1873 Q.8278.
5. PRO MT/9 73 M.5l7/1871.
6. FRRCUS 1874 xv.
7. PRO MT/9 73 M.6681/l870.
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and an anonymous master at Plymouth said that
advances were essential where a sailor had run out
of funds when travelling from port to port to find
work.' The issue hung fire for some years, but such
was the reforming zeal of the new Liberal ministry
in 1880 that the Act which abolished advance notes
went through at a sitting. As will be shown later,
within a few years the Liberals were to find the Liver-
pool argument persuasive and bring back the conditional
advance note on the grounds of expediency.
The protection given to British seamen in
United Kingdom ports by the 1880 Act was soon extended
to some classes of foreign seamen. Orders in Council
made under s.6 of that Act gave similar protection
from the attentions of crimps to Italian, Swedish and
Norwegian sailors in 1881, to Germans in 1882 and to
Americans in 1883.2 Crimps then countered by using
the new device of a 'bonus' note and nominal wages of
a shilling a month to get round the Act but, except
in a few special cases, skilled men tended to avoid
1. PRO MT/9 73 M.1113/1871.
2. See the London Gazette for 4 March 1881, 28
October 1881, 5 December 1881 and 29 May 1883.
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this type of contract through its unfamiliarity)
Crimps were reduced to handling an inferior product
- tramps, runaways, the feeble-minded, foreigners
who did not understand the language and old or
diseased seamen who resorted to the crimp voluntarily
to get any kind of berth. Almost invariably destitute,
these men and boys provided little profit, and Thomas
Gray was able to report in 1886 that 'the low public
houses and other dens which abound in the neighbourhood
of the docks ... have greatly decreased, probably one
half of them are closed altogether .... At the same
time the Superintendents of the twenty-nine principal
Mercantile Marine Offices in the United Kingdom gave
a collective opinion that crimping had become a
relatively minor problem. 2 Firm action by the Board
1. The device of shilling-a-month nominal wages was
used by masters in the l850s when many crewmen were
would-be ijnjigrants expected to desert on arrival
in Austrafla or California. It was, and is, employed
where men work on a share basis in fishing or whaling
or in salvage work. When, in 1871, th Board of
Trade enquired into the crewing of the Liverpool
steamer Cruizer which sailed with fourteen shilling-
a-month men aboard it was suspected that crimps had
been at work, but it transpired that the voyage was
a salvage and towing venture with rewards contingent
on the degree of success - see PRO MT/9 58 M.20581
1871. Cattlemen, passage workers, supernumeraries,
relatives, invalids and surgeons seeking experience
were often signed-on at a shilling a month, as were
passengers carried in ships not otherwise permitted
to carry them.
2. Report on the Supply of British Seamen - a depart-
mental report prepared for the Royal Commission on
the Loss of Life at Sea - BPP 1886 (C.4709) LIX 197
and Appendix F!.
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of Trade had curbed the activities of the 'advertising'
or 'outfitting' crimps in the early 1870s. These
gentry advertised in national daily papers for 'mid-
shipmen' or 'apprentices', and made their profits
from clothing supplied and premiums exacted from
parents. The victims of 'advertising' or 'outfitting'
crimps were conducted aboard ship at dead of night,
finding in the morning that they had contracted to
serve a term of years at little or no wages in a collier
or tramp rather than the full-rigged, crack ocean
carrier mentioned in the advertisement. Following a
number of prosecutions, and subsequent convictions,
the Board of Trade inserted warning notices in the news-
papers concerned, and the practice slowly died out.1
As crimping decreased overall, the behaviour patterns
of seamen changed. Despite R.H. Thornton's blanket
condemnation of latter-day seamen as 'casual and shift-
less' 2 and the continuing view that seafaring was a
residual occupation, 3 there are signs that the era of
1. See The Times 12 May 1871, PRO MT/9 63 M.1138O/1871
and PRO MT/9 62 M.7922/1871.
2. Thornton, British Shipping 226.
3. William Lamport, the Liverpool shipping magnate,
told the 1860 Select Committee on Merchant Shipping
that 'I never knew a sailor 30 years of age who was
not anxious to leave the sea if he could find any-
thing to do on shore' - RSCMS 1860 Q.2585. A 1973
study of seafarers reports that 'In all cases men
rarely stay at sea when other shore-based methods
of obtaining economic rewards are available'.
Peter H. Fricke (ed.) Seafarer and Community
(Towata, New Jersey, 1973) 4.
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ignorant, rum-soaked illiterates was over. The better
class of seaman - notably those employed in the liner
trades and on ships with regular ports of call - now
allotted a portion of his pay to his family, sent the
balance home under the Transmission of Wages Scheme
and left the dock area by cab for the nearest railway
station after pay-off. As the late David Alexander
put it, sailors were now simply working men who got
wet)
In the years between 1875 and 1880 the
legislators began to look at merchant seamen in a new
light. Partly, this was due to the fact that free
trade - the obvious creed for the earliest industrialized
nation - had to be based on a strong merchant fleet,
and partly because it seemed inequitable that seamen
be denied the benefits conferred on shore workers by
the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875. Imprisonment
for breach of contract seemed indefensible when applied
to one group of workers but not another. Sir Charles
Adderley, President of the Board of Trade between 1874
and 1878, played a dominant role in the Select Committee
on the Merchant Seamen Bill in 1878 and ventilated the
whole complex problem of contractual obligations during
its deliberations. Samuel Plimsoll was on the Committee
1. The concluding sentence from David Alexander's
paper, 'Literacy among Canadian and Foreign Seamen,
1863-1899' read posthumously at the Maritime
History Group conference at Memorial University,
Newfoundland in July 1980. The phrase was sub-
sequently used as the title oE tke conference paper.
See Rosenary Onuner and Gerald Panting (eds) , Working
Men Who Got Wet, (St. John's, Newfoundland,
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and made some telling points, bringing out in particular
the absurdity of a situation whereby engineers and
senior officers of a ship could be arrested without
warrant by ship's husbands or consignees of cargo
if suspected of desertion.' Colby Atkinson Davis, a
former Customs officer turned seaman's representative,
testified that in his experience most failures to join
a ship were accidental; that at Hull all legal process
leading to imprisonment for failing to join was initi-
ated by two crimps and that the law forced men to sail
in unsafe ships. Although Davis does not bear the best
of reputations, 2 his evidence is full and informative.
To the key question - 'Do you find, then, that the
threat of imprisonment does operate upon seamen to
make them go to sea in unsafe and unseaworthy ships?'
he replied
It does, because it throws them into
debt as well. They have had their notes
cashed, and if they do not go to sea in
those vessels then they have that money
to refund, and it distresses their wives
and families considerably, in the case of
those that are married men, by reason of
their having to repay the loss as well as
undergo the imprisonment.3
In the event, although it had been envisaged that the
maximum term of imprisonment for failing to join a
ship after contracting to do so be reduced and that
1. RSCMSB 1878 99.
2. He had been dismissed from his post as Surveyor
of Customs for theft.
3. RSCMSB 1878 QQ.142-17O and Q.211.
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legal process be not employed until a man had actually
joined his ship, the Select Committee did not endorse
clause six of the projected Bill which would have
reduced the maximum term of imprisonment from twelve
weeks to six weeks, nor interfere with the existing
process of law.1
The new Liberal government of 1880 saw Joseph
Chamberlain, 2
 the great Liberal Unionist statesman, as
President of the Board of Trade, and from his first
days in office he was receptive to the idea of abol-
ishing imprisonment for breach of contract. 3
 However,
the 1880 government lacked a clear majority and when on
16 June 1880 the Employer and Workmen Act 1875 (Extension
to Seamen) Bill was introduced by a follower of Plimsoll
he bowed to the wishes of the shipowners and declared
that seamen were a special case and that an element
of compulsion could not be done away with. He promised
to introduce a Bill dealing with the whole question of
contract and discipline in the merchant service in the
next session, 4
 but four years passed before he introduced,
1. This Select Committee's findings did, of course, lead
to the passing of the 1880 Merchant Shipping (Payment
of Wages and Rating) Act referred to earlier in this
chapter.
2. Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), Mayor of Birmingham
1873-76 and MP for that city between 1876 and 1914.
He is chiefly remembered for his involvement in schemes
for imperial and colonial preference, tariff reform
and the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3. For example, on 27 May 1880 he said in the House that
he hoped to bring in a measure abolishing imprisonment
for breach of contract 'in the next session'. Hansard
3 252 530.
4. Hansard 3 253 157-159.
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somewhat hesitantly, a Bill with the limited objective
of amending s.2 of the 1880 Act. This would have
merely had the effect of legalizing the conditional
advance note once more provided such notes were for
only a month's wages, but the measure did not reach
the statute book. The basic contractual position of
seamen did not change, 1
 and there seems to have been
a general evaporation of initial goodwill, while
Chamberlain in particular turned away from seamen's
problems and did not take up the cudgels again until
the 1890s. It was mainly a matter of timing. The
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had produced a minor
boom in shipping, 2 and an euphoric posture had been
adopted by the Liberals. An optimistic view could
still be taken in the late 1870s, but freight rates
were already on a slippery slope that only flattened
out in 1896 when they were down by half from the 'high'
of 1869.	 As so often in human affairs, principles lose
their clarity of outline in hard times.
The general overview in 1883, therefore, is
1. For a fuller examination of the history of the sea-
men's contract with his employer see Conrad Dixon
'Signing-On', The Mariner's Mirror Vol. 67, No.3
(1981).
2. It involved only steamships because north-north-
westerly winds predominate in the northern part of
the Red Sea, and are contrary for UK-bound sailing
ships. There is little room for tacking in the
Gulf of Suez when the prevailing wind is blowing.
See the Hydrographic Department's Ocean Passages for
the World (Taunton, 1973) 68.
3. H.J. Dyos and D.H. Aldcroft, British Transport (1969)
287.
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that the merchant seaman was safer, healthier,
slightly better housed and fed and much less subject
to harassment by crimps than was the case in 1867.
Other minor reforms must be noted. In 1872 the employ-
ment arrangements for Home Trade seamen were put on a
long-term basis, 1
 and colour-blindness tests for
deck officers were introduced in 1877.2 There was
official awareness that seamen were poorly paid, and
comparisons were made that revealed that while seamen
and firemen were victualled and accommodated when
aboard ship their wages tended to be between a half
and two-thirds of those paid in comparable shore
occupations 3
 Thomas Gray and R.G.C. Hamilton, the
1. Section 16 of the 1872 Act permitted Home Trade seamen
to enter into time agreements of more than six months'
duration, and annual contracts of employment became
common.
2. Red and green sidelights had been introduced in 1862,
and colour-blindness had become a contributory factor
in collisions. Merchant Seamen (Certificates: Colour
Blindness), BPP 1878-79 (340) LXIV 170.
3. The Supply of British Seamen, BPP 1873 (C.752) LIX 232.
Wages at Liverpool in 1872 were as follows. Dockers
and riggers got 51- a day, painters 6/-, stevedores
and carpenters 7/-. Seamen serving in steamships
received, on average, 2/ljd a day, and in sailing ships
l/Hjd a day. Victualling was nominally worth 1/- a
day, so that seamen were consistently less well paid
than their counterparts in shore employment. A glance
at Appendix Fifteen (A) shows that the 1872 mean
monthly wages of a sailing ship seaman were £3-5-0
and in steamers £3-15-O. The Liverpool men receiving
£2-18-9 and £3-3-9 respectively were not only below
the mean but very much worse off than men in other
trades. Appendix Fifteen (B) shows that in 1872 a
seaman in the China trade was receiving £4-O-O a
month, and in the Quebec trade £3-lO-O a month. The
men in the Atlantic trade receiving £4-10-O a month
were the only ones above the national average figure
among the Liverpool men.
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Assistant Secretary at the Board of Trade, had deter-
mined this statistic while reporting on the labour
supply position as they saw it in 1872. The primary
concern of shipowners was that there should be no
manning restrictions and no governmental regulation in
respect of apprentices or the employment of foreign
seamen. The task of the state was to provide men,
without further taxation, in accordance with the laws
of supply and demand. Gray and his collaborator saw
no reason for any government intervention, but urged
that medical inspection should be more thorough)
They expressed concern over the physique and health
of serving seamen, and the same concern led the Board
of Trade to send an official to inspect hospitals for
British seamen abroad. 2
 It was found that tax-supported
hospitals at Smyrna and Constantinople were generally
satisfactory, while voluntary financing was working
reasonably well at Buenos Ayres, Kronstadt, Callao and
Valparaiso. The voluntary system had quite failed at
Pernambuco and Monte Video, 3 and the recommendation was
1. BPP 1873 LIX 227.
2. He was William Cosmo Monkhouse (1840-1901), who was
also a poet and art critic and who wrote two defini-
tive books on The Italian Pre-Raphaelites (1887) and
British Contemporary Artists (1899).
3. Merchant Shipping (Hospitals in Foreign Ports), BPP
1877 (348) LXXIV 91-133 and Papers relating to
Hospitals for British Seamen in Foreign Ports, BPP
1878-79 (149) LXIV 98-116. At the Pernambuco
Hospital a stabbed seaman was placed on a mattress
from which a dead smallpox victim had been removed
half an,d hour earlier, while Monte Video Hospital
was financially unsound.
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that all such institutions be maintained by taxes.
At home, the infirmary building of Greenwich Hospital
was made available as the nucleus of a land-based
hospital for merchant seamen in 1870 when Dreadnought
was closed, 1 and in 1877 the Dreadnought School for
Nurses was established nearby as a direct result of
the tireless lobbying of Florence Nightingale.2
The adniinistrative response of Board of Trade
officials to the just grievances of seamen in this
period tended to be skewed in that a firm distinction
was drawn between deck and boiler-room personnel.
There was a sustained effort to improve the status of
Able Seamen, 3 which culminated in the s.7 provision of
1880 that a man had to serve four years before the mast
before he could be so rated.. 4 An 'intelligent,
1. This concession was made because the Seamen's Hospital
Society had applied for a grant of public money in
1865 to compensate for lost revenue from the fees
charged for replacement Register Tickets, and the
Admiralty was persuaded to make the infirmary building
available. PRO MT/9 19 M.l468/l865.
2. May and Baker Pharmaceutical Bulletin Vol. 20, No. 1
January/February 1971, 4.
3. The original initiative had come from a group of ship-
owners who, in 1877, placed before the Board of Trade
a scheme for examinations for ABs. A pilot scheme
was launched in June 1878, but after three years when
only twenty-three men had passed the examinations the
plan was abandoned. See the Peter Parkhurst type-
script 'Ships of Peace' - N}'IM PKT 8/1 181.
4. This clause was popular with the Board, the industry
and the seamen. Some reformers wanted to go further,
and in 1875 Bedford Pim, a retired naval officer who
was MP for Gravesend between 1874 and 1880, chaired
a meeting of the London Seamen's Nautical Protection
Society which called for examinations for ABs. The
shipowners took up the idea - see Footnote 3 above,
and PRO MT/9 M.1373/1875.
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industrious and sober AB" could go to navigation
school and qualify as a deck officer, but no such
avenue was available to the stoker or trimmer because
engineer officers were recruited from men who had
served a shore apprenticeship. Consequently, although
the wages were better in the boiler-room 2 the work
attracted men of lower calibre, as information from
outside sources indicated. A letter from Massey and
Sawyer, Hull shipowners, to the Board of Trade in 1879
said bluntly,
firemen and stokers are of the lowest
class of society, without a settled
abode, or ties of any description and
their chief object in life appears to be,
when they have money, to get drunk and
make as much disturbance as possible.3
When John Paterson, the Surgeon Superintendent at Con-
stantinople, produced his annual report for 1878 which
said 'from a hygenic point of view the Mercantile
Marine in this part of the world can only be considered
as a large disease-producing establishment' a master
mariner, Richard Kay, felt compelled to point out that
stokers were not seamen in the proper sense of the word
and that the men employed in the engine-rooms of Black
Sea steamers tended to be 'shore labourers of the
lowest class, gas-stokers broken down, iron-workers,
puddlers and the like •..'. 	 These men clearly had
1. Villiers, Voyaging with the Wind 10.
2. See Appendix Fifteen (A).
3. BPP 1878-79 LXIV 119.
4. BPP 1878-79 LXIV 108 and 116.
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little in common with the deck seamen described so
well by writers with personal knowledge of the type,
such as Joseph Conrad. 1
 In 1880 the spokesman for
the North of England Steam Shipowners Association
believed that the mixing of deck seamen with the less-
disciplined firemen in steamers led to deterioration
in the former, 2 while the Registrar-General of Seamen
had said seven years before that the supplanting of
sail by steam meant that an Able Seaman's rating was
too easily obtained. 3
 The status and responsibilities
of Able Seamen were to be a matter of continuing debate
- particularly as union power grew - but engine-room
and boiler-room ratings attracted no such attention.
Like lascars, they had no opportunity of a break-through
1. Joseph Conrad (Josef Conrad Korzeniowski), the
Polish-born writer, had a great deal of personal
contact with seamen, and had risen to command from
fo'c's'le beginnings. He was a deckhand in the
Mavis, a Constantinople coal-trader, and served in
the coaster Skimmer of the Sea in 1878. In 1879 he
signed-on as an Ordinary Seaman in the sailing ship
Duke of Sutherland and made the round voyage to
Australia and back, and was an AB in the collier
Europa in 1880. For his career before the mast see
Jocelyn Baines, Joseph Conrad (1960) 58 and his evi-
dence to the 1896 Manning Committee contained in the
Report of the Committee appointed by the Board of
Trade to enquire into the Manning of British Mer-
chant Ships, BPP 1896 (C.8128) XL Q.6276. (Report
referred to hereafter as Manning Committee Report,
1896).
2. Report of the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping,
BPP 1880 (305-Sess.2) XI QQ.4179-4198 and QQ.4325-
4328. (Report referred to hereafter as RSCMS 1880).
3. PRRCUS 1873 Q.lO,017.
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to officer rank in the nineteenth-century.1
In this chapter the interaction described
has been between philanthropists and reformers,
officials and politicians, with the seamen themselves
speaking mainly through intermediaries or forwarding
petitions to a benevolent government. The view of
the seafarer as childlike and needing the protection
of the state is just beginning to fade, 2
 but there is
stern resistance to granting him any kind of parity
with workers ashore. The Factory Act of 1874 had
instituted the fifty-six and a half hour week - but
not for seamen. Uniquely among British workers, the
seaman could still be imprisoned for breach of con-
tract. There was no statutory food scale, and the
Employers Liability Act of 1880 had no effect aboard
ships at sea.	 A lag in work-related legislation
is apparent, and with the rise of a viable national
union the stage is set for a head-on confrontation
between master and man.
1. Normally, an engine-room or boiler-room rating
could rise no higher than Storeman or Donkeyman,
and a lascar to Serang or Tindal - See Appendix
Twelve. However, an avenue of promotion to Refri-
gerating Engineer - for which no formal qualifica-
tions were needed - opened up as the carcase trade
from Australia and New Zealand developed.
2. It faded slowly: an 1860 view. tJack does not
think, and often does not know where he is going
till he gets aboard a ship'. James Beazley, a
Liverpool shipowner, RSCMS 1860 Q.2244.
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CHAPTER SIX
TWO DECADES OF CONFLICT
In the mid-1880s the contrast between the
working conditions of men employed ashore and those
employed afloat was such as to reveal to any thought-
ful observer the grossly disadvantaged position of
the latter group. There were no restrictions on the
hours worked by seamen so that the eighty-four-hour
week was a commonplace,' and there was no overtime
unless a specific amendment had been made to the
engagement form providing for overtime payments.2
There were no standard rates of pay, no proper scheme of
workmen's coupensation3 and, in general, no continuity of eirqloyment.4
1. The four-hours-on and four-hours off watch system,
with two two-hourly dog-watches daily, amounted to
an eighty-four-hour week at sea. Many masters also
compelled the hands to clear out the holds for new
cargo during their afternoon watch below, and chief
engineers held regular 'field days' during which
watches were ignored while general maintenance took
place.
2. The case of Harrison v. Dodd (1914) III L.T. 47 con-
firmed that overtime was not payable unless some
special arrangement had been made.
3. Seamen had been specifically excluded from the opera-
tion of the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875, and
when s.11 of the 1880 Act removed the exclusion
clause for seamen and apprentices no provision was
made for enforcement. Consequently, there was no
proper compensation scheme until s.7 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1906 (6 Edw VII c 58) made
provision for compensation in respectThf 'personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment' and s.11 provided that a ship could
be detained until it was paid.
4. The exceptions were the large liner companies, and
coasters where annual agreements had been permissible
since 1872.
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The discipline code imposed by the 1854 Act was so
drawn that industrial action could be readily stigma-
tized as mutiny, and the contractual obligation
entered into when articles were signed meant that
leaving one ship for another where wages were higher
was classed as a criminal offence and punished
accordingly. 1 On shore, the widening of the franchise,
the nine-hour day and the legalization of trades unions
were accomplished facts: it had to follow that seamen
would seek an improvement in their lot and that the
establishment of a national union would be part of that
struggle.
It was shown in Chapter Two that early sea-
men's unions were local in character and limited in aim,
and in the period immediately preceding the creation of
a national representative body the same weaknesses may
be observed. Many attempts to organise or to wring
concessions from the employers were made in the 1870s
and early 1880s, but failure was the inevitable result.
For example, the Port of London seamen held a mass
meeting in the East End on 3 May 1872 to press for
higher wages, but although thousands were present, and
the theme of solidarity was urged by a number of speakers,
1.	 For example, a seaman from the British ship Golden
who joined a colonial vessel at Quebec to boost
bis monthly wages from £3-lO-O to £13-O-0 was
recognised as a deserter on his return to England
and was sentenced to the maximum term of twelve
weeks' imprisonment at Thames Police Court.
BPP 1873 LIX 259.
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no lasting organisation emerged. 1 In the same year,
the Southampton men employed by the Royal Mail Line
and P & 0 struck for parity of wages and 500 of them
formed a union under a seaman, E.G. Fairchild. It was
a short-lived strike, and the union perished when it
collapsed. 2 Fairchild turned up at Liverpool in 1879
and was one of the founders of the Liverpool Seamen's
and Firemen's Bowl Union 3 which combined with the
Amalgamated British Seamen's Protection Society4 to
fight a wage claim. The strike failed and the union
ceased to exist shortly afterwards. 5 Unions of the
ad hoc variety evidently could not survive strike failure,
whereas those with a friendly society function, and the
funds that went with it, had a better chance. The Hull
Marine Firemen's Mutual Association with some 450 members
was in the latter category, and it survived the failure
of the 1881 strike: 6 the North of England Sailors' and
1. The Eastern Post, 5 May 1872.
2. A. Temple Patterson, A History of Southampton, 1700-
1914 (Southampton, 1975) 81-84.
3. Named from a charity bowl outside the restaurant owned
by a co-founder of the union, William Simpson.
4. A dubious 'union' in that it was dominated by boarding-
house keepers and later had a strike-breaking role.
Its founder, William Paterson Lind, was an advocate
of 'free labour'.
5. E.L. Taplin, Liverpool Dockers and Seamen, 1870-1890
(University of Hull Occasional Paper in Economic and
Social History No. 6, 1974) 61.
6. Raymond Brown, Waterfront Organisation in Hull, 1870-
1900 (University of Hull Occasional Paper in Economic
and Social History No. 5, 1972) 36.
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Sea-going Firemen's Friendly Association, established at
Sunderland in 1879, never fought a strike, yet it
served as the seed-bed for a national union and as a
vehicle for the most significant personality in the
history of trade unionism among seafarers - J. Havelock
Wilson.
Wilson was a Sunderland man with extensive
experience at sea, and his aims were simple. He wanted
four things: union recognition, the settlement of
disputes through collective bargaining, better accommo-
dation for seamen and an improved scale of provisions.'
He had observed that earlier struggles with shipowners
had generally failed because union infrastructure was
inadequate and demands were centred merely on wages,
and concentrated his efforts on building an organisation
with national, and later international, linkage. In
1887 he had come to realise that the North of England
Sailors' and Sea-going Firemen's Friendly Society would
never break out of its parochial mould and formed the
National Amalgamated Sailors' and Firemen's Union of
Great Britain and Ireland, which for the sake of brevity
will be referred to hereafter as the Sailors' and Fire-
men's Union. In the following year his national union
had 500 members and was affiliated to the Trades Union
Congress: in 1889 it had 65,000 members and almost
1.	 This summary of aims taken from Walter Runciman's
introduction to J. Havelock Wilson's autobiography
My Stormy Voyage Through Life (1925). It had been
intended to be a longer work, but only one volume
was published.
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sixty branches.' Prom the beginning, Wilson took the
view that conditions for British seamen were depressed
because foreign seamen and lascars had free entry to
the industry, 2
 and campaigned for certificates for
seamen and firemen and extension of the Employers
Liability Act to seafarers. 3 He was reluctant to be
drawn into any kind of dispute while his fledgling
organisation was still growing, 4 but in 1889 tie pressure
of events compelled the Sailors' and Firemen's Union to
lend its support to the Liverpool men who had struck
for a pay rise of a pound on monthly earnings and
launched an on-off dispute that took up the first half
of the year.
Wilson's unwilling participation in the 1889
dispute served to confirm his earlier view that organi-
sation must precede action, and when he returned to
Liverpool after the strike had collapsed he was able to
sketch out the future forcibly to a mass meeting. 'The
aim of all concerned', he declared, 'will be to build
up a strong and firm union upon the solid foundations
1. The Story of the Seamen - a National Union of Seamen
pamphlet published in 1964, 7-8.
2. Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 98. The union
rules provided for differential dues for foreigners,
so that a foreigner with no sea time had. to pay £20
for membership.
3. He gave evidence to the 1887 Royal Commission on the
Loss of Life at Sea to this effect. Final Report of
the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea, BPP 1887
(C.5227) XLIII QQ.18,745-18,934. (Referred to here-
after as FRRCLLS 1887.)
4. Taplin, Liverpool Dockers and Seamen 82, and Wilson,
My Stormy Journey Through Life 140-147.
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which have already been made'.' The 1889 strike had
highlighted the basic flaw in workers' organisations
in the period, which was that there was no general
traditionof class solidarity or awareness of politico-
economic principles despite E.L. Taplin's doctrinaire
(1974) view that 'employees were ... increasingly dis-
illusioned by the growing inadequacies of Victorian
capitalism'. 2
 The 1889 strike was easily broken by the
employers because they had no difficulty in getting
imported labour from elsewhere. Wilson himself reports
that 'fishermen from Yarmouth were imported in hundreds
to act as deck hands', 3 and seamen were brought in from
as far away as South Devon to crew the mail boats.4
The final phase of the Liverpool strike, and that at
Leith, lasted a mere six weeks, and the principal result
was that the owners proceeded to create a permanent
strike-breaking organisation that was to employ virtually
the same tactics of introducing labour from unaffected
areas in all the battles between the union and employers
1. Liverpool Mercury, 23 July 1889.
2. Taplin, Liverpool Dockers and Seamen 86.
3. Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 140.
4. There was some resistance from local men. A party
of Teignmouth seamen returned home 'in their
working clothes and with their faces blackened;
they said that the unionists had played practical
jokes on them, purloining their money and throwing
their clothes overboard'. Devon Weekly Times,
12 and 19 July 1889.
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from 1890 to 1926.
Many early employers' organisation had
sprung from common insurance needs, and with the
growth of the shipping industry some had avowed short-
term political aims. 1
 However, a permanent employers'
organisation was not envisaged until the Sailors' and
Firemen's Union was seen to be a serious threat to
the interests of shipowners, for in 1890 the Shipping
Federation was created simply because it came to be
believed, on rather slim evidence, that the union
intended to enforce a closed shop. 2
 The Shipping
Federation initiated a four-pronged campaign against
unionisation. First, it issued Federation 'tickets'.
These documents were in parchment form, and nominally
entitled the holder to industrial injury benefit from
the Federation Benefit Fund although their real purpose
was to enable masters and mates engaging crew to
distinguish between union and non-union labour. 3 Second,
1. For example, the General Shipowners Society of the
1830s and the Central Association of Shipowners set
up in 1885 to influence the 1886 Royal Commission on
Loss of Life at Sea.
2. The background to the formation of the Shipping Federa-
tion is given in L.H. Powell's The Shipping Federation
(1950) 3. As the story is revealed there, it seems
most likely that the Federation was created by a panic
response to an unconfirmed rumour. A conversation
aboard a Tyne ferry between an official of an insurance
association and the solicitor acting for the Sailors'
and Firemen's Union was the basis of the rumour that
masters and seamen would be compelled to join the
union.
3. A Federation 'ticket' cost the seaman a shilling and
could be renewed annually for sixpence, The rules on
the back stated that the holder was entitled 'to
employment - at the recognised wages of the port
with any shipmaster or owner affiliated to the Shipping
Federation Ltd.'
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the employers' organisation opened offices at all the
major seaports where holders of Federation 'tickets'
could be engaged) Third, it maintained a small fleet
of depot ships with the dual function of housing 'free
labour' and transporting it to where it would be needed.
Finally, the Shipping Federaticr.. served as a clearing-
house for irtformatio an beame the national representa-
tive body for the great majority of shipowners. 2 Seamen
soon realised that the safest course was to hold both
union and Federation membership cards, particularly after
23 February 1891 when the Shipping Federation made the
production of one of their 'tickets' an absolute pre-
requisite for sea employment in ships owned by their
members. However, there was strong initial resistance
to compulsion in respect of holding Federation 'tickets',
and in 1890 there were strikes at the ports of London,
Liverpool, North and South Shields, Newcastle, Leith,
Aberdeen, Hull, Glasgow, Hartlepool, Middlesborough,
Cardiff and Swansea. A description of what happened at
London, Hull and Cardiff will serve to illustrate the
trend of events.3
1. This was necessary because of intimidation at Mercan-
tile Marine Offices. The master of the steamer Trinidad
said that at Newport, Monmouthshire, 'it was highly
dangerous for a free seaman to enter the shipping
offices of that port owing to the continual presence
of a rowdy element of unionists'. FFRRCL 1894 439.
2. 81% of owners joined within a month of its foundation.
Powell, The Shipping Federation 5.
3. Unless otherwise stated, the version that follows
is taken from FFRRCL 1894 435-451.
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In September 1890 the Sailors' and Firemen's
Union came into conflict with the British India line
based at the Albert Docks in London through a demarca-
tion dispute with the Hainmermen's Union. Seamen pickets
at Mercantile Marine offices refused to let anyone enter
to sign-on unless he could produce a union card, and as
the dispute widened the employers began to recruit 'free
labour' - mostly seamen, fishermen and agricultural
workers from Kent. The depot ship Scotland housed these
men, who were signed-on afloat to avoid confrontation
with strikers, and it was attacked by seamen who pelted
the occupants with household refuse. At various times
the coal porters, ship-repair workers, stevedores and
dockers came out in support of the seamen, but the stop-
page was never complete and the supply of 'free labour'
was not cut. In February 1891 the strike fizzled out -
chiefly because the stevedores, who were aristocrats of
labour in terms of wages received, found that unskilled
men could soon master their jobs. The Hull strike arose
when the steamer Mary Anning berthed with an all-union
crew and the master discharged them because he had orders
to ship an all-Federation crew. Dockers refused to dis-
charge the ship, and when the Shipping Federation sent
men from Liverpool to unload into lighters the lightermen
refused to handle the cargo either. A smouldering strike
went on for six months, and the Royal Commission on
Labour version of events at Hull is worth reproducing in
full to illustrate the line taken by the Shipping
Federation on that occasion.
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Representatives of the Seamen's Union
called on the committee of the Ship-
ping Federation and asked that the union
crew (of the Mary Anning) might be taken
back, but the reply was that they would
ship whom they liked. This was the
beginning of a number of strikes which
went on for about six months, and it is
stated that the blame in the majority of
cases lay with the local officials of
the Shipping Federation, and that pre-
ference of employment was frequently given
to incompetent Federation men over conipe-
tent unionists.
The stiff attitude of the Shipping Federation
on this occasion goes a long way towards explaining why
the subsequent 1893 dispute at Hull was so virulent.1
The Cardiff strike of 1890-91 had its roots in a reso-
lution passed by the Cardiff shipowners in August 1890
supporting the 'right of free labour', for the union
response was, as in London, to picket Mercantile Marine
Offices to ensure that only union members could sign-on.
The coal-tippers supported the seamen, and J. Havelock
Wilson staged a series of demonstrations in the town.
The depot ship Speedwell was stationed in Penarth Roads,
and drafts of up to 200 men at a time were supplied by
the Liverpool crimps to man outward-bounders. In March
1891 Wilson proposed a truce, but neither side would
yield, and when the strike ended after eight weeks Wilson
was imprisoned for organising unlawful assemblies and
causing a riot. An assessment of the events of 1890-91
must start with an appreciation that the Shipping
1. For a detailed account of the 1893 strike see
Brown, Waterfront Organisation in Hull 66-87.
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Federation and the Sailors' and Firemen's Union were
both young organisations and that a trial of strength
was taking place. As to who was the victor, there are
two answers. In the short term the Shipping Federation
emerged as top dog, and the power and influence of the
union was greatly curtailed.' The wider view is that
Wilson came out of prison in 1891 a national figure,2
and from the experiences of 1890-91 a national figure
with a coherent policy. His targets now were improved
food scales, better accommodation, proper manning
regulation and the eight-hour day, 3
 and these objectives
could be attained without recourse to the strike weapon.
He %vas prepared to be conciliatory, and Raymond Brown's
(1972) view that Wilson 'was always spoiling for a fight'4
1. Union membership halved between 1890 and 1892
according to Matthew Swainston in his unpublished
study 'Merchant Seamen' 220. The typescript of
this document is lodged at the National Union of
Seamen headquarters at Old Town, Clapham, and while
it is an informative account its authority is
weakened by an absence of indications as to source
material,
2. He was elected as MP for Middlesborough in 1892, and
although defeated in the 'khaki' election of 1901
was re-elected in 1906.
3. The victory of the gas-workers in respect of the
eight-hour day had been unexpected, and it
immediately became the fashion among union leaders
to include the eight-hour day in any list of
demands.
4. Brown, Waterfront Organisation in Hull 61.
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is not supported by the facts. 1
 He had a new platform
through his seat in Parliament, and although he was
to suffer initial defeats there, 2
 and be beaten again
in 1893 as he had been in 1889 and 1890-91, the low
point of his fortunes was in 1895 when the membership
struggle was acute. 3
 As will be shown, the first
significant union victory may be dated from 1910-11
when Wilson had established his union on a 'proper and
honest basis, worked by honest men' 4
 and when the work-
force in large steamers had an industrial background
approximating to that in workshops and factories on land.
The strike at Hull in 1893 began as a local
stoppage in support of the Leeds tanners, 5
 but soon
1. In 1892 Wilson came to an agreement with the
National Association of Boarding House Masters -
an organisation that may fairly be described as
the crimps' trade union - whereby they collected
arrears of union dues from their lodgers. In the
same year he approached the Shipping Federation to
propose a common front to keep freight rates high.
The latter organisation replied coldly that such
a course was commercially unrealistic. Wilson's
own view was that the shipowners had 'reduced us to
a negligible quantity' after the 1890-91 dispute -
My Stormy Voyage Through Life 206.
2. His Seamen's Rating Bill of 1893 was abandoned:
the Seamen's Provisions Bill of the same year was
withdrawn - see Hansard 4 15 852.
3. In June 1895 Wilson was reduced to offering union
membership at a bargain entrance fee of 2/ôd - see
Fairplay XX1V 631 1170.
4. A phrase used by James Fitzpatrick, a fireman and
union activist, to describe the kind of union the
men wanted to the Royal Commission on Labour.
FFRRCL 1894 Q.16,275.
5. Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 273.
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evolved into a struggle between the Sailors' and Fire-
men's Union and the Shipping Federation over pay and
union recognition. Fearing a breakdown of law and
order, the Hull magistrates asked for military aid,
and the town was virtually garrisoned by soldiers.
Allegations of violence and intimidation were common
on both sides, with the Shipping Federation alleging
that strikes were threatening the families of the 'free'
labourers and seamen while union spokesmen said that
police were attacking pickets. 1 J. Havelock Wilson
went to the House of Commons on 4 May 1893 to claim
that the Shipping Federation was an illegal organisation
creating disorder and manning ships with incompetents,
while Keir Hardie 2 declared that as the Hull magistracy
was dominated by shipowners the workers would never
obtain justice before the courts. John Burns, the
Member for Battersea and for many years a campaigner
for seamen's rights, 3 gave substance to Hardie's allega-
tions. His researches showed that twenty-three out of
thirty-eight of the Hull magistrates had shipping
1. Powell, The Shipping Federation 17 and Hansard 4 12 78.
2. James Keir Hardie (1856-1915), was the founder of the
Independent Labour Party and the first Labour Member
of Parliament, being elected in 1892. His opposition
to the Boer and First World Wars held back the Labour
Party early in the twentieth-century, and the failure
of international socialism in 1914 to prevent the
latter conflict hastened the end of his life.
3. John Burns (1858-1943), was a socialist who refused
to join the Labour Party, and is chiefly remembered
as the first working man to become a cabinet minister
- being President of the Local Government Board in
Canipbell-Bannerman's Liberal administration of 1905,
and briefly at the Board of Trade in 1914.
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interests, while five shipowners were on the fifteen—
man Watch Committee. Wilson failed to get an adjourn-
ment motion through, but had the satisfaction of
hearing the Prime Minister say that an unnecessary
parade of military might was 'impolitic, unwise, and
calculated to defeat the very purpose in view'. 1 The
strike collapsed, and the Shipping Federation claimed
another victory.
The stoppage at Liverpool in the same year
was a straight-forward reaction to a wage cut, for a
downturn in the economy had led to Leyland's, Lamport
and Holt and the Allan line reducing wages by ten
shillings a month. The Shipping Federation employed its
usual tactics, but encountered for the first time a
measure of disapproval on the part of a Local Marine
Board. On this occasion the Allan liner Mongolian was
towed out to anchor in the Mersey and the major part of
the crew was supplied by a crimp, Mrs Langan, who
charged between £2 and £2-Ss a head - representiaag a
fortnight's advance. Wilson had the crew interviewed
in New York, and the subsequent enquiry by the Liverpool
Marine Board shed a great deal of light on the methods
used by companies belonging to the Federation. 2 Two of
1. Hansard 4 12 81-118. Fifty years before Gladstone had
been the junior minister at the Board of Trade, and
although he always described himself as 'an out-and-
out inequalitarian' his opinion of 1844 that merchant
seamen were a class deserving the sympathy of the
legislature does not seem to have changed.
2. Retort made to the Board of Trade attending the epgage-
inent of the Crew of the S,S. 'Mon golian', BPP 1893-94
(240) LXXX 335. The Liverpool Local Marine 3oard
supplied the bulk of the information.
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the stokers recruited to work on the Mongolian were
tramps who had been picked up by a crimp's runner
while asking the way to the casual ward of Liverpool
workhouse. They had been taken to Mrs Langan's boarding
house, given drink, and sent to bed. At two o'clock in
the morning they were taken ('marched' is the word used
in the report) to the docks and embarked on a tug.
Once aboard the Mongolian they were signed-on and taken
down to the stokehold to raise steam. William Simpson
and John O'Brien, the two tramps, seem to have had
very little idea of what was going on until shovels
were put in their hands, and many others in the scratch
crew were totally lacking in skill and had no knowledge
of their duties. The strike failed, but the industry
and officials were left with the indelible impression
that Wilson's allegations that the Shipping Federation
preferred to man ships with incompetents rather than
employ union labour were correct, and that lines belonging
to the Federation did not scruple to use crimps when it
suited them.
The defeats of 1893 led to the liquidation of
the old union, and when it was reconstituted in 1894 the
word 'Amalgamated' had been dropped from the title
together with friendly society status. The 'climax of
militancy" had been reached in 1889-91, and after 1893
the Sailors' and Firemen's Union was on the defensive
1, Taplin, Liverpool Dockers and Seamen 79.
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until 1910. The heroic days of demonstrations,
marches, occupations 1 and street confrontation were
over: the new emphasis was on finance, membership2
and building branches at the principal ports - as Wilson
had always wanted. A degree of representation on
influential committees was seen as more important than
organising pickets; manoeuvering to get serving seamen
on Local Marine Boards more essential than purchasing
elaborate banners. 3 Moreover, Wilson saw clearly that
in the long term the mere interposing of officials
between employers and employed was of limited value,4
and that substantial improvements in the sailors' lot
could best be achieved by face-to-face negotiation with
employers' representatives at national level. In the
short term, he had to mobilise Liberal support in the
House and elsewhere to campaign for iniprovemental changes
at a time when the gains made in 1867-83 were being
eroded.
1. On one occasion J. Havelock Wilson and his followers
occupied a workhouse and demanded the privileges of
a pauper's existence.
2. It had fallen to 18,000 by 1893. Matthew Swainston's
!1erchant Seamen' 220. Less than 8% of the total
woTkforce was unionised.
3. Wilson said in his autobiography that the verbal
tradition in the north-east was that many early unions
had drifted into bankruptcy because, in emulation
of the miners, a large proportion of the funds had
been spent on silk banners.
4. He believed that Mercantile Marine Office staff were
no more than 'Government-paid crimps' - y Stormy
Voyage Through Life 77.
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The Merchant Shipping (Payment of Wages
and Rating) Act of 1880 had four elements that had
been commended by the reformers. Conditional advance
notes had been made illegal (s.2), and a seaman could
allot up to half of his pay to near relatives (s.4).
There was a qualifying period for the rank of Able
Seaman (s.7), and it seemed as though imprisonment for
desertion or failing to join a ship after having con-
tracted to do so had been abolished by s,10. The
conditional advance note was reintroduced in 1889,1
while it was soon found that the allotment system
could be manipulated by crimps to provide an extra
source of income. 2 The requirement that a man should
serve for four years before being rated as an Able
Seaman was eminently sensible, but as there were no
penalties for non-compliance it was widely disregarded.
When, on 5 March 1891, Joseph Chamberlain tabled a
question in the House of Commons about the shipping of
incompetent men as Able Seamen at Cardiff, the reply
from Sir Michael Hicks Beach, 3 President of the Board
1. By s.2(4) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1889, 52 & 53
Vic c 46. There was a limit, which was frequently
disregarded, that a conditional advance note should
be for no more than a months t wages.
2. Allotments could be made to the 'wife, father,
mother, grandfather, grandmother, child, grandchild,
brother or sister' of the seaman. Crimps were quick
to persuade men to sign notes for the benefit of
'sisters', and Edward Tupper, active in union affairs
in the early twentieth-century, believed that at this
time most allotment notes were fictions concocted by
crimps. Edward Tupper, Seamen's Torch (1938) 22.
3. Michael Edward Hicks Beach (1837-1916), was a Tory land-
owner who was President of the Board of Trade from 1888-
92. According to his DNB entry, he was a 'thorough
conservative of the olchool'.
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of Trade, was to the effect that Superintendents of
Mercantile Marine Offices had no power to prevent
inexperienced men without documentation being signed-
on as Able Seamen. In a further exchange with
Chamberlain on 16 March 1891 he indicated that the
crimps who had supplied the inexperienced men at
Cardiff had been prosecuted and convicted of other
offences, but quoted the portion of the 1887 Final
Report of the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea
that said 'there is great laxity in this respect. Men
are constantly being rated as ABs without any enquiry
as to their past services ... Nor does it appear that
this can be prevented'. 1
 Two years later, Wilson
tried to introduce certificates for some classes of
seafarers in his Seamen's Rating Bill, but it was
eventually withdrawn. 2 When the 1894 Merchant Shipping
Act came on the statute book s.126 repeated the require-
ment of four years' sea service, but there was still
no penalty for failing to comply with it. The Board
of Trade also sought certification from the late 1880s,3
and the 1887 Final Report of the Royal Commission on
the Loss of Life at Sea contained a recommendation that,
as a check on qualifications, Able Seamen should be
issued with Continuous Discharge Books. 4 In the event,
1. Hansard 3 351 224 and 1049.
2. Hansard 4 15 852.
3. It was suggested in the Report on the Supply of
British Seamen prepared by Thomas Gray in 1886.
BPP 1886 LIX 199.
4. FRRCLLS 1887 128.
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these books were issued to all ranks in 1900 for
quite a different reason,' and it is ironic that
Wilson's initiative - designed to exclude foreign sea-
men and lascars from jobs - and Board of Trade moves
to check desertion and establish the good character of
job applicants, both derived from a suggestion first
made by a crimp as far back as 1878.2
After 1880 the legal position in respect of
desertion or failing to join a ship having contracted
to do so was complex. Even the experts were confused,
and T.H. Farrer believed, quite wrongly, that the
position was that 'refusal to perform a contract to
serve at sea is now treated like other refusals to
1. Principally to check desertion. Continuous Discharge
Certificates were in book form and contained a des-
cription and photograph of the holder. When each
voyage had been completed an entry was made showing
the holder's rank, character and ability. The
columns for character and ability were generally
marked tv•, (Very Good), but rarely a conscientious
master might insert 'D.R.' (Decline to Report). A
'Bad' discharge was very bad indeed, and .'Good' was
fairly damning.
2. When John Harris, a London 'outfitting crimp' who
made his profits from discounting advance notes for
shoddy clothing and a little cash, gave evidence to
the Select Committee on the Merchant Seamen Bill in
1878 he produced a Swedish discharge book containing
a photograph, description and spaces for observations
on character and ability that he had acquired from
one of his customers. The Committee had evidently
not seen such a document before, and even the con-
cept was new to them. RSCMSB 1878 QQ.5299-5306.
The specific suggestion that British seamen should
have a similar document came from Henry G. Wilcox,
the principal officer of the Board of Trade at
Liverpool, in 1893 during the Mongolian enquiry -
see BPP 1893-94 LXXX 343.
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serve, as a breach of civil contract'.' The correct
legal situation was that a seaman who deserted lost
his possessions left on board and his back wages. If
the desertion took place abroad he also lost any wages
earned on the return trip to the United Kingdom, had
to pay the excess wages of any substitute and could
be imprisoned for up to twelve weeks, with or without
hard labour. The man who failed to join his ship on
time could be fined two days' pay initially, and then
have deducted up to six further days' pay for each
twenty-four hours of absence, or pay for a substitute,
If the offence took place abroad he could go to prison
for up to ten weeks, with or without hard labour.2
In the United Kingdom, a deserter or absentee could
be arrested by a master, mate, owner, ship's husband or
consignee and taken aboard by force unless he specifically
requested to go before a Court. That Court had the power
to order that he be 'conveyed on board his ship for the
purpose of proceeding on the voyage' and thus be com-
pelled to fulfill his contract. 3 The sole effect of s.
10 of the 1880 Act that Farrer based his observation on
was that seamen were no longer imprisoned for failing
to join merchant ships in the United Kingdom. The element
of compulsion was strong in fishing and whaling vessels
1. T.H. Farrer, The State in its Relation to Trade (1902)
150.
2. As codified by 5. 221 of the Merchant Shipping Act
1894, 57 & 58 Vic C 60.
3. SS. 222-224 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.
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where the offence commonly referred to as 'being a
disobedient fisherman failing to obey a lawful command'
was still being dealt with by the Courts as late as
1969. The procedure employed by United Kingdom
magistrates in fishing ports was that warrants were
issued for the detention of hands who failed to join
their ships, and those who could not pay fines were
imprisoned for up to four weeks. Where the hand asked
for 'time to pay' and then made off without doing so
the magistrates would issue committal warrants so that
the man went straight to prison on being apprehended.1
As early as 1880, Joseph Chamberlain had promised to
abolish imprisonment for breach of contract, 2
 but sea-
men continued to be employed for the next ninety years
under legal restraints unknown to other groups of
workers. Wilful disobedience of orders, for example,
was still punishable with up to four weeks' imprisonment,
and leaving a ship without permission after berthing,
but before formal discharge, could cost the seaman a
months' pay. 3
 No factory hand, manual worker or day
labourer in agriculture was liable to such penalties
for actions of this kind, and moreover they were free
to strike at the place of employment: a seaman could
1. I am indebted to Skipper Tim Cresswell of the
Lowestoft trawler Gloria for this information,
which is contained in a personal letter dated 12
December 1979. Authority for the procedure out-
lined here derives from s.376 and s.380 of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1894.
2. Hansard 3 252 530.
3. SS. 225(1)(b) and 225(1) (a) of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1894.
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only withhold his labour while on shore and picket
his place of employment at a distance.
One of the root causes of this continuing
disparity in treatment was that the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1894 was, like the 1854 Act, a consolidating
measure with few innovations. Introduced on 25 August
1893 by Anthony Mundella, President of the Board of
Trade, 1 the Merchant Shipping Bill was dealt with in a
leisurely fashion by a Joint Committee of both Houses
presided over by the Lord Chancellor. Mundella had
indicated clearly at the beginning what sort of Bill
it would be. 'There is no intention', he said, 'of
hurrying this Bill through the House ... the Bill in no
substantial sense increases the power of the Board of
Trade, imposes new penalties or creates new offences'.2
The corollary of this last phrase must be that old
penalties and old offences were to remain in force.
The Employers' Liability Bill was under consideration
at the same time, and the then Home Secretary, Herbert
Asquith, 3 was involved in both measures. In relation
to the latter, his attitude was that seamen would have
to be dealt with later, and separately, 4 although six
1. Anthony John Mundella (1825-1897), was of Italian
immigrant stock and served as the Liberal MP for
Sheffield from 1868 to 1897. He is best remembered
as the initiator of the Labour Department at the
Board of Trade.
2. Hansard 4 16 1876.
3. Herbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928), was MI' for East
Fife from 1886 to 1918, and Liberal Prime Minister
from 1908-1916.
4. Hansard 4 18 811.
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years earlier the Royal Commission on the Loss of
Life at Sea had recommended that the provisions of
the Employers Liability Act of 1880 be extended to
cover seamen. 1
 J. Havelock Wilson had given telling
evidence on the need for proper cover to the Commission,
quoting the case of a vessel berthed at Mobile taking
on ballast and using a hatch as an impromptu staging.
The hatch gave way, but instead of setting up a
proper staging the mate of the vessel got another hatch
and ordered a second man to work on it. He refused,
but two other men obeyed the order and worked on the
hatch, and were drowned when it collapsed. No compensa-
tion was paid, and Wilson went on to underline the
dilemma faced by men ordered to perform dangerous
tasks. If they were killed or injured there was no
compensation, and if they refused to do the work they
could be imprisoned.2
The type of good intention expressed, but
only partially implemented, as a result of the 1887
Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Lose of Life
at Sea 3 was repeated in the Fifth and Final Report of
the Royal Commission on Labour of 1894 and the Manning
Committee Report of 1896. The Royal Commission said that
1. FRRCLLS 1887 xxx.
2. FRRCLLS 1887 QQ.18,934-18,948.
3. Briefly, it had recommended a continuous certificate
of service for ABs, the legalization of advance
notes - accomplished in 1889, the extension of
employers' liability provision to seafarers and
examinations for some classes of petty officers.
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seamen were under-represented and owners over-represented
on Local Marine Boards,' and had suggested that the
Board of Trade nominate 'suitable persons of the class
of an AB' as one of their four nominees on each Board.
It was also suggested that the seamen of the port con-
cerned should have the right to vote representatives
onto Boards, but as s.7 of the 1850 Act and the Seventh
Schedule of the 1894 Act only permitted election by
owners of foreign-going and home trade passenger ships
this logical idea could have no practical effect.2
The Royal Commission members had declared that although
s9 of the 1867 Act had decreed a minimum of seventy-
two cubic feet of space per man the proper figure should
be 120 cubic feet. As a result, the Board of Trade
instructed its surveyors to point out 'the desirability
of providing sufficient and healthy quarters for seamen',3
1. Of the 184 members of Local Marine Boards in 1890,
some 143 were involved in shipowning, according to
FFRRCL 1894 429.
2. In fact, the degree of under-representation was
greater than stated. The 1890 Return of Local Marine
Board Members on which the Royal Commission on Labour
relied shows that 143 members had a direct interest
in shipping, while forty-one did not. Only six
members of the uncommitted forty-one had lower-deck
experience: three were ex-seamen employed as secre-
taries of sailors' societies, one was a serving AB,
one a seaman and one a deep-sea diver. Local Marine
Boards, BPP 1890 (372) LXVI 73.
3. Papers showing the action taken by the Board of Trade
with re?ard to certain Recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Labour respecting Seamen of the Mercan-
tile Marine, BPP 1894 (C.7540) XXXV 117. (Referred
to hereafter as BOTARRCL 1894).
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but there was no legislation on this point for a further
twelve years. The Royal Commission on Labour had
called for the appointment of Inspectors of Medical
Stores: none had been appointed by Local Marine Boards
when subsequent enquiry was made. 1 A statutory diet
scale was to have legislative priority, 2 but it did not
become a reality until 1906. At the turn of the century,
seafarers had to accept a diet based either on the old
Liverpool Scale or the Board of Trade Scale of 1867-68
as written into crew agreenients. 3 The sole modification
was that, through a compromise arrived at between the
shipowners and Hicks Beach in 1892, ships trading through
the Suez Canal or round Cape Horn or the Cape of Good
Hope, were to have an inspection of food and water before
sailing. 4 The 1894 Act merely repeated earlier provisions
whereby any three complainants could ask for a survey of
bad food or tainted water 5 but, as had been the case
fifty years before, frivolous complaints were still to
be punished by a fine of up to a weeks' pay.
The Royal Commission on Labour had called for
a departmental enquiry on manning, 6 and a manning
committee sat and published its report in l896. 	 The
1. BOTARRCL 1894 118.
2. FFRRCL 1894 vii.
3. See Appendix Eleven (F) and (H).
4. S.3(l) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1892, 55 & 56
Vic c 37. See also Hansard 4 5 411-412.
5. S. 57 of the 1844 Act: s.198 of the 1894 Act.
6. FFRRCL 1894 vi.
7. Mundella set up this committee: J. Havelock Wilson
and George A. Laws, General Manager of the Shipping
Federation, were members.
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evidence of seamen of all ranks was overwhelmingly in
favour of a compulsory manning scale, with Captain E.B.
Hatfield, a Liverpool shipowner and master mariner,
declaring that there had been 'a more or less reckless
disregard for keeping up what I should call a sound
standard of manning', and George William Robinson, an
Able Seaman with eighteen years service, testifying
that 'the majority of vessels going to sea now are
under-manned'. George Groot, forty-three years in
command, believed that sailing ships were 'not half
manned to what they were years ago' while Joseph Korzen-
iowski (Joseph Conrad) thought that in foreign-going
steamers having only three men to a watch amounted to
under-manning, 1 George William Robinson described
graphically what happened in coasting steamers when only
two men were on watch:
You must understand that whenever a
light is passed - a lightship or a
light on shore - the man is called off
the lookout to look at the log and see
what the vessel has gone at that parti-
cular point. Of necessity that man is
called off the lookout to do that parti-
cular duty, unless the officer takes
the wheel and lets the man at the wheel
go to look at the log, or anless the
officer goes himself; and it is always
necessary for one man to leave the deck,
whether from the wheel or lookouts to
1. Manning Committee Report, 1896, Q.6241, Q.16,834,
Q.16,677 and Q.6309. The usual arrangement was that
one man was at the wheel, one on lookout and the
third employed as a standby to read the log and act
as messenger. Duties were rotated hourly, but one
man would have to work 'double-wheel' in each watch.
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call the watch below, which invariably
takes ten minutes to do..1
One result of having only two men on watch
at night was that, as in the Deeside case, if the
lookout had to go forward to tend the sidelights and
the officer of the watch and the helmsman were pre-
occupied with a potential collision situation, there
was no-one available to call the master. 2 Despite the
weight of the evidence, however, the departmental
committee caine to the rather tame conclusion that while
there had been a tendency to reduce crews, underinanning
was not general. 3 This conclusion was then hedged by
a declaration that a manning scale was necessary. A
standard of manning was recommended, and it is repro-
duced in Appendix Sixteen (A). The scale suggested
that in a stexner of 2,750 tons there should be three
mates and nine deckhands to give full coverage at night,4
with a minimum of nine 'effective hands' in a small
sailing vessel under 400 tons. However, the tonnage!
manning ratio arrived at by this committee did not , give
two four-man watches in steamers under 2,000 tons, while
1. Manning Committee Report, 1896 Q.l6,894.
2. Manning Committee REport, 1896 QQ62-63.
3. A useful summary of the Report exists in a shilling
pamphlet entitled Reports from the Departmental
Committee on Manning of Merchant Shipi with' Addenda
and Statistical Tables reprinted from the Shipping
Gazette and Lloyds' List (1896). Copy on BLRD 8808
aa 16 3. Referred to henceforth as Lloyds' Manning
Pamphlet 1896: this from p.4.
4. The Merchant Service Guild - an officers' trade
union - had called for four hands in each watch when
giving evidence to the Manning Committee. Manning
Committee Report, 1896 1007.
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for sailing vessels the number of 'effective hands'
was arrived at by including bosuns, carpenters and
sailmakers who were normally 'daymen' and did not
keep regular watches. A cook-steward was counted as
two-thirds of a man, but in practice his only deck duty
would consist of tending the foresheet when going about.'
These non-mandatory recommendations 2 omitted any scale
for engine-room personnel, 3 and a glance at Appendix
Sixteen (B) will show that in the twenty years between
1860 and 1880 the mean number of men employed per
hundred tons of steam shipping had fallen by almost
a half while in all classes of ships the manning ratio
was down by a quarter. Larger vessels manifestly give
economies of scale with regard to manning, but all the
statistical and impressionistic evidence is that owners
were following a policy of minimum manning in the
period. Frank Bullen reports that the 1,225-ton sailing
ship Western Belle had a 'very small crew' of twelve
Able Seamen, one Ordinary Seaman, a Bosun, Carpenter,
Sailniaker, Painter, Steward, Cook, three officers and
three boys - some twenty-one 'effective hands' by the
1. Hence the expression in common use and meaning that
every man should stick to his trade - 'The gunner to
the linstock, the steersman to the wheel and the cook
to the foresheet'.
2. At this time the only legal requirement was that emi-
grant ships should have an 'efficient crew' as laid
down by s.28 of the Passenger Act 1855, 18 & 1.9 Vic
£
3. In the l870s, insurance clubs insisted on one fireman
and one AB for every hundred registered tons - PRO
MT/9 86 M.3123/1874.
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1896 criteria, but only the Able Seamen and the
Second Mate would have worked regularly aloft - thirteen
out of the twenty-five men and boys aboard. 1 When
Captain G.G. Randell joined the 1,187-ton Sunderland
tramp Audacious in 1898 as Second Mate he found that
there were three men in each watch, and two of them
had to steer in all but the finest weather because
the ship's wheel was turned wholly by muscle power
and rope stoppers were employed to hold it against
the push of the screw. 2 The shipowners were implacably
hostile to any system whereby manning was determined
by government, and George A. Laws refused to sign the
Manning Committee Report on behalf of the Shipping
Federation because he felt that a tonnage-based method
took no account of differences between individual ships
while insisting that the Report contained a phrase
indicating that under-manning did not, of itself, amount
to unseaworthiness. 3 The Act of 1897 that was supposed
to implement the recommendations of the Manning Committee
proved to be dead letter, for while s.l gave power to
detain undermanned ships and treat them as unsafe there
was no statutory definition of undermanning, and the
section could not be employed unless ships were so
weakly manned that they could have scarcely left port
1. Bullen, The Log of a Sea Waif 163.
2. A.G. Course, The Deep Sea Tramp (1960) 7-11.
3. Manning Committee Report, 1896 xxxix and vii-viii.
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in the first place.1
The association between hours of work and
a manning scale was emphasised by four members of
the 1894 Royal Commission on Labour who said, in a
minority report, that a comprehensive manning scale
would eventually result in an eight-hour day. 2
 Stokers
and trimmers in some of the larger lines already had
the eight-hour day because of the arduous nature of
their employment, but the rest of the workforce was
either on watch-and-watch (four hours on duty followed
by four hours off duty), or were 'daymen'. The length
of 'days' varied, but for Oliver Bernard, a cabin-boy
in the Manchester Commerce in 1899, it ran from 5am
to 10pm. 3
 A,E. Dingle was an under-steward in the P & 0
liner Shannon in 1897 and records that he rose at 5am
to scrub out, worked until after lunch, took a brief
siesta and then worked again until 9pm. 4
 Jack McLaren
served in a l,4OOton barque in 1905 and wrote feelingly
about the tyranny of the watch-and-watch system in the
following passage:
Four-hours-on-and-four-hours-off - it
made up the rhythm of our days and nights,
ABs and OSs alike, our days and weeks and
weeks. Never once in all that time could
a seaman sleep in one stretch more than
three and three quarter hours ... an 'all
night in' was a luxury, a something to
1. The Merchant Shipping Act, 60 & 61 Vic C 59.
2. BOTARRCL 1894 6-7.
3. Oliver P. Bernard, Cock Sparrow (1936) 72.
4. A.E. Dingle, A Modern Sinbad (1933) 125-128, The
book was originally published anonymously.
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revel in, gloat over, and look
forward to.1
The absence of any manning legislation may be held to
account in part for the continuing long working day
for seamen, but three other factors must be mentioned.
First, these were hard times in this particular field
of employment, for while seamen's wages fell between 4%
and 5% in the period 1890_19052 the national product
per head at current prices rose by over 8%. 	 Second,
there was unrestricted entry of labour, and shipowners
used foreign and lascar labour whenever it was expedient
to do so. Lastly, J. Havelock Wilson's union was in no
position to press for a decrease in working hours because
it was numerically weak and had not completed its co-
hesive network of port branches. Wilson made no mention
of the eight-hour day between 1891 - when it was included
in a list of aims - and July 1910 when he called for
a National Wages Board, fixed hours of work and a manning
scale. 4 During the First World War Wilson concentrated
on achieving a 'closed shop', and made few pronouncements
on the subject of hours of work. As a consequence, there
was no regulation of the working day in the period
1. Jack McLaren, My First Voyage (1947) 57.
2. Hansard 4 143 195. See also Appendix Fifteen (A) which
shows the mean monthly pay of ABs in sail as £3-5s a
month in 1890 and £3 a month in 1905. Firemen were
getting £4-12s a month in 1890, but only £4-5s in 1905.
3. P.M. Deane and W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth,
1688-1959 (1962) 282.
4. The Story of the Seamen 14.
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studied, and seafarers were still working an eighty-
four-hour week in the 1930s.
In Chapter Five it was shown that homeward-
bound crimping had ceased to be a problem by 1886,
and one of the last convictions for this type of offence
in the United Kingdom was recorded on 30 December 1887
at the Justice's Court Hall, Glasgow when John Anderson
was fined £10 and ordered to pay £2 costs for going
aboard a merchant ship without permission. 1 Abroad,
the situation was as bad as ever. In the month following
the Anderson conviction a master wrote to the Board of
Trade from the West Coast to complain that 'The crimps
were alongside before the Doctor's visit 2 and within
ten minutes of the Ship receiving Pratique 3
 fifteen of
my crew were on their way ashore with their effects. In
looking for a crew, I found it of no use fighting against
the extortion practised by the Boarding Masters in
demanding $30 blood money for each seanian'. 4 When, in
May 1888, a seaman called George Copeland was murdered
at a crimping house in Dunkirk there was strong public
demand for the extension of the Transmission of Wages
1. Glasgow Herald, 31 December 1887.
2. A medical officer was, and is, always the first person
to board an incoming ship, and until he gives the
crew a clean bill of health no other person should
be in contact with them.
3. A Certificate of Pratique confirms that there is no
communicable disease among the crew.
4. He was Captain B, White of the Drumblair, and his
letter was dated 20 January 1888 - see PRO MT/9 328
M.4338/88.
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Scheme to foreign ports, 1
 and the scheme was steadily
extended so that by 1911-12 about a quarter of a
million pounds was being transmitted annually0
However, one shortcoming of the scheme was that there
was a 3d in the pound users' fee so that seamen often
preferred to be paid off in cash, and progress proved
to be unspectacular. 2
 In 1893, when there was a
departmental enquiry into the transmission of wages,3
the Board of Trade took a complacent view with an
official declaring that 'It is only the outward bound
seaman that the crimp gets anything out of' 4 . This
complacency was unwarranted insofar as the near Conti-
nental ports were concerned, for evidence was shortly
to emerge showing that crimps had changed with the times
and were operating within the system and with official
sanction.
An enquiry in 1897 led to the disclosure that
crimps had evolved into what were euphemistically termed
1. See the Daily Chronicle for 26 May 1888 and The Observer
for 27 May 1888. Paradoxically, the Vice-Consul at
Dunkirk, one Edward Taylor, had just submitted a report
on Crimping at ports between the Elbe and Brest (that
is, within home trade limits) and the Transmission of
Wages Scheme was already in operation at Dunkirk. See
PRO MT/9 321 M.6047/88 and M.10410/88.
2. Transmission of Wages Scheme, BPP 1913 (Cd.7033) LX ill.
In 1889-90 the figure was about 20% lower - see BPP 1890
LXVI 128.
3. Report of the Board of Trade departmental committee on
the Transmission of Seamen's Wages, BPP 1893-94 (C.7179)
LXXX 387. Referred to hereafter as Wages Report s 1893-94.
4. Wages Report, 1893-94 Q.7. Complacency and lack of
urgency are the 'keynotes of this report. The fifth
paragraph makes it clear that the extension of the
scheme was to take place in a 'tentative and deliberate
manner'.
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'shipping masters'. 1
 The British Consul at Hamburg
actually had two of these shipping masters working in
his office, and he defended the practice by saying
that 'they do a considerable amount of work that makes
things easier; they see that the old articles and the
official log are properly signed before handing in;
they make out the seamen's accounts and do everything
The shipping masters at Antwerp charged between
five and eight francs for subsequently finding a seaman
a berth, collecting the money quite openly in the Con-
sulate, while at Hamburg the going rate was ten marks.3
J. Havelock Wilson was concerned that the provisions
of s.l86 of the 1894 Act relating to discharge abroad
were being blatantly ignored, with seamen being put
ashore abroad without proper provision for their
repatriation. The purpose was, according to Wilson,
1. The enquiry led to the Report of the Committee on
the Engagement and Discharge of British Seamen
at ports on the Continent within home-trade Timits,
BPP 1897 (C.8577) LXXVIII 63, which is referred to
hereafter as the Report on Discharges, 1897.
Commander W. Dawson, Secretary of the Seamen's
Mission, gave the following explanation of the
evolution process. 'Driven off from the paying
off of the men, they have turned to the engagement
of seamen and call themselves 'shipping masters'.
Report on Discharges, 1897 Q.2135.
2. Evidence of the Hon. Charles Dundas, Consul-General
at Hamburg. Report on Discharges, 1897 Q.4899.
3. Report on Discharges, 1897 69.
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purely economic, 1 but the result was that these men
fell easily into the hands of crimpse The shipowners'
defence of their acquiescence in these arrangements
was that 'you cannot get the seamen except through
the boarding-house keepers', 2 but as the explanation
came from the General Manager of the Shipping
Federation, George A. Laws, and that organisation had
relied heavily on crimps to supply labour during the
strikes of 1890-93, it seenis a weak argument. The
Committee recommended that the 3d in the pound fee
for use of the Transmission of Wages Scheme and for
remitting Money Orders be abolished so that seamen be
encouraged to send their earnings home; that Consuls
be 're-instructed' in relation to discharges abroad
and that shipping masters be 'discouraged'. 3 It did
not touch at all on the heart of the matter - that the
two shillings signing-on fee payable by seamen when
engaged in the presence of a Consul represented a
1. The appropriate passage is to be found in the Report
on Discharges, 1897 QQ.l022-1023 and reads: 'You
say it has become the practice to pay off more fre-
quently in foreign ports? Yes, since 1890. That
was in consequence no doubt of the higher wages: in
order to try and get men at a cheaper rate? Yes.
The wages at that time in England were £4-l5s a
month, whereas at continental ports they were only
£3-15s to £4 so that by discharging a more expensive
English crew at foreign ports they were enabled to
sign on cheaper men in their place, and they would
probably have the same men to start the next voyage
at £3-15s each'.
2. Report on Discharges, 1897 QQ.l984-1985.
3. Report on Discharges, 1897 72.
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considerable source of income to these officials and
had led some of them to cultivate, and accommodate,
crimps.
The last stronghold of forcible crimping
was North America, where a wide range of crimping
techniques was employed down to the outbreak of the
First World War. In the Forest King case of 1886,
for example, the ships' officers 'hazed" one crew
out of the ship at New York, signed-on a number of
shilling-a-month men from a crimping house and later
delivered them penniless into the tender care of
another crimp in Belgium with the connivance of a
corrupt clerk at the Amsterdam Consulate. 2 On the
West Coast, crimp bosses such as Shanghai Brown in
San Francisco, Larry Sullivan at Portland, Liiney Dirk
at Port Townsend and Cockney Jack at Vancouver had
such a grip on the waterfront and such a wide range
of contacts in the police, judiciary and the local
political machines that they were virtually above the
law. 3 At these ports, crimping was often a matter of
1. That is, bullied them so that they left the ship. This
device was employed so that no wages need be paid, and
it was a device often forced on masters by owners. The
master of the Crassendale, detained for months at Mar-
tinez awaiting a grain cargo in 1892, wrote home that
he had 'received strict orders not to pay them (the
crew) anything, but - mark you - "Get rid of them if
you can". Alfred J. Green, Jottings from a Cruise
(Seattle, 1947 edition) 202.
2. Correspondence relating to the Crimping of the Crew of
the Forest King, BPP 1886 (94-Sess.2) LIX 273.
3. Stan Hugill, Sailortown (1967) 190-221 and Basil
Lubbock, Round the Horn Before the Mast (1902) 21-22.
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simple kidnapping, with miners, cowboys and hoboes
shipped out unconscious from drink, drugs or hard
usage to serve before the mast. Profits from crimping
were volatile, as may be shown by referring back to
an episode in 1873-74. In the former year the boarding
house proprietors of San Francisco were getting a $40
bonus for each man shipped, but in 1874 the British
Consul had to warn masters that demanding a bonus
from crimps to take seamen off their hands was illegal,
Thomas Gray noted on the file, 'This is curious as
showing how the laws of Economy can be upset', and
T.H. Farrer added his observation - 'A very curious
case of Tables turned •... 	 Usually, however, the
price of crimped sea labour varied according to latitude
and season. The Liverpool Shipowners Association com-
piled a dossier on Crimping at US Ports 2 at the turn
of the century which showed this aspect clearly. In
June 1899 at Portland 'blood money' was $55 a man,
while at San Francisco in December it was only
Further north at Puget Sound and Tacoma the rate was
$75 throughout 1900-01. The master of the Glenogil
reported at this time that the crimping interest was
so powerful that he had to pay $75 for men who had not
passed through a crimps' hands but had signed-on in
1. PRO MT/9 74 M.5873/1873 and MT/9 88 M.15455/l874.
2. PRO MT/9 696 M.10068/Ol.
3. There are, of course, many alternative forms of
work in agriculture, forestry and construction
during the months of summer - hence the higher
'blood money'.
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the ordinary way, and Basil Lubbock had the same
experience.' Crimping flourished because desertion
could not be checked, and deserters provided the bulk
of the crimps' raw material. When a solution was
found to the problem of desertion, crimping swiftly
withered and died.
The Board of Trade was well aware that
crimping and desertion were linked, and did its best
to provide explanations and suggest remedies. It had
long been appreciated that wage disparity gave a
powerful incentive to desert, and it had been noted in
1878 that desertion in the United States had fallen
when the wage differential narrowed. 2 In 1896 the
Board published a preliminary analysis of the problem,
which had some good features, but was misleading in one
respect. 3 it was shown that deserters fell into two
main categories - Able Seamen and firemen, and passage
workers such as cattlemen and shilling-a-month hands
who were expected to desert on arrival. After deducting
the latter group, the Board of Trade assessment of the
annual rate of desertion at home and abroad, in sail
and steam, was that 44.2% of the workforce was deserting
annually. 4 This staggeringly high figure was not
1. PRO MT/9 696 M.10l02/Ol and Lubbock, Round the Horn
before the Mast 8.
2. RSCMSB 1878 Q.1011. Evidence of P. Talbot Peterson
of the London Ship Masters Society.
3. British Ship (Desertion of Seamen Abroad), BPP 1896
4. See Table One.
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challenged at the time, but it is now possible to
make a more rea'istic assessment from other data. The
Board of Trade statisticians had made the error of
including failures-to-join in with desertions, and
the true numerical desertion figure for 1895 is given
in Table Two overleaf. When applied to the number of
seamen, obtained from Appendix Three, the true per-
centage of desertions in 1895 is as shown in Table
Three. The desertion rate was 1.7% annually at home,
but one in thirteen British seamen was deserting
abroad. Was this latter figure abnormally high?
The answer would seem to be that it was, for while the
figure of 14,502 men deserting abroad in 1895 is very
close to the figure for all desertions for 1847,1 the
mean figures for the larger period 1895-1900 are about
a third up from the mean figures for 1845-53 - even
when allowance is made for an increase in the work-
force of about a quarter. 2 As a consequence, when
Admiral Field, the Member for Eastbourne, called for
an enquiry into desertion in May 1898 the Board of
Trade responded with alacrity, and Consuls were circula-
rised. The results were published in a paper entitled
Merchant Shipping (Desertion of Seamen) in the following
3year.
1. See Appendix Seven: 14,360 men deserted in that year.
2. See Appendices Three and Seven.
3. Merchant Shipping (Desertion of Seamen), BPP 1899
(C.9265) LXXXVII 119. Referred to hereafter as
the Field Enquiry, 1899.
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Table One: Desertions at home and abroad in 1895 as a
percentage of the total employed according
to BPP 1896 LXXV 85.
Sailing Ships
Steamships
United Kingdom
1 10
.J. I P
16.6%
Abroad
15.3%
8.6%
Table Two: The number of deserters at home and abroad
in 1895 from BPP 1901 LXVIII 71,
United Kingdom	 Abroad
All Ships	 3,629
	
14,502
Table Three: Adjusted percentage of 1895 desertions
United Kingdom	 Abroad
All Ships	 1.7%	 7.8%
Table Four: Ethnic origins of seamen at work on the
census dates in 1891, 1896 and 1901.
Year British seamen Foreign seamen Lascars	 Total
1891
	
127,567	 23,884
	
21,322 172,773
1896
	
125,009	 27,446
	
27,911 180,366
1901
	
120,412	 32,614
	
33,611 186,637
Sources: BPP 1896 LXXV 85, BPP 1901 LXVIII 71, BPP 1902
XCII 282 and PRO MT/9 741 M.1816l/02.
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The most notable feature of the Field Enquiry
was that it confirmed the existence of wage disparity.
The Consul at Baltimore reported that American wages
averaged £1 a month higher than British wages, while
the San Francisco representative said that while
British wages were £2-15s to £3 a month for Able Seamen
they averaged £4 a month on the West Coast. 1 Most of
the West Coast desertions were said to "take place
directly after the vessels arrive' due to the activities
of crimps, 2 and the San Francisco Consul recommended
that advances be restricted to one months' wages to
make the seaman a less attractive proposition to the
crimps. Wage disparity was, however, thought to be
less marked than in earlier decades, and the desertion
rate was down from 25% of all British crews calling at
San Francisco in 1888 to 12% in 1897, although at
Portland, Oregon the rate stood at 24% in the latter
year. 3 The British representative at Rosario said
that masters continued to be in league with crimps,
and took gratuities to turn men adrift abroad so as to
provide the crimps with raw material for their trade.
At Sydney, wages in colonial ships were almost double
1. Field Enquiry, 1899 122.
2. Sir David Bone noted that 'scarcely was our anchor
down in 'Frisco Bay than the boarding-house 'crimps'
were alongside, beaming with good fellowship, and
tumbling over one another in their anxiety to shake
'Jack' by the hand, and to tell him of the glorious
opportunities for smart sailor-men ashore'. David
W. Bone, The Brassbounder (1942, Penguin) 71.
3. Field Enquiry, 1899 123-124.
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those in British ships, thus giving men a powerful
incentive to desert, while the Secretary of Trade and
Customs at Melbourne reported that high wages ashore,
poor food afloat and a two months' advance spent in
the United States before sailing were compelling reasons
leading to a high level of desertion at Australian ports.
The Consul at Marseilles came to similar conclusions,
and believed that the institution of a continuous certi-
ficate of discharge might be the best solution,' The
idea was not new, 2 but Board of Trade officials had
come to look on it with favour and on 18 April 1899
Charles Ritchie, 3 President of the Board since 1896,
ordered that a departmental committee investigate the
matter and report their findings.4
Prior to 1900, discharge certificates took
the form of thin printed forms acnown to seamen as 'flirns'
or 'flimsies', and the history of these documents goes
back to 1729. The 'Act for the better Regulation and
Government of Seamen in the Merchants Service' had
1. Field Enquiry, 1899 125-165.
2. It was first mooted in 1878 - see RSCMSB 1878 QQ.
5299-5306.
3. Charles Thomas Ritchie.(1838-1906)., was an early
progressive Tory who was President of the Board of
Trade between 1896 and 1900.
4. The Report of the Committee appointed by the Board
of Trade on the Question of Continuous Discharge
Certificates for Seamen is at BPP 1900 (Cd.133)
LXXVII 99, and is referred to hereafter as the Dis-
charge Certificate Report, 1900.
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provided that seamen should have a written statement
of wages earned, 1 and in the course of time it became
the common practice that when a man received his
wages account on discharge it was endorsed with the
master's remarks as to his conduct and ability. In
1835 the form that these settlement of wages certificates
should take was set out in a schedule to the Merchant
Shipping Act of that year, 2 and the 1850 Act laid down
that a separate document 'in a Form sanctioned by the
Board of Trade' should provide 'a Report of the Con-
duct, Character and Qualifications of the Persons dis-
charged'. 3 Unfortunately, these 'flimsies' had no
representation or description of the holders, were
not robust 4 and, like the register tickets of 1844,
were readily obtainable for small sums, and were traded
in freely by seamen and crimps alike. Additionally,
it was perfectly possible to get hold of another man's
discharges on payment of a penny from the office of
the Registrar-General of Seamen on Tower Hill, 5 and
1. 2 Geo II c 36, second paragraph.
2. 37 Geo III c 73.
3. 13 & 14 Vic C 93.
4. Consequently, these documents are now rare, but an
example may be seen at the Arklow Maritime Museum,
Ireland. It was issued to a seaman discharged from
the Great Eastern and was, no doubt, retained by
his family because of the historical association.
5. By the 1850 Act one of the two copies of the single-
sheet discharge certificate was lodged there.
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unqualified men could buy and use discharge tickets
and certificates of service or competency issued to
others. The author of A Modern Sinbad bought a master's
papers in Mauritius and subsequently commanded a barque
and a steamer in the 1890s although his experience
barely qualified him to serve as an Able Seaman. 1
 The
Discharge Certificate Report, 1900 noted these short-
comings of the existing system, and added that masters
tended to give 'very good' for character and ability
too freely. It was recommended that continuous dis-
charge certificates be introduced, but the Report was
lukewarm as to the potential effect on character, saying
that the change would not alter character although it
might improve discipline. 2
 The benefits that might be
expected from the institution of continuous discharge
certificates were outlined by a number of witnesses, but
not given any emphasis by the Committee. Chief among
them was that where a discharge book was lodged with
the mate once a man had signed-on he would have the
greatest difficulty finding another ship if he deserted
or failed to join. 3 The new certificates greatly
strengthened the position of Superintendents of Mercantile
1. Dingle, A Modern Sinbad 110-173.
2. Discharge Certificate Report, 1900 104-106.
3. See the evidence of Captain T.D. Bulkeley, late of
the Royal Mail Line, William Brown, secretary of the
North Shields branch of the Sailors' and Firemen's
Union and George Alexander Laws for the Shipping
Federation - Discharge Certificate Report, 1900 QQ.
1990-2220.
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Marine Offices who had the duty of keeping registers
of deserters, 1 and the success rate of the scheme at
home was dramatic. Between 1900 and 1908 the number
of deserters in the United Kingdom fell by 70%, and
the number of failures-to-join halved. Desertion
abroad fell by 20%, but failures-to-join scarcely
altered. 2 The institution of the Continuous Discharge
Certificate may, therefore, be assessed as having been
an effective means of checking desertion at home, but
less effective abroad where the demand for sea labour
was such that a scrupulous adherence to legal forms
could not be counted on.
The Navigation Laws had restricted the employ-
ment of foreigners in British vessels until the middle
of the nineteenth-century, and a look back at Figure
One will show that in the 1820s at least four out of
five of those serving were of British origin. In 1853-
54 all restrictions on the employment of aliens were
removed so that shipowners could - as they had long
desired - recruit seamen of any nationality. 3 So long
as the percentage of foreign seamen remained small
there were few complaints from British seamen and their
representatives, but by the early 1880s foreigners
1. By s.3 of the 1889 Act, 52 & 53 Vic C 46.
2. See Appendix Seven.
3. During the debate on the 1850 Bill Lord John Manners
said that Parliament 'should abolish those distinctions
respecting the employment of foreigners on board the
merchant ships, as they presented sensible obstructions
and hindrances to commerce and the interests of the
shipowners'. Hansard 3 112 1451.
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were seen to be about a seventh of the workforce' and
when Thomas Gray circularised Mercantile Marine
Offices and the shipowners in 1886 it transpired that
14% of the seamen and 2.4% of the masters were aliens.
Their distribution was uneven, with few serving in
coasters and the large steamers but a great number in
medium-sized foreign-going ships and sailing vessels,
and the Tyne ports, Hull and Cardiff were recording
over 21% of foreign seamen among crews signing-on.2
The proximity of Hull and Newcastle to Scandinavia
and the winter freeze-up in the northern Baltic accounted
largely for the availability of Baltic seamen at Hull
and Newcastle, and shipowners had a distinct preference
for them as employees. 'Scandinavians and Germans are
more sober and obedient', said one, while another
believed that 'foreign seamen are preferred to the
ordinary British sailor as they are of better physique,
have a better supply of clothes and are more skilful,
sober, industrious and respectful'. 'The Aberdeen
seaman', said another, 'would not ship at the current
rate of wages and we send to Norway for crews'3
Cardiff was able to attract cheap and docile labour
because of the constant flow of coal exports which kept
up demand for ships' crews, 4 and foreign seamen flocked
1. See Appendix Three (iii).
2. BPP 1886 LIX 199-201.
3. BPP 1886 LIX 222-223.
4. See Martin Daunton 'Jack ashore: seamen in Cardiff
before 1914', The Welsh History Review IX 2 1978.
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there for work. E.F. Knight records a conversation
with a Dutch seaman in Delfzyl in 1887 when the latter,
speaking of his way of life, said 'I won't go to sea
so long as I have a stuiver left. That's my way. When
I've spent all my money I'll go to Cardiff and ship for
what I can get, but not till then'. 1 Subsequent enquiry
at Cardiff in 1894 showed that its popularity with
foreign seamen had not waned. 35.9% of the Able Seamen
signing-on steam vessels were foreigners, while in
sail the figure was 43.5%, and 24.3% of firemen were
aliens. 2 Foreign seamen seem to have been attracted
to serve in British vessels for two main reasons - the
large number of jobs available and the absence of
bureaucracy. The most famous foreign-born seaman of
the period, Joseph Conrad, was advised to join a British
ship precisely 'because the British do not bother about
the formalities'. 3 J. Havelock Wilson and the Sailors'
and Firemen's Union had been unhappy at Thomas Gray's
recommendation of 1886 that as foreigners made up less
than the 25% of the workforce no restrictions were
necessary, and in the years that followed campaigned
for control of entry by a number of devices.
Wilson's claim in his autobiography that he
was only biased against foreign seamen because they
accepted lower wages 4 does not stand up to detailed
1. E.F. Knight, The Falcon on the Baltic (1889) 132.
2. Manning Committee Report, 1896 1010.
3. Baines, Joseph Conrad 58.
4. Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 98.
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examination, for his union had from the start demanded
heavy initial subscriptions from foreign seamen, and
in his evidence before the Royal Commission on the
Loss of Life at Sea in 1887 he had outlined a scheme
whereby foreigners would have to serve longer proba-
tionary periods before being rated as Able Seamen or
firemen, 1 Next, he mooted the idea of a language test,
and in 1900 was urging its implementation on the
grounds of safety. 2 The 1901 census of seamen gave
Wilson valuable ammunition for a continued campaign
against the employment of foreigners, for it gave the
composition of the workforce on a given day and
revealed that on the 31st March 1901 lascars and
foreign seamen together made up more than a third of
the number of men in employment. A comparison with
the census figures for 1891 and 1896, reproduced on
page 242 as Table Four, shows that the number of
British seamen at work had declined both relatively
and absolutely while the percentage of foreign seamen
serving afloat was up from 13.8% to 17.5% and that of
lascars up front 12.3% to 18% in the decade, 3 These
figures led Wilson into making further efforts to
1. Wilson suggested that foreign seamen should have
to serve an extra year at sea before being rated
AB, and that foreigners should serve for five years
as trimmers before promotion to firemen. FRRCLLS
1887 QQ.18,758-18,782.
2. Discharge Certificate Report, 1900 Q.1485.
3. Return of the Number, Ages Ratings and Nationalities
of Seamen employed on the 1st day of March 1901, BPP
1902 (Cd.1342) XCII 282.
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exclude lascars and foreigners front the shipping
industry, notably by saying that the former group were
a source of danger because of their unfamiliarity with
written and spoken English while the latter were
security risks, but at the same time he was developing
the theme of internationalism which weakened those
arguments considerably. Eventually, he was able to
reconcile both themes by taking the line that an inter-
national federation of seamen's unions would lead to
equalized wages and remove the necessity for an influx
of foreign seamen. The problem proved to be insoluble,
even though an international federation of seamen's
unions was eventually formed, 1 and British merchant
ships continued to be crewed by a substantial proportion
of foreign and Asiatic seamen down to the present day.2
1. At the triennial congress of the International Trans-
port Workers' Federation held at Miami in 1980 the
problem was still being discussed - there being a
resolution on the agenda to the effect that 'owners
should give priority to domiciled crews'. See The
Telegraph (organ of the Merchant Navy and Airline
Officers Association) XII No.9, September 1980.
2. After 1918 it became official policy that there should
be no discrimination in crewing merchant vessels. The
Final Report of the 1918 Departmental Committee on the
position of the Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries
after the War emphasised that 'any measure preventing
the free employment of foreign seamen on British ships
would be undesirable on account of the world-wide
character of the shipping industry', and that no
restrictions be placed on the employment of 'Asiatic or
coloured seamen, whether British subjects or not'. BPP
1918 (Cd.9092) XIII 588. Enquiry of the General
Council for British Shipping in June 1980 revealed
that one in twelve British seafarers was a native of
India, Pakistan or Bangladesh - the figures being
6,300 seamen from the Indian sub-continent out of a
total 1980 workforce of 75,000.
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An objective summary of the period 1884-1904
must begin with an acknowledgement that, except in a
few areas, seamen were worse off at the end than they
had been at the beginning. By and large, unionism had
failed and the employers' organisation was dominant.
Seamen had proved to be difficult to organise, 1 the
legal restraints on their freedom of action were
formidable, government tended to rely on non-mandatory
recommendations rather than legislation when considering
the sailor's lOt, and the only Board of Trade initiative
of any consequence was the institution of the Continuous
Discharge Certificate. As Trevelyan so aptly put it,
'The later Victorians laid no far plans for the future',2
and it would be right to say of these years that, as a
class, seamen remained stationary at a time of general
advance when living standards, and aspirations, were
rising.	 Ashore, trades unions were beginning to be
effective; hours of work were falling, housing con-
ditions were improving and the Fabian Society, founded
in 1884, was marshalling middle-class support and
harrowing middle-class consciences to make socialist
principles respectable. The last great evangelical
1. A Fabian tract entitled Socialism and Sailors by
Benjamin T. Hall, a former activist in the Sailors'
and Firemen's Union, described the position of the
seaman accurately. 'His sense of community is limited
by the size of the fo'c's'le, and is only extended
when he goes to sea in a larger vessel'. Fabian Tract
No. 46 published by the Fabian Society in September
1893, 3.
2. G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History (1973 edition)
556.
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movement, the Salvation Army, was purging the town
poor of its apathetic shiftlessness while the Workmen's
Compensation Act, the Employer's Liability Act and the
steady diffusion of the eight-hour day pointed to the
new shape of industrial society. The agricultural
worker had the franchise after 1884,1 the death-rate
fell dramatically through improvements in sanitation,
water supply and medical knowledge, while imports of
cheap frozen meat from Australia, New Zealand and the
Argentine transformed the whole basis of working-class
nutrition. Seamen, however, had been excluded from
the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
Employer's Liability Act, they had to work unlimited
hours, consume sub-standard food and sleep in cramped
quarters. Their social status was low, 2 and where an
improvement in the sailors' lot may be recorded it
tends to derive from the previous era of benevolence
rather than spring from an expression of late Victorian
goodwill towards seamen.
In this regard, it should be noted that the
passing of the Load Line Act of l89O, the Merchant
1. The Liberal Party was the chief beneficiary and it
captured the vote in the countryside as a result.
After 1905 Liberals used this newly-attained ascen-
dency to implement a number of measures that improved
the lot of seamen.
2. Thirty-one out of the thirty-nine Prisoners' Aid
Societies in existence in 1897 made it their business
to find work at sea for discharged felons. Prisons
Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies), BPP 1897 (C.
299) XL 63.
3. 53 & 54 Vic c 9. Its proper title is the Merchant
Shipping Act, 1890, but it is generally referred to
by the more descriptive title.
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Shipping Act of 18921 and the powers given by s.459
of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 more properly
represent a natural outcome and extension of the earlier
agitation generally associated with the names of James
Hall and Samuel Plimsoll than a new series of reforms.
Their effect was that s.1 of the 1890 Act established
a compulsory load-line, while s.l of the 1892 Act said
that a ship with a submerged load-line was unsafe and
could properly be detained. S.459 of the 1894 Act
laid down the procedure for actually detaining it and
compelling a survey. 2 The load-line tables produced
by Digby Murray for the Board of Trade and Benjamin
Martell for Lloyd's in 1882 were revised by the Load
Line Committee that began sitting in 1883, and given
the force of law in l89O. 	 The effect was immediate.
The number of steamers registered rose by 10% in the
decade 1890-1900, but the mean percentage of steamer
losses fell from 2.12% to l.4l%. 	 Similarly, the number
of deaths by wreck, drowning and accident fell by 20%
between l89l-l9O0,	 Two decades after Piinsoll's Act
1. 55 & 56 Vic C 37,
2. A vessel was provisionally detained for the purpose
of survey, and then finally detained for repair,
alteration or re-loading. Owners could appeal to a
court of survey, and nominate assessors who would
accompany the surveyor on his inspection,
3. Uphain, The Load Line - A Hallmark of Safety 40-41.
4. See Appendix Thirteen.
5. See Appendix Eight (C),
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came into force a downward trend in both types of
losses is discernable for the first time, and it was a
trend that was to continue for the remainder of the
period studied if war losses are excluded from con-
sideration.
On the debit side, there was a final attempt
to implement the centuries-old policy of keeping up
the number of young men going to sea so that the Navy
could be fully manned in times of war. The 1894 Act
re-stated earlier provisions relating to an intake of
pauper apprentices,' while s.7 of the Merchant Shipping
(Mercantile Marine Fund) Act of 1898 promised owners
a 20% cut in the light dues paid by their vessels
provided they took on seaman apprentices in the fifteen
to nineteen age range and enrolled them in the Royal
Naval Reserve. 2 Both moves failed, and the naval
reserve recruitment scheme was wound up in l9O6.	 The
legislators had evidently not studied recent information
on the matter. The truth was that premium apprentices,
bound for the quarter-deck, had driven out seamen
apprentices altogether. One reason was given by a
contributor to the Nautical Magazine in 1882 who used
the cognomen 'Twenty Years in Steamships'. The article
1. SS. 105-109.
2. 61 & 62 Vic c 44.
3. The number of apprentices fell from 1,861 in 1894 to
1,072 in 1903 - see Appendix Five. For the winding-
up of the Royal Naval Reserve scheme see Hansard 4
142 700,
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he wrote emphasised that owners got up to £60 in
premiums for quarter-deck apprentices, and did not
have to feed theni in home ports because they went home
to their families. On the other hand, 'poor boys could
not go hornet.1 Another version was available in the
Final Report of the Royal Conunission on Loss of Life
at Sea of 1887 which said categorically that seamen
apprentices had ceased to exist because young men went
to sea as boys or Ordinary Seamen, and were paid for
it. 2 One fact is beyond dispute. The numbers of both
types of apprentice had been fal1in steadily since he
element of compulsion had been removed in mid-century,
and subsequently many owners were not prepared to invest
in training boys who might later go and work for some-
one else, while relatively few young men found a sea
career attractive enough to seek a premium apprentice-
ship. By 1903 apprentices made up a mere 0.4% of the
workforce - the lowest percentage ever recorded.3
In the matter of diet, it should be noted that
Board of Trade officials did their best to make the
1892 Act work, while the shipowners were able, once
again, to defer the institution of a statutory food scale.
It will be recalled that s.3(l) of the 1892 Act had made
1. Nautical Magazine LI, November 1882. The article
was entitled 'Dutchmen v. British Seamen'.
2. FRRCLLS 1887 xxvii.
3. See Appendices Three (iv) and Five.
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the inspection of food and water mandatory on long
voyages, and in the first year the Act was in force
the Board of Trade inspectors did yeoman service.
Between 17 July and 2 September 1893, for example,
they made 273 inspections and there were ninety-six
condemnations - a 35% condemnation rate. 1 Shipowners
gradually conformed to the new standard, 2 but there
continued to be no compulsion on them in respect of
victualling on the shorter sea routes. A protest in
1902 from the Worcester branch of the Navy League to
the effect that sub-standard food was being supplied
to merchant seamen brought a reply from the Board of
Trade that 'the question of the food supplied to seamen
in the merchant service will probably be considered by
the committee presently sitting'. 3 This departmental
conmiittee 4 subsequently recommended a voluntary food
scale, but few shipowners felt that they had to adhere
to it. When questioned in the House on 20 March 1905,
1. Hansard 4 17 738-739.
2. It was a grudging conformity, and Sir David Bone,
writing at the end of a 140-day voyage in the late
1890s, noted that 'The food, poor in quality, and of
meagre allowance at the best, has become doubly dis-
tasteful ... The fresh water had nearly run out, and
the red rusty sediment of the tank bottoms has a
nauseating effect and does little to assuage a thirst
engendered by salt rations'. The Brassbounder 59-60.
3. PRO MT/9 720 M4353/1902.
4. The Mercantile Marine Committee included Board of
Trade, Shipping Federation, Trinity House and
Sailor's and Firemen's Union representatives.
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Bonar Law 1
 had to admit that of the 3,647 British
merchant ships on the register in 1904 only 340 had
adopted the new voluntary scale.2
At the beginning of this chapter the four
main aims of J. Havelock Wilson were listed, and it
needs to be said that none of them was achieved in
this period. He did not get recognition for the
Sailor's and Firemen's Union, and disputes were still
being settled by brute force. There was no statutory
increase in the minimum scale of accommodation for
seamen, and no statutory scale of provisions. The
shipowners had a strong collective voice in the form
of the Shipping Federation, and while the growing
strength of the Liberal Party and the spread of socialist
ideas meant that many radical suggestions were endorsed
by Royal Commissions and Parliamentary and departmental
committees, the follow-up rate was low. The unimple-
mented suggestions at the close of this period included
abolition of imprisonment for breach of contract,
qualifications for petty officers, firemen and Able
Seamen, an increase in minimum accommodation standards,
a statutory manning scale, a statutory food scale and
increased representation of seamen on Local Marine Boards.
1. Andrew Bonar Law (1858-1923), was a Canadian-born
Conservative who had prospered in the Glasgow iron
trade. He led the party after 1911, and was briefly
Prime Minister in 1922-23.
2. Hansard 4 143 429-430.
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The conclusion must be that in these two decades of
conflict the seamen manning the world's largest mer-
chant fleet had made little material progress. Their
lives were less at risk because of derivative legis-
lation arising from an earlier reform movement, and
crimps were less importunate because of executive action,
but in other respects their living and working conditions
remained largely unchanged.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE YEARS OF HOPE, 1905 TO 1918
Three factors underlie the improvement in the
sailors 1 lot that took place between 1905 to 1918,
and they are the Liberal victory at the polls in 1905,
union successes in 1911-12 and the advent of the First
World War. The merchant service of today was shaped in
this period when sail virtually vanished from the seas
and seamen obtained something close to parity with shore
workers in respect of their conditions of employment.
In looking at the improvements of these years, it is
important to appreciate that while the reforming Liberals
and the Sailors' and Firemen's Union were able to make
advances of the ratchet type it was the demands of war
that brought about radical change. As will be shown,
the setting-up of the National Maritime Board, the
institution of the P.C.5 system, 1 the employment 'pool'
and the guaranteed minimum wage all sprang from a
recognition that merchant seamen had a crucial role in
supplying the sinews of war, and that without their
efforts the conflict with Germany could well be lost.
1. A form designated Port Control 5 was devised so that
seamen seeking work had a type of security clearance.
J. Havelock Wilson was able to tie in the issue and
completion of this form with the issue and inspection
of union cards, and thus achieve a kind of 'closed
shop'.
4.
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The legislative phase attendant on the Liberal victory
of 1905 antedated the achievement of power by some
months, and began with the passing of the Shipowners
Negligence (Remedies) Act of ios)
This measure was conceived by Sir Harry Samuel,
the Member for Tower Hamlets, as a retributive exercise
because foreign governments were claiming jurisdiction
in respect of personal injury suffered by their nationals
unloading British ships abroad, but the background to it
stretches back a quarter of a century. In Chapters Five
and Six it was shown that the Employers' Liability Act
of 1880 had been of little use in securing compensation
for injured seamen, and the same may be said of the Work-
men's Compensation Act of 1897. The 1897 Act was
admittedly 'experimental': 2 it failed to give realistic
payments to those killed at work, 3 and a Home Office
enquiry in 1904 concluded that it had engendered
'excessive litigation' because a high degree of negligence
had to be proved. 4 The 1904 enquiry report urged that
'powers should be given providing an attachment of a
foreign ship to answer a claim', 5 and this recommendation
1. 5Edw7clO.
2. See Hansard 4 48 1432-1433.
3. A wholly dependent relative might get the maximum
payment of £150 or three years' wages - whichever
was the greater.
5. BPP 1904 LXXXVIII 843.
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was the cornerstone of Sir Harry Samuel's Bill. John
Burns, the veteran socialist leader, supported the Bill
because it gave the power of detention and thus made
proper provision for enforcement, 1
 and the same principle
was embodied in s.11 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of 19062 and meant that British ships could also be
detained pending the settlement of a claim. Section 7
of the 1906 Act also gave British seamen the unequivocal
right to compensation for 'personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment'. 3 The
arguments that were used by the employers in relation
to the issue of workmen's compensation were simplistic
in the extreme, with a Glasgow Shipowners Circular of
2 May 1906 saying that, in the first place, injuries on
shipboard were acts of God, and if they could not be so
classed, and anyone was responsible at all, it should be
the state who paid up. The union line was that there
1. Hansard 4 142 326-345. Second Reading debate on
3 March 1905.
2. 6 Edw 7 c 58.
3. The definition of an 'accident' had been established
by Lord Shand's judgement in Fenton v. Thorley & Co.
(1903) A.C. 443 as 'any unexpected personal injury
resulting to the workman in the course of his employment
from any unlooked-for mishap or occurrence'. The key
words in this phrase are 'workman' and 'in the
course of his employment', for there were many
subsequent legal actions where it was claimed that,
for example, ships' officers were not 'workmen' and
accidents between ship and shore when berthed
alongside were not 'in the course of employment'.
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was no essential difference between workers at sea
and on land, that surgeons were rarely carried in
merchant ships so that many injuries were untreated'
and that the existing Shipping Federation Benefit Fund
was inadequate. 2
 The union pamphlet stating their
case 3
 attempted to draw a comparison between the risks
run by miners and seamen, but failed to make the
essential point that the industrial accident rate
was between four and six times higher at sea than down
the mines. 4
 The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906
proved to be reasonably efficient in providing com-
pensation for disabling accidents at work, but was
less effective where the cause was not directly work-
related, 5
 or when death ensued.
J. Havelock Wilson had followed the practice
of tabling questions on deaths by accident aboard ship
1. Surgeons were only carried in foreign-going ships
with more than a hundred persons on board and
emigrant ships.
2. The death grant was £25, while injured men got a
maximum benefit of ten shillings a week for thirteen
weeks.
3. Edmund Cathery, Workmen's Compensation Bill? 1906.
Cathery was the general secretary of the Sailors' and
Firemen's Union, and a copy of the pamphlet may be
seen in the BLRD under reference Cup. 600 b. 1 43.
4. The 1904 figures collected by the Home Office showed
that seamen mean deaths were 64.5 per 10,000 employed
and the mean death rate for miners was 12.9 per 10,000
- see BPP 1904 LXXXVIII 977. This gives five times as
many deaths at sea compared to deaths underground, and
Appendix Eight (D) gives comparable figures on a
decennial basis.
5. For example, death or disability caused by disease was
not covered until the case of the Dover Navigation Co.
v. Isabella Craig (1940) A.C. 190 established that a
seaman who died of yellow fever in West Africa had
contracted the disease 'in the course of his
employment'.
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for many years, 1
 and was one of the Members who called
for the regular publication of statistics about death
or injury payments following the passing of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Insofar as deaths were con-
cerned, the Act was shown to have limited impact, for
in 1908 when 999 seamen died from accident only in 371
cases was compensation paid. In 1910 there were 1,053
deaths in this category, and compensation was paid in
456 cases, A threefold reason was given for this state
of affairs: that many men had no dependents, that
foreign dependents were not aware of their rights and
that some deaths were not 'in the course of employment'.2
When it was suggested to the House that steps be taken
to publicise the right of compensation abroad so that
more foreign dependents might claim, the Home Secretary
declined to comply. 3
 The figures for disablement com-
pensation paid between 1909 and 1913 appear in Table
Five, and it may be seen that the take-up rose to a
plateau of about 8,000 cases a year while the compensation
figure stabilised at about £13 a man. There were no
payments in respect of industrial disease cases involving
seamen prior to the outbreak of World War One, and where
1. On 13 April 1899, for example, he tabled questions
on the deaths of John Mallom and George Withers, sea-
men killed by accidents with mooring wires - Hansard
4 69 987.
2. Statistics of Compensation, BPP 1909 (Cd.4894) LXXX
954 and BPP 1911 (Cd.5896) LXXV 748-749.
3. He was the Rt. Hon. H.J. Gladstone, and the exchange
took place on 5 November 1909. See Hansard 5 12 2251.
Average Compensation
£10-13s
£l1-6s
£12-4s
£13-us
£13-6s
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TABLE FIVE:
Year
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
Compensation for Disability.1
Number of Cases
6,701
7,544
8,109
8,301
8,191
compensation was paid for the death of a seamen it
averaged £160 - about the same as the figure shown
earlier as the maximum payment under the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.
The Merchant Shipping Act of 19062 had been
originally envisaged by Arthur Balfour 3 and Bonar Law
was an improvemental measure, and was initially narrowly
based on the recommendations of the Departmental Committee
on Shipping Law published in 1905.	 It was proposed, for
example, to tidy up arrangements for dealing with the
wages of deserters, clear up ambiguities that had arisen
over the repatriation of distressed seamen and rationa-
use arrangements for securing a passage home for men who
1. Statistics of Compensation, BPP 1914 (Cd.7088) LXXX
1060 and BPP 1914-16 (Cd.7669) LXI 996.
2. 6 Edw 7 c 48.
3. Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930), was Prime Minister
and leader of the Conservative Party in 1902-05 in
succession to his uncle, Lord Salisbury. He is now
chiefly remembered for the Balfour Declaration which
led to the establishment of the state of Israel when
the British Mandate in Palestine came to an end.
4. Report of the Departmental Committee on Shipping Law,
BPP 1905 (334) LXXI 179.
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had signed-on abroad. However, the first debate in
the House of Lords on 31 March 19051 was the occasion
for a move by Lord Muskerry, chiefly for reasons of
pique, 2 to make amendments relating to an increase
in living space for merchant seamen, improved ventila-
tion of living quarters, more light, insulation from
bare metal, the provision of messrooms for meals and
bathrooms. The Bill hung fire: a standing committee
was appointed, and with the change to a Liberal govern-
ment at the end of the year a great number of additional
clauses accumulated. Some of them were blatantly
special pleading - as with J. Havelock Wilson's endeavour
to legislate that one lascar in every five should be
English-speaking, 3 and failed, but Lloyd George 4 and
his supporters transformed the Bill into a reforming
measure by including many long overdue improvements in
1. Hansard 4 144 8-10.
2. He had tried to get the Mersey Docks and Harbour
Board Bill through in 1904, but it failed to reach
the statute book and he acknowledged freely in the
House that his amendments to the 1905 Merchant
Shipping Bill were of a disruptive nature.
3. Report of the Standing Committee on the Merchant
Shipping Act Amendment (No.2) Bill, BPP 1906 XI (202)
58. (Referred to hereafter as RSCMSAAB 1906).
4. David Lloyd George (1863-1945), was MP for Caernarvon
from 1890 to 1945, and President of the Board of Trade
in 1905-1906. Prime Minister from 1916-1922, the
great Liberal statesman's finest achievement was his
National Insurance Act of 1911 that remains the
foundation stone of Britain's welfare state.
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the lot of seamen. The 1906 Act brought in the first
statutory scale of provisions, 1 and certification of
cooks in foreign-going ships of over 1,000 tons, 2 and
the right to repatriation when service ended abroad.3
Lloyd George, who is often said to have been the
brightest star in the Campbell-Bannerman administration,
forced through the last-mentioned provision with great
vigour, and was also personally involved in framing s.64
(1) which gave seamen 120 cubic feet (fifteen super-
ficial feet) of living space, as recommended by the
Royal Conunission on Labour in 1894. 	 Another part of
the Act where the hand of Lloyd George can be detected
is s.61 which provided that men signing-on be asked
about any allotment notes recorded in their names. The
purpose was to combat crimps and 'sisters' who tried to
profit from forgery and signatures obtained by threat
or blandishment. 5 As a sop to Wilson and the Sailors'
1. S25(1). The First Schedule to the Act has details, and
the new diet scale is reproduced as Appendix Eleven (I).
2. S.27.
3. S.32. This provided that when a man signed-on in the
United Kingdom ends his service abroad he is entitled
to his full wages, a certificate of discharge and his
passage home. It did not apply to foreign seamen
engaged abroad and paid-off abroad.
4. See RSCMSAAB 1906 78 for Lloyd George's part in this
piece of legislation: recommendations are at FFRRCL
1894 iii.
5. Mercantile Marine Offices, where most signing-on took
place, had doorkeepers who would exclude known crimps
and hangers-on from the room where crews were engaged.
If a man was sober enough to know what he was doing,
questions about a dubious allotment note entered on
the agreement might alert him to the fact that he was
being duped by his former host, or companion.
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and Firemen's Union, s.12 provided that no seaman be
signed-on unless he had sufficient knowledge of
English to 'understand the necessary orders' but,
significantly, lascars, British subjects and British-
protected persons were exempt under this heading, The
'hazeing' of men to desert so that their wages need
not be paid was brought abruptly to an end by s.43
which made it a niisdemeanour, punishable with up to
two years' imprisonment, to force a seaman on shore,
while s.34 said that the expenses of sick and injured
seamen were the owners' responsibility - except where
the sickness or injury was attributable to venereal
disease, misbehaviour or default. 1 The penalty for
failing to join a ship after cashing an advance note
became a £5 fine, 2 but the alternative was still a
prison sentence - a maximum of twenty..one days. Finally,
ss.l and 2 of the 1906 Act ensured that foreign ships
had to conform to British load-line legislation while
in British jurisdiction, and s.7 did away with a legal
loophole whereby coasting steamers of less than eighty
tons had been exempt from having load-line markings.
An objective appraisal of the ranking of
these reforms must give pride of place to the institution
1. The Merchant Shipping (Mercantile Marine Fund) Act
of 1898 had covered injured, but not sick, seamen
in respect of hospital care and repatriation, and
an internal Board of Trade enquiry in 1905 had
recommended extension to sick seamen. See BPP
1905 LXXI 184.
2. S.65(l).
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of the statutory dietary scale, and an examination
of Appendix Eleven will reveal how radical the change
really was. Appendix Eleven (F) has the Liverpool
Scale, which represents the lowest common denominator
in nutritional terms and was the widest-employed
victualling scale in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, and it will be seen that it is inferior in
many respects to the Royal Navy scale of 1785 - as at
(A). The monotony of the seaman's diet can be appreciated
from (B) and (D) where the basic daily alternation is
from salt pork and pea soup one day to salt beef and
duff the next. More enlightened owners, such as the
African Steamship Company (E) and Money Wigram and
Sons (G), had the usual 11bs of salt meat as the daily
mainstay, but tried to ring the changes with vegetables
and dried fruit. The Board of Trade scale of 1867-68 (H)
suggested similar additions to the basic diet, but the
quantities involved were minute. Quarter-pounds of
butter or suet, raisins or dried apples, weekly are mere
token amounts when compared to the bulk of salt meat
and hard biscuit consumed. The statutory scale of 1906
(I) cut the salt meat element by half, brought in fresh
food in the form of potatoes in sufficient quantity to
serve them up each day,' and provided infinitely more
variety. For example, the weekly diet from 1906 onwards
1. Fresh potatoes had to be provided for the first eight
weeks of any voyage commencing at a Home Trade port
between September and May. See the First Schedule
to the 1906 Act.
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contained twenty items of solid food: the Liverpool
Scale had four, and the Money Wigrain scale - the best
of the company diets - had a mere eight. However, the
enforcement of the scale proved to be more difficult
than the legislators and officials had envisaged.
The question of a statutory dietary scale had
been under discussion for some forty years prior to
the passing of the 1906 Act,' and as shipowners had
always taken the line that 'usage governs rations' 2
 it
was apparent that machinery for enforcement would be
required. 3
 The regular and statutory inspection of food
and water had begun in a modest way with s.3 of the 1892
Act which provided for an inspection of food and water
supplied to ships making long voyages, and the 1894 Act
embodied, in s.206, the same concept. 4
 S.26 of the 1906
1. The Seamen's Parliamentary Committee, based at Liver-
pool, had urged that a compulsory diet scale be
introduced in a letter to Board of Trade dated 6
February 1868 - see PRO MT/9 40 M.2495/l868.
2. Lindsay, History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient
Commerce ii 494.
3. The Shipping Federation had brought out a diet scale
in 1893 to counter J, Havelock Wilson's Seamen's
Provisions Bill, but most owners reverted to the
'pound and pint' diet as given in Appendix Eleven (F)
when the threat of a statutory scale was removed.
4. It was a concept that had been bitterly resisted by
T.H. Farrer, the dominant civil servant at the Board
of Trade for almost forty years. Farrer had set his
face against statutory food scales and inspection,
and in a departmental minute dated 6 December 1866
had declared 'I am against any attempt to determine
provisions by law - and the less inspection the
better'. (PRO MT/9 25 M.1354/1866). The 1892
legislation was not drafted until after his departure
from the Board.
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Act went further in providing for the inspection of
food and water in any British ship, and a Chief
Inspector of Ships' Provisions had the responsibility
of enforcing both pieces of legislation. Insofar as
individual ships were concerned, these inspections had
the effect of pushing down the percentage of rejected
packages of stores from around 3% to 1.2% between 1908
and 1914,1 although bulk store 2
 examination had less
impact. It seems evident from the figures that
suppliers had, since 1892, been able to adjust the
quality of goods to fit new minima, and the annual
reports of the Chief Inspector of Ships' Provisions
confirm that this is the case. The highest individual
rejection rates relate to tinned milk and preserved
meat, for it is blown and rusty tins - old stock that
has been long in store - that is now being supplied for
the use of seamen, and the classic type of condemnation
involving weevils in the biscuit and overaged salt
beef is on the decline. 3 One weakness of the system
1. See Appendix Fourteen
2. Food supplied to sailing vessels and steamers in the
long-distance trade came under this category, and
examination was in respect of the 1892 and 1894 Acts.
Individual ships were inspected under the 1906 Act,
although coasters where men provided their own food
were exempt. All inspections were by arrangement
and notice had to be given, so that a 2% or 3%
rejection rate is surprising in the circumstances
and tends to suggest that the food supplied for con-
sumption by seamen was near the end of what we would
call today its 'shelf life'.
3. See the Annual reports of the Chief Inspector of
Ships' Provisions, PRO MT/9 1082.
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was that these 'field executives', as Oliver MacDonagh
terms them, 1 conducted their inspections ashore in
Britain before stores were loaded, and there was no
inspection when ships were re-victualled in foreign
countries. The result was that supplies obtained
abroad continued to be sub-standard. Geoffrey Rawson,
serving in the Inversnaid in 1907, reports that 'the
rascally contractors naturally put on board the lowest
quality meat and biscuits', 2 and Sidney Sandford recalls
joining a ship in 1909 armed with a mallet and canvas
bag for breaking up ship's biscuits to make 'dandyfunk'
and 'crackerhash' from 'Liverpool Pantiles' as in the
pre-1906 era. 3 The reason why owners were able to
continue to supply largely traditional foods lay in
previous legislation. Section 199 of the 1894 Act said
that if food 'could not be procured or supplied in
proper quantities ... equivalent substitutes ... (be)...
supplied in lieu thereof'. The 1906 Act spelled out
the nature of these 'equivalent substitutes', 4 and
the consequence was that on long voyages - particularly
1. MacDonagh, A Pattern of Government Growth 1800-60 332.
2. Rawson, Sea Prelude 105.
3. I. Moass, 'Memories of Sail and Steam' Sea Breezes
Vol. 51 No. 380 491, August 1977. 'Dandyfunk' was
broken biscuit baked with jam or marmalade and
'crackerhash' the savoury version seasoned with
salt meat. 'Liverpool Pantiles' were so named
because they were said to be hard enough to use
as roofing tiles.
4. In the First Schedule to the 1906 Act.
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in sailing ships - the diet of seamen could, quite
legally, revert to the old stand-bys of salt meat,
biscuit, dried peas and coffee. The only consolation
for the man concerned was that a compensation payment
of from fourpence to a shilling a day might be paid
in addition to his wages. 1 Food provided for the use
of seamen was, until the 1920s, labelled as such and
was not available to other consumers, 2 and there was
no inspection abroad unless three or more crew members
complained under the legal provision first established
in l844.
Two other reforms brought about by the passage
of the 1906 Act were similarly flawed. The increase in
living space to fifteen superficial or 120 cubic feet
applied only to European seamen, with lascars and
Asiatic seamen having to accept a much lower standard.
Section 64 of the 1906 Act specifically excluded these
men from the legislation, and their minimum standard of
accommodation remained subject to Indian law. India
Act XXVIII of 1850 had given them only four superficial
feet, and India Act IV of 1875 added a minimum height
in fo'c's'les of four feet, six inches. India Act XIII
1. However, s.199(2)(c) said that if provisions 'could
not be procured' - as would be the case in an extended
voyage - a Court could reduce or refuse compensation
'as the justice of the case requires'.
2. For a description of 'crew' provisions see Alan
Villiers, The Set of The Sails (1974 edition) 81.
3. Subsequently codified in S.198 of the 1894 Act.
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of 1876 increased living space to six superficial
or thirty-six cubic feet, but it was not until 1933
that they achieved twelve superficial or seventy-two
cubic feet - the area given to British seamen in 1867.1
Of course, area is not a perfect yardstick by itself,2
and decent standards of accommodation for British sea-
men were not agreed until 1917 when Ministry of
Shipping, Shipping Federation and union officials made
a joint declaration about accommodation in new stan-
dardised vessels. Thereafter, it was promised, new
ships would provide accommodation for seaman aft rather
than in a fo'c's'le, with two-bunked cabins, a crew
smokerooni and a mess-room for meals. 3
 Lloyd George's
action in respect of allotment notes (s.61) proved
to be ineffective in checking the issue of fictitious
notes for the benefit of crinips, 4
 and a re-examination
1. By India Act XXV of 1933, s.4, and the Merchant
Shipping Act 1867, s.9. See Chapter Five for the
history of the last-named Act.
2. Particularly when space is occupied by a large number
of people. For example, the master of the Childwickbury
wrote with pride to the Registrar-General of Seamen in
1864 to say that twenty men lived in a fo'c's'le
measuring twenty-six feet by twenty-six feet and that
they had an ample allowance in cubic feet. Translated
into shore terms, it meant that twenty men were living
for months on end in the space occupied by two sitting-
rooms in a twentieth-century house. BPP 1865 L 298.
3. See The Shipping World LVII 1,260 62, 25 July 1917.
4. Crimps had turned to the use of allotment notes
between 1880 and 1889 when advance notes were banned
- see Chapter Six - and found that small, but regular,
sums paid monthly to a female confederate were as
good a source of income as a once-and-for-all settle-
ment on an advance note.
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of the problem led to new legislation in 1911 to
increase the percentage of pay that could be allotted
to genuine dependents and shorten the payment interval.
However, before dealing with this measure and three
other Acts passed in the immediate pre-war period, it
is necessary to describe the break-through achieved by
the Sailors' and Firemen's Union in 1911-12 and the
new relationship with the employers' organisation that
emerged.
In Chapter Six it was shown that the Sailors'
and Firemen's Union followed a non-confrontation policy
after 1893 and concentrated on building up the branch
structure and membership. J. Havelock Wilson took the
view that long-term gains were contingent on securing
recognition from the employers and being in a position
to bargain on level terms., and between 1911-12 he
achieved this aim. The coming into effect of the Trade
Disputes Act in 1906 and the growing international trend
in the labour movement stiffened his resolve considerably,
for while the latter encouraged labour leaders to hope
for advance through concerted action in a number of
countries the former ensured that unions, and their
funds, were protected when strike and picket tactics
were employed. Following its defeat in 1893, the Sailors'
and Firemen's Union under Wilson's direction had con-
centrated on securing a strong base in the ports, and
when that had been achieved Wilson toured Europe and
America in 1909 and 1910 to obtain promises of support
from the unions in seven nations - the United States,
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Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Holland and Belgium,
This move was in emulation of the employers' organisation,
the Shipping FederatiGn, which in 1907 had set up the
International Shipping Federation to strengthen its
interests and co-ordinate activity world-wide. The 1911
strike had, therefore, a national and an international
aspect, and the latter may be dealt with quite briefly.
International co-operation quite failed to materialize,
and in the words of the historian of the Shipping
Federation 'fizzled out almost before it had started',1
The German seamen won an immediate increase in wages and
withdrew: the remaining national unions gave only luke-
warm support. At home, the aims of the strike insofar
as the men were concerned were seen to be the achievement
of £5-lOs a month in cargo ships, £6 a month in liners
and 35/- a week in coasters, 2 other issues such as a
manning scale, fixed hours of work, overtime, part-wages
when on board in port and better accommodation took
second place. As the struggle developed, emphasis began
to be laid on the abolition of the practice of signing-on
in Shipping Federation offices and the physical possession
of Continuous Certificates of Discharge. Wilson had a
poor view of the staff in Mercantile Marine 0ffices,'
1. Powell, The Shjping Federation 21. A parallel may be
drawn with the failure of the international socialist
movement to halt the march to war in 1914 by means of
a general strike, Nationalism and self-interest
proved stronger than international class solidarity.
2, Matthew Swainston 'Merchant Seamen' 233.
3. See, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 77.
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but was perfectly well aware that the achievement of
his primary aim - a union presence when men signed-on
- could be more easily attained in premises controlled
by the Board of Trade 1
 and was prepared to tackle the
Shipping Federation in the first instance and leave
the Board for another day.
So much for the issues; now for the strike
and its aftermath. It began in mid-June 1911 after
a series of local stoppages of a partial nature, and
the dockers were soon out in sympathy. Cardiff had
been one of the earliest ports to be disrupted and
Edward Tupper, 2
 recruited by Wilson in 1910 and soon
to be made the union's national organiser, played a
leading part in bringing the men out. He initiated
mobile pickets at Cardiff and Swansea, secured the
sympathy of the railway workers so that 'free labour'
could not easily be imported and got union members to
lodge their Continuous Certificates of Discharge with
union officials - nominally as a gesture of solidarity,
but actually to prevent them signing-on at the temporarily
enhanced rates being paid by shipowners. After five
weeks the Cardiff seamen secured a local agreement for a
1. Although originally established under the aegis of
Local Marine Boards by ss. 7 and 35 of the 1850 Act,
staff were paid by the Board of Trade from 1854, and
in 1911 were wholly under central government control.
2. Nothing is known of his early life: he claimed to be
a master mariner, but no certificate in this name can
be traced. Active in union affairs until 1936, he
died in 1942, His biography, Seamen's Torch,
published in 1938, is here used as the principal
source document for the 1911 strike.
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£5 a month wage, for the Shipping Federation had
failed, for the first time in its short existence,
to recruit, transport and supply sufficient non-union
labour to man the ships of its members) At Southampton,
the Olympic was due to sail on her maiden transatlantic
voyage when the seamen and firemen struck for higher
wages and her owners, the White Star Line, gave way
almost at once for reasons of prestige and so as to
maintain the service in the face of fierce competition
from Liverpool-based liner companies. Seeing this
success, the workforce of all the other passenger lines
and most of the cargo companies walked out, and after a
fortnight the owners conceded the wage claim. 2 Edward
Tupper had gone on to Liverpool after the Cardiff settle-
ment, and with the assistance of Tom Mann and the dockers
won a substantial increase in wages. Local settlements
followed at many other ports, for the owners had lost
unity just as the port workers had achieved it, and 'in
port after port they (the owners) climbed down and
1. Solidarity among different classes of workers had
been virtually absent in 1889-93, but was a feature
in 1911. Tom Mann and Ben Tillett called sympathy
strikes of port workers in Southampton, Hull, Man-
chester, Liverpool and Cardiff, and Joseph Cotter
brought out members of his Cooks and Stewards Union.
The railwaymen were sympathetic, although they did
not strike, and Tupper even managed to subvert
Shipping Federation employees on depot ships. This
new unity led to the famous 'Red Sunday' at Liverpool
which persuaded employers there that a settlement
was essential.
2. See the Southampton Times for 10, 17 and 24 June 1911,
5 August 1911 and 30 December 1911.
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granted the sailors large increases in wages'. 1
 The
Hull dispute was notable for the first intervention
by the Board of Trade in an official conciliatory
capacity, and at other East Coast ports agreement was
reached between seamen and shipowners' associations
with George Askwith countersigning for the Board. 2 The
settlement on the Tyne had the interesting consequence
that the Sailors' and Firemen's Union won grudging
recognition from the Executive Council of the Shipping
Federation as a bona fide and representative organisation,
and the situation by the beginning of 1912 was that
wages were standardised on a port-by-port basis, seamen
were no longer compelled to hold the Federation ticket
and discrimination against union members had virtually
ceased. 3 It was an armistice rather than a victory for
1. G.D.H. Cole and Raymond Postgate, The Common People
1746-1946 (1971 edition) 487.
2. Although described somewhat dismissively by G.D.H.
Cole and Raymond Postgate as an 'overworked civil
servant', George Ranken Askwith was, in fact, chairman
of the Fair Wages Advisory Committee from 1909 and
Chief Industrial Commissioner at the Board of Trade
from 1911-19. His book, Industrial Problems and Disputes
(1920), contains, in chapter sixteen, a personal ac-
count of the Hull dispute.
3. The exact phrase used in the Executive Council reso-
lution of 17 November 1911 was 'recognition of the
Seamen's Union should be based upon freedom of con-
tract and the employment of union or non-union seamen
and firemen'. The reason for this concession was
that the Shipping Federation ticket was devalued
because the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 had,
in Swainston's words, 'struck a mortal blow at the
Shipping Federation Benefit Fund'. The death benefit
of £25 from the latter fund compared poorly with the
£160 average payment under the Act. See Swainston
'Merchant Seamen' 225.
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either side, but the major development arising from the
1911 strike was the change in the role of the Shipping
Federation, It ceased to be primarily a strike-breaking
organisation, 1
 and gradually adopted a training role.
The process had already begun as a result of the 1906
Act 2
 and it accelerated with the passing years as the
Federation established Sea Training Schools in various
parts of the country for firemen, deckhands and catering
personnel. 3 The new relationship between the employers'
organisation and the union was that the former was to
have the initial selection of would-be recruits to sea
employment, give them elementary training, weed out
misfits and check any tendency to 'deterioration', while
the latter signed-up those thus qualified for sea service
and enforced a de facto 'closed shop'.
Four pieces of legislation passed during the
last years of peace require comment. The first of them,
the Merchant Shipping (Seamen's Allotment) Act of 191l,
was Board of Trade-sponsored and went through without
amendment. 5 Its preamble shows the purpose, for the
1. It did, of course, break the 1925 strike by tradi-
tional methods, and used them for the last time in
the General Strike of 1926.
2. Federation-financed cookery schools were set up at
Belfast, Cardiff, Glasgow, Hull, North Shields,
Southampton and Sunderland as a consequence of the
s.27 provision in the 1906 Act that ships' cooks be
certificated.
3. Of which the Gravesend Sea School, founded in 1918,
is the best known.
4. 1 & 2 Geo 5 C 28.
5. Report from Standing Committee A on the Merchant Shippin
(Seamen's Allotment) Bill, BPP 1911 (97] VII 549.
(RSCAMSSAB 1911 hereafter).
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opening words are 'whereas doubts have arisen as to
the interpretation of s.141 of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1894 and s.62 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1906 ...'
and the enactment permitted, by ss.1(a) and 1(b), the
allotment of more than half wages' and the payment of
allotments at weekly intervals. 2 This useful measure
greatly reduced the financial burden on seamen's
families - particularly after the beginning of a voyage
when resources tended to be lowest at home after a period
of unemployment. A similarly-sponsored measure in 1914
brought the certification of ships' officers more
directly under central government control. The 1894 Act
had continued to allow Local Marine Boards to examine
candidates for certificates of competency at the seaports,
subject only to Board of Trade supervision, 3 but the
Merchant Shipping (Certificates) Act of 944 gave the
Board power to hold examinations anywhere, and to have
complete control over them. Third, mention must be made
of s.48 of the National Insurance Act of 1911 which set
up a special, comprehensive, insurance scheme for sea-
farers. It was negotiated by Lloyd George, the Treasury
and the Shipowners Parliamentary Committee, and for the
first time since the demise of the Merchant Seamen's
1. Previously, by s.141(2) of the 1894 Act, a man could
only allot half of his wages.
2. S.62 of the 1906 Act had said: 'payment ... shall begin
one month from the date of the agreement with the
crew and ... be paid at the expiration of every subse-
quent month'. These delays in receiving allotments were
a source of great hardship to the families of seamen on
long voyages.
3. S.94 of the 1894 Act.
4. 4 & 5 Geo 5 c 45.
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Fund in the l850s' there was provision for benefit in
respect of sickness and disablement financed by state
and employee contributions. Most important of all, the
Seamen's National Insurance Society took over the care
of sick and disabled seamen when the obligations of
owners ceased. 2
 The last relevant enactment in this
inunediate pre-war era was passed as a direct result of
the Titanic disaster of 1912, and it had the effect of
greatly increasing the use of wireless by shipping,3
with a consequent improvement in the crew death
statistics.
The Report on the Loss of the S.S. Titanic4
embodied a number of recommendations which were subse-
quently discussed at the International Convention for
1. As described in Chapter Three.
2. S34 of the 1906 Act had said that, except in cases
where disability arose from venereal disease, default
or misbehaviour, the cost of 'surgical and medical
advice, and attendance and medicine, and ... mainte-
nance ... until (the seaman) is cured, or dies, or
is returned to a proper return port ... shall be
defrayed by the owner'. As the obligation of the
owner ceased when a 'proper home port' had been
reached, the operation of the Seamen's National
Insurance Society benefit scheme was an essential
element in restoring a sick or disabled man to health.
3. The Report of the Berlin Radiotelegraphic Convention
Inter-Departmental Committee of 1906 had showed that,
up to that date, the use of wireless was, for all
practical purposes, confined to passenger liners
and cross-Channel steamers - see PRO MT/9 812 M.
339 2/07.
4. BPP 1912-13 (Cd.6352) LXXVI 541.
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the Safety of Life at Sea held in London in 1914.
The signatories, including all the major maritime
powers, pledged themselves to bring in a wide range of
safety measures - of which the most noteworthy was the
implementation of recommendation twenty of the Titanic
Report calling for the installation of wireless in all
large sea-going vessels. Britain's response was the
introduction by John Burns, the veteran socialist who
had just become President of the Board of Trade, of
the Merchant Shipping (Convention) Bill in June 1914.
In the House, the validity of the main safety provisions
was not contested, 1 but a clause seen to be leading
to further state intervention in the shipping industry
was queried and debated. Section 18 - as it became -
provided for the issue of safety certificates in
respect of ships carrying wireless and with more than
fifty crew on board, and was thought by some members to
signal the introduction of a manning scale by bureaucratic
action. To the owners, the introduction of safety
certificates, necessitating annual compulsory surveys,
hinted at a possible refusal of certificates by reason
of underinanning, while a reformer - Sir Frederick Banbury,
Member for the City of London - enquired bluntly whether
the Board would 'put in a clause that for every vessel
1. Briefly, they were that icebergs and derelicts be
reported, that British foreign-going ships with more
than fifty crew should be fitted with wireless, and
that a percentage of the crew should hold lifeboat
certificates so that they could handle small boats
following shipwreck.
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for so many tons shall carry not less than a certain
number of men?' Banbury wanted a 'skeleton scale' of
manning, 1 and while J.M. Robertson, Parliamentary
Secretary at the Board of Trade, refused to be drawn
over this point he acknowledged that the Bill 'gave
the Board of Trade power to make regulations as to
manning' and indicated that the Board had a Merchant
Shipping Bill 'in preparation'. 2 No such draft Bill
can now be traced, and in any case the coming of war
put an end to the possibility of allotting Parliamentary
time for a Bill dealing with the manning of merchant
ships. The real importance of the Merchant Shipping
(Convention) Act of l914 is that it had a dramatic
impact on crew deaths at sea. Excluding war casualties,
it can be said the Act halved the figures, for the
average annual number of crew deaths fell from 825 in
1911-15 tà 385 in l9l6-20.	 The latter figure is all
the more convincing when compared to that for the longer
period from 1896-1915. The mean annual figure for these
twenty years is 781 - still double that for.the 1916-20
period, and the improvement in lives saved took place
at a time when the mean number of steamship losses,
5
excluding war casualties, increased by about 1OL
1. Hansard 5 63 687-689.
2.' Hansard 5 63 682.
3. 4& 5Geo5c5O.
4. See Appendix Thirteen (B).
5. See Appendix Thirteen (A) and (B).
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IVireless distress calls and lifeboat expertise were
ensuring that the seaman was less at risk when his
ship was endangered.1
In 1915 three factors were beginning to
operate in such a way as to bring about further improve-
ment in the sailors' lot. First, the wave of patriotic
fervour accompanying the outbreak of war had led a
number of seamen to enlist thus reducing the workforce
considerably, 2 and second the government itself had
distorted the normal price mechanism by chartering
large numbers of British merchant ships and paying their
3
crews a flat £1 a month increased wages.	 Third, there
was inflation with a sharp rise in food prices: the
demand for shipping was acute and the charter rates of
1. Nevertheless, seafaring continued to be 'among the
most hazardous of occupations'. In Chapter Ten of
his book entitled Foc's'le and Glory-Hole (1974
edition), James C. Healey emphasises that in the 1920s
and 1930s seamen continued to have a high death rate
when compared to other workers because they were at
the place of work for the full twenty-four hours and
always 'exposed to danger from fire, collision,
explosion or shipwreck'. Foc's'le and Glory-Hole 103
and 112.
2. Swainston believed that the workforce fell by 15%
between 1914 and 1915 for this reason - see his
'Merchant Seamen' 240.
3. A policy followed by Walter Runciman (1870-1949), who
succeeded John Burns at the Board of Trade in 1914.
A Liberal shipowner, and the son of Walter Runciman
whose book, Before the Mast - and After was referred
to in Chapter Four, he is said to have 'rendered con-
spicuous service to the State as a master of both the
strategy and tactics of economic warfare' in his DNB
entry. However, his judgement in this instance
may not have been sound because flat-rate increases
of this kind were a recipe for future discord.
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unrequisitioned vessels rose four-fold. 1 In the next
two years a patchwork of local wage increases began
to overlay the pre-war wage structure, and the govern-
inent was compelled to make further payments to seafarers
because of war conditions. The diversion of ships due
to the adoption of the convoy system led to the payment
of seamen's railway fares from discharge port to home
port, while the loss of clothing and effects when ships
were mined or torpedoed was met by a government grant.
The deep-sea Able Seaman's wage rose from its peacetime
average of £5-lOs a month to £8-lOs a month, and when
America entered the war the pressure on wages increased
because the American rate stood at around £18 a month.
A series of local stoppages in 1917, due in the main
to price rises, engaged the full attention of the
Sailors' and Firemen's Union, the Shipping Federation
and the Ministry of Shipping, and led after very little
discussion to the establishment of a National Maritime
Board for the industry. 2 It was a time of unease at
home, 3 and the war was not going well, 4 so that the
owners and the union were, uniquely, in accord. Wilson's
1, See PRO MT/9 1125 M.12l8/l917.
2. Report on the work of the National Maritime Board,
1917-19, BPP 1920 (Cmd.545) XXI 640. (Referred to
hereafter as RWNMB 1917-19)
3. A Commission of Enquiry was appointed to deal with
the problem, and the Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, BPP 1917-18 (Cd.
E662) XV 1 will be referred to hereafter as RCEIU
1917-18.
4. The Lloyds rate of insurance against war risks rose
to 10% a month or 25% for a three months' voyage in
a war zone - see PRO MT/9 1128 M.34479/1917.
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Sailors' and Firemen's Union has disassociated itself
from the National Transport Workers Federation for
patriotic reasons, while the Shipping Federation had
so far forgotten its individualistic creed as to parti-
cipate in the work of the Inter-Allied Chartering
Committee which arranged a central control of chartering
neutral ships and which, hitherto, had been a source of
much individual profit. 1
 Under the chairmanship of Sir
Leo Chiozza Money, 2
 Parliamentary Secretary at the
Ministry of Shipping, the Board held its first meetings
in November 1917,
The first matter to be settled was wages. A
national pay scale was announced which gave Able Seamen
£11-lOs a month, a fireman £12, Chief Engineers about
£33 a month and the master of a twelve-thousand ton
ship between £50 and £58 a month. 3
 A comparison with
other occupations follows. In 1917 agricultural workers
had just achieved a minimum weekly wage of twenty-five
shillings, 4
 so that the Able Seaman was more than twice
1. This committee was set up by an Order in Council of
10 January 1917.
2. Leo (George) Chiozza Money (1870-1944), was Italian-
born and assumed the surname of Money in 1903. MP for
Northants East and Paddington North from 1906-18, he
disappeared from public life abruptly when it was
revealed that he was associating with a Hyde Park pro-
stitute. For a full list of his official posts see
Who Was Who, 1941-1950 edition.
3. See Appendix Fifteen (D) for engineers' wage rates in
1918. The rate for masters of the largest ships was
not agreed until 17 April 1919, but the award was back-
dated to November 1917 - see RWNMB 1917-19 675.
4. The Corn Production Act of 1917 had created an Agri-
cultural Wages Board which determined the 25/-
minimum wage.
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as well paid as the man on the land, Further, the
pre-war wage ratio had been 11:8 in the seaman's
favour so that the wage differential had increased
from about 27% in 1912-13 to almost 60% in 1917.1 An
Able Seaman in the Royal Navy with three years' service
was getting £38-O-5d a year at this time (3-3s-4d a
month) 2 and a private soldier in the trenches a mere
shilling a day (l-l0s-5d a month). 3 The ratio, there-
fore, in respect of merchant seamen, naval seamen and
private soldiers wages was 23:6:3, while for merchant
seamen and agricultural labourers it was 23:11. High
wages for merchant seamen in wartime were no novelty,4
but this time the fall that invariably accompanied a
return to peacetime conditions was delayed and of lesser
effect, 5 although the 1930s slump did bring about a
1. The ABs average pre-war wage had been £5-lOs a month,
while that for agricultural labourers in England and
Wales was £3-7s-2d - this latter figure being taken
from B. Seebohm Rowntree's How the Labourer Lives
(1913) 36-36.
2. Navy List for January 1918.
3. RCEIU 1917-18 82.
4. See, for example, Appendix Fifteen (A) which shows
that ABs had £1 more a month during the Crimean War,
and Appendix Fifteen (D) which shows that all grades
of ships' engineer had higher wages in the same
period than at any other time up to 1914.
5. In the Napoleonic period, according to Robert Gray,
a shipowner who gave evidence to the 1833 Select
Committee on Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping,
seamen's wages had averaged £45s a month in 1815
and fell steadily to £2-5s a month in 1833. RSCMCS
1833 225.	 In 1920, due chiefly to pent-up demand
following World War One, an ABs pay stood at £14-lOs
a month - see RWNMB 1917-19 644. A war bonus of £3
a month had been added tothe 1917 wage to give the
higher figure.
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significant cut for seamen to the £8-lOs a month level.
When a new National Maritime Board was created on 1
January 1920 to replace the wartime expedient of the
same name it had two principal aims: to establish,
revise and maintain national standard rates of wages
and to create a single source of new labour. As
described earlier in this chapter, the latter aim was
achieved by the employers' organisation selecting and
training new entrants, while the union signed them on
and took the dues. The P.C..5. system' which had
ensured that union representatives were present when
men signed-on and paid off was discontinued, but the
union presence continued. A war-time 'pool' arrangement
for filling vacancies became a permanent feature and
performed the same function as the labour exchange used
by shore workers. 2 The wage problem was tackled from
1917 onwards by setting up panels for four classes of
seafarers, while a fifth panel represented the owners'
interests and was manned wholly by Shipping Federation
officials.
At this stage the deck officers were represented
1. Described in the first page of this chapter.
2. The parallel is close in that the 'pool' was
generally used by the lower grades of sea labour,
Its chief customers were, and are, the very young,
aliens, casual seafarers who spend long periods
ashore between voyages and those with indifferent
discharges.
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by the Imperial Merchant Service Guild, 1 the engineers
by the Marine Engineers Association, 2 the cooks and
stewards by the National Union of Ship's Stewards,
Cooks, Butchers and Bakers, 3 and the seamen and firemen
by Wilson's Sailor's and Firemen's Union. Paradoxically,
there was very little for these panels to do in 1917-18
because the government was extremely responsive to the
demands of merchant seamen while the outcome of the war
lay in the balance. For example, in the first few pages
of Chapter Four it was shown that the 1854 Act and the
Board of Trade interpretation of s.183 left it unclear
as to when wages stopped if a ship was wrecked. When, in
1917, the Welsh seamen called for pay to continue until
the survivor of a wrecked ship returned to the United
1. In 1890 there had been four unions representing
deck officers. They were (1) the Liverpool-based
Mercantile Marine Service Association, (2) the
Scottish Shipmasters Association, (3) The London
Shipmasters' Society and (4) the British Ship-
masters Protection Society, which was strong on
the north-east coast. To resolve this division
of representation the Shipping Federation had set
up the Shipmasters and Officers Union, but it was
a 'tame' union and a breakaway group of ships'
officers then formed the Imperial Merchant Service
Guild. For a detailed historical account of
officers' unions see The MNAOA At Work, a
Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association
pamphlet prepared for the use of union officials
in 1979 by Bob Elliott and Brian Orrell.
2. The United Kingdom Sea-Going Engineers' Association
had been started in 1871, and the Marine Engineers
Union in 1887. In 1890 the Marine Engineers Union
became dominant, and its name was changed to the
Marine Engineers Association.
3. This union, led by Joseph Cotter, was crippled by a
strike in 1921 and was absorbed by the Maritime
Workers Union in 1922.
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Kingdom there was an almost immediate government
response, and a pronouncement in August 1917 that
the crews of ships lost by war risks were to receive
a months' pay or full wages until the date of their
arrival in the United Kingdom, whichever was the
greater. 1
 Similarly, there was no hesitation in
granting a war risk bonus of £3 a month on top of
ordinary wages in 1918: the Germans were on the Marne
and unrestricted submarine warfare was taking a dread-
ful toll of shipping, so that a bonus payment was seen
as a necessity if the workforce was to be maintained
at a high level when there were many competing claims
for labour. The real significance of the panel system
was, in the first place, that it established the
principle of joint consultation whereby the Seafarers'
Joint Council - representing all the unions - was able
to negotiate directly with the Shipping Federation with-
in the framework of a Joint Industrial Council. This
Council eventually became the reconstituted National
Maritime Board, and the involvement of the Ministry of
Shipping 2
 ceased. The second consequence was that the
1. The complaint of the Welsh seamen is at RCEIU 1917-18
125. The official reply was issued as part of a
Statement by the Board of Trade as to Compensation
for Death or Injury caused b War Risks. BPP 1917-18
.SiOb) XXXVIII Z51.
2. The Ministry of Shipping was a temporary department
of state formed by Lloyd George in December 1916
under Sir Josepy Maclay. The Marine Department at
the Board of Trade had a muted role while the
Ministry existed.
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Board of Trade ceased to handle industrial relations
in a spirit of 'enlightened paternalism', 1
 and
changed its principal function to one of dispensing
information and ensuring safety standards rather than
acting as an umpire between two unruly antagonists.
An early example of the new detachment was the Board's
attitude to appeals from seafarers over 'bad' dis-
charges in 1918. It declined to arbitrate at all in
such mundane matters, and made Superintendents of
Mercantile Marine Offices the final judge in disputes
of this type between master and seaman. 2 With the
passage of years, the Board came increasingly to a
view that its job was to develop policy at an Inter-
national Labour Organisation or Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Orguisation level, and to leave
the minutiae to National 1ritime Board committees.
At this point, it is Ilecessary to draw up a
balance sheet covering the gains made, and the
opportunities missed, in this last period from 1905 to
1918. First, on the positive side, comes the virtual
exclusion of unskilled labour from the industry. In
1910, when the Southampton firemen struck for a rise
of wages of ten shillings a month, the Adriatic sailed
1. A phrase used by Roger Davidson to describe the
Board's handling of industrial relations between
1896 and 1914, Roger Davidson 'The Board of Trade
and Industrial Relations, 1896-1914', The Historical
Journal 21 3 571, September 1978.
2. See, The Shipping World Year Book for 1919, 248.
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with eighty-nine men in the engineroom who had never
been to sea before: 1 in 1918 when a Continuous
Certificate of Discharge, a form P.C15. and a union
card had to be produced when signing-on that kind of
dilution of labour would have been impossible. In 1905
there had been no proper system of compensation for
disability or for loss of effects by war action, no
pension or sick care payments and no standard wage.
There was no statutory scale of provisions; living
space was restricted and the unions were relatively
powerless to change material conditions. In 1918 the
merchant seaman may be ranked among the aristocrats of
labour with high fixed wages, improved statute-backed
living and working conditions, restricted entry to his
trade, ample representation in disputes with his employers
and an improved safety record. On the negative side, the
listing must show that hours of work remained unlimited,
that there was no overtime, no manning scale, and that
the bulk of a man's wages was withheld until a voyage
was completed. Accommodation in older vessels may
fairly be described as primitive, 2 and there was no
1. Southampton Times 13 August 1910.
2. Noel Mostert observed that 'the dark side of the
nineteenth-century lingered more persistently in the
forecastles of a large proportion of the British mer-
chant navy than it finally did almost anywhere in the
island itself', and although he was making a contrast
with modern tankers a contemporary traveller found
that even where conveniences were provided their use
was circumscribed. H.M. Tonilinson voyaged to South
America in a 3,000-ton Cardiff tramp in 1909-10 and
noted wryly, 'there was a bath-room aboard - it was
used as a paint locker'. See Noel Mostert, Supership
(Penguin, 1975) 308 and H.M. Tomlinson, The Sea and
the Jungle (1927) 90.
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security of employment because generally each engagement
was for a single voyage.1
Hours of work were not made subject to
governmental regulation during this period primarily
because although it was on Wilson's list of demands
after 1910 he gave higher priority to recognition and
a strong union infrastructure. Additionally, the hours
of work problem was necessarily linked to manning, and
it has been shown that Board of Trade intentions in
respect of manning were stifled by the advent of war.
The legal position in 1918 was that ss.92 of the 1894
Act and 56 of the 1906 Act said that foreign-going
steamships of over 100 tons should be manned by at least
a certificated master and a certificated mate, while
two certificated engineers were required when the
nominal power of the engines exceeded lOOhp. Foreign-
going sailing vessels of over 100 tons also had to
carry a certificated master and. a certificated mate,
although the latter could be a second mate. The Board
of Trade had taken note of the recommendations of the
1894 Royal Commission on Labour minority report, 2 and
in 1896 suggested to owners that three mates be carried
in ships of over 2,000 tons. 3 In 1909 the Board of Trade
1. 'Leave with pay was virtually unknown ... dismissals
without notice were common'. F.J. Thompson 'Peace
at Last', Sea Breezes Vol.30, No. 443, December 1960.
2. See Chapter Six. It had been suggested that a manning
scale would lead automatically to an eight-hour day.
3. Manning Committee Report, 1896 xxxiv.
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reminded surveyors that s.459 of the 1894 Act, as
amended by s.1 of the 1897 Act, gave powers to detain
undermanned ships, but the guidelines were imprecise
and the onus lay on the individual surveyor to make a
case. 1 Consequently, it was not until 1936 that an
authoritative scale of manning was published. This
said that foreign-going steamships of over 700 gross
registered tons had to carry 'sufficient deck crew to
maintain navigational watches of not less than three
of the deck complement for each watch exclusive of the
officer'. 2 Undermanning, the first of Plimsoll's
priorities when he called for a Royal Commission in
1873, had taken over sixty years to eliminate.
These deficiencies in legislation and the
lack of administrative firmness led to a further lag
in workforce conditions in the l920s and 1930s. Officers
and men continued to work a twelve-hour day, and in the
tramping trades it was the custom for the master to keep
the day watches while the deck, officers worked below
in the holds with the seamen and apprentices laying
dunnage, 3 sweeping out and painting in preparation for
the next cargo. 4 Overtime was not paid, 5 although
1. Board of Trade Circular 1463, March 1909.
2. Board of Trade Circular 1707, 21 July 1936.
3. Small boards, matting or brushwood placed under or
between items of cargo to prevent chafe and wetting.
4. A.G. Course, The Deep Sea Tramp (1960) 153.
5. A point given emphasis in instructions to masters
in this period. See The Shipmasters' Manual published
by the Shipping Federation, 1925 edition, 29.
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Australian and American seamen had been receiving it
for many years, 1 and the only concession allowed for
working long hours might be a small bonus, additional
rations or a tot of spirits when crew helped to load
or unload cargo. In coasters, the Able Seamen worked
the winches in port, and at mealtimes the officers
relieved them. It was common practice for coasters to
unload by day and sail the same evening so that crews
could only rely on getting a proper rest every second
night. 2 Crews were better paid, but the nature of the
contract with the employer was such that a deep-sea man
could work for months and see no more of his wages than
the customary five shillings doled-out by the master at
a port of call. 3 Monthly pay, long advocated by former
naval officers and other reformers with experience of
the benefits, was resisted by owners, and a sailor
signing-on abroad had to find two shillings for the
Consul while the shore worker paid nothing at all at
1. Frank Bullen noted that an overtime rate of one
shilling and sixpence an hour was paid in Australian
coasters in the 1880s, and the San Francisco Consul
reported that overtime on American vessels was fifty
cents an hour in the 1900s. See The Log of a Sea-
Waif 261 and BPP 1909 LXXVIII 39.
2. In the coal trade this is still the case. For a
modern account of long hours of work in coasters
see the article by Rosemary Hart entitled 'Round-
the-clock schedules and lack of sleep upset collier
officers' in The Telegraph (monthly journal of the
Merchant Navy and Airline Officers Association) for
July 1980.
3. A sum carefully calculated as sufficient for a 'run
ashore t , in the l930s, but not enough to attract the
attention of what Herman Melville called 'land-
sharks'.
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the labour exchange. 1 After 1918, there was no
significant change in the working conditions of seamen
until the Second World War put in train a further
series of reforms culminating in the passing of the
Merchant Shipping Acts of 1970 and 1979 which made
the sailors' contract a civil one, abolished the crime
of desertion and transferred the judging of disciplinary
problems from the masters' cabin to a shore disciplin-
ary committee. 2 However, the long delay in making a
legislative change of this type illustrates the point
that while merchant seamen were, in the words of a
leading maritime lawyer, 'a meritorious class of His
Majesty's subjects' and 'favoured objects of the British
Parliament', 3 that merit and favour was more apparent
in times of danger than in times of peace. At the
beginning of this study it was said that state interest
in the lot of merchant seamen sprang from an appreciation
of their role in times of war: at the end it seems as
1. The ILO Seamen's Conference held at Genoa in June 1920
produced a draft convention which said, in Article II,
that 'Each Member ... shall establish a system of
free public employment agencies under the control of
a central authority'. Britain did not sign the Placing
of Seamen Convention for this reason.
2. For a full discussion of the effect of the 1970 Act
see Cadwalladar, 'Discipline in British Merchant Ships'
147. The provisions of the 1979 Act are summarised
in an article entitled t Merchant Shipping Act 1979
brings in new penalties' in the September 1979 issue
of The Teleraph (organ of the Merchant Navy and
Airline Officers Association).
3. David Maclachian, A Treatise on the Law of Merchant
Shipping (sixth edition, 1923) 157.
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though sixteenth-century and twentieth-century
politicians and administrators took a similar pragmatic
view when making laws for a class of worker whose
labours went largely unobserved and unreported.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
This study had two primary aims. The first
was to determine the general outline over time of
improvements in the merchant seaman's lot, arid the
result is that the years 1838-51, 1867-83 and 1905-18
may be singled out as periods of sustained advance,
with the earlier and intervening years forming plateaux
where little significant change has been observed.
The three periods of advance have different characte-
ristics, and while mono-causal explanations are always
suspect it may be said that paternalism, pragmatism
and equity are the appropriate key-words to describe
each succeeding phase of reform. The motivation
behind the two main types of legislation noted here
requires a longer exposition. State concern over the
welfare and working conditions of British seamen arose
initially through an appreciation of their vital role
in times of war, and was a recognition of the fact
that seagoing tends to be a residual occupation when
alternative work is available ashore. Between the
late sixteenth and nineteenth-centuries there were con-
stand attempts designed to (a) keep up the number of
recruits to the sea service, and (b) ensure that men
could readily be found to man the fleet. Compulsory
apprenticeship was decreed many times between 1704
and 1844: the registration of seamen began with
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Burghley's census of 1583 and continued until the
1850s. The type of Admiralty inspired legislation
designed to coerce the young pauper into going to
sea and then enrolling him as a reservist was still
emerging in the 1890s, for while the institution of
continuous service in the Royal Navy dates from 1853
there was a persistent Admiralty interest in the
merchant seaman as a secondary source of manpower.
The trade-enhancing mode of legislation caine in with
the eighteenth-century when longer voyages led to the
bonds of discipline being tightened, and a number of
Acts passed between 1729 and 1854 shaped the seaman's
subsequent unique legal position of being a civil
worker employed within the framework of a state-super-
vised contract of employment with many penal clauses.
In the early nineteenth-century, when the British
shipping industry was seen to be falling behind its
competitors, trade-enhancing legislation had the basis
that deficiencies in ships and industrial practice
could be corrected by improving the calibre of the
workforce, while at the end of the century the 1894 Act
tied the seaman to a number of consolidated and fossi-
lized requirements at a time when workers ashore were
receiving the benefits of a more liberal interpretation
of the relationship between employer and employed.
Free trade - the obvious creed for the first industria-
lised :nation - depended for its success on a limitless
supply of cheap labour, so that the repeal of the
Navigation Laws permitted an influx of lascars and
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foreign seamen, while no trade-inhibiting legislation
- such as might arise from the imposition of manning
regulation, a limitation on the hours of work or a
change in the contractual relationship - was formulated.
The principal difference between the two
main types of legislation is that Admiralty-inspired
laws tended to fail in operation but conferred benefits
on merchant seamen fortuitously, while trade-enhancing
laws were drafted with specific economic aims and
generally succeeded, but doled out any benefit sparingly.
For example, although the interest of the Admiralty in
the health of merchant seamen and the repatriation of
shipwrecked mariners had a strong element of self-
interest, there were manifest gains for the men in the
shape of medicine chests and a passage home for sur-
vivors of shipwrecks. Similarly, while Greenwich
Hospital was primarily a naval hospital which took in
very few merchant seamen, although all merchant seamen
paid for it, its poor record on admissions led to the
establishment of the Merchant Seamen's Fund. Even the
Royal Navy's cherished right of direct recruitment had
an element of advantage. Time and again, the Admiralty
had refused to dispense with the arrangement wherEby
merchant seamen who wished to enter a naval ship could
do so on request and thus get their contract broken and
be paid in full on leaving the merchant vessel.
Although a mere recruiting device to replace men lost
by sickness on foreign stations, it nevertheless enabled
a 'hazed' or bullied seaman to leave a harsh master and
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make a new start.
	
Trade-enhancing laws tended to
confer benefit with one clause and take it back with
another.	 The written agreement of 1729 guaranteed
wages: it also introduced the new concept of desertion.
The 1850 Act set up Mercantile Marine Offices which
functioned in the same way as labour exchanges; it
gave control of them to local shipping interests by
making election to seats on Local Marine Boards largely
contingent on the ownership of tonnage.
	 Sometimes, the
benefit arising from an Admiralty-inspired measure was
cancelled-out by trade-enhancing legislation.
	 The
1844 Act set up a complaints procedure: the 1854 Act
said that a complainant could only go ashore to make a
complaint f doing so was consistent with his duty to
the ship.	 Philanthropy was quite absent in trade-
enhancing legislation, as the preamble to the 1850 Act
shows.	 'Whereas it is expedient to make Provision
for improving the Condition of Masters, Mates and Seamen'
is the opening phrase, followed by 'and for maintaining
Discipline in the British Merchant Service' to show the
Act's real purpose.
A third, but smaller, legislative model was
the reformist measure, which had its heyday between
1867 and 1906.	 These reformist Acts tended to be pro-
ducts of agitation by zealots, sustained public impa-
tience and the desire of newly-elected politicians to
show a swift response to a long-debated source of
grievance.	 With the passage of time, these reformist
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measures began to reflect a general move towards
equitable treatment for merchant seamen, but a lag in
conditions of employment afloat existed, and was per-
petuated. The agitation of the l870s about unsea-
worthy ships and the consequent loss of life did not
lead to effective legislation until two decades later,
while the lag in introducing effective employers'
liability legislation may be put at a quarter of a
century. In a few instances the gap was never closed
in the period studied. Undermanning took seventy years
to eliminate; engagement by the voyage and delayed
final payment of wages even longer. Additionally,
some early reformist measures may be seen as a freak
response to special circumstances, with emotive issues
such as slavery and cannibalism producing a statutory
food scale and safety legislation, while a gross war-
time labour shortage led to special treatment for
lascars. However, these exceptions prove the rule
that concessions are most easily obtained when the
state is in disequilibrium, and in the case of merchant
seamen some spectacular concessions were obtained during
World War One without recourse to the legislative
process at all,
The second primary aim of this study was to
assess the relative importance of (a) unionisation,
and (b) the executive arm of government in the law-
making and administrative process. Union development
was in two distinct stages, with the earliest unions
locally-organised within close-knit communities. These
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local unions could wring concessions from owners if
industrial action took place in an environment where
seamen and ancilliary workers formed a substantial
element of the total workforce, but not otherwise.
In the early nineteenth-century the collier seamen
struck successfully: the Post Office packet seamen
had to give way. These early, local unions produced
officials who gave a great deal of evidence to the
various Parliamentary enquiries on shipping and seamen
in the nineteenth-century, and influenced the direction
of legislation in the case of deck-loads, the Merchant
Seamen's Fund, accommodation and advance notes. A
national union emerged in the late 1880s after a number
of false starts, but it was not effective for another
quarter of a century for four main reasons. First, the
disciplinary provisions in the various Merchant Shipping
Acts inhibited direct action at the place of work.
Additionally, the workforce was employed atomistically
- in the same way as farm workers - while the employers'
organisation was strong and had an avowed strike-breaking
role. It was not until the men were grouped in large
steamships where the conditions approximated to those
in factories ashore that strike action could be effec-
tive, and thus it was not until 1911 that the union
could record both its first successes and gain recogni-
tion from the employers. These late gains meant that
the union had very little opportunity to influence
legislation before 1914, while Wilson's insistence on
achieving the closed ship during World War One meant
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that the preparation of reformist legislation took
second place, and that any attempt to change the
contractual basis of employment in the years of inter-
war slump and unemployment was doomed to failure. As
in the case of safety and employers' liability, there
was a lag in unionisation of about a quarter of a
century, with the consequence that seamen's conditions
in the inter-war years lagged still further behind
those of other workers.
The Board of Trade had assumed full responsi-
bility for the merchant seaman in 1850, and this study
shows that prior to 1867 the executive was remarkably
ineffective and that the MacDonagh thesis of a revolu-
tion in government completed by 1860 cannot be "alid
in this context. There were, it is true, special cir-
cuinstances in this department of state where t civil
servants with pronounced anti-interventionist beliefs
dominated for almost forty years, and in many ways it
may be said that minor officials accomplished change
by stealth where orthodox channels were blocked. This
is certainly the case insofar as crimping was concerned,
where a Police superintendent took the initiative in
providing physical protection at pay-off time while
Farrer was lamenting that nothing could be done.
Similarly, Gray was saying that government supervision
did not save lives while Leach demonstrated that improved
health care provision did so. An over-meticulous
adherence to legal form characterised the Gray/Farrer
approach to seamen's conditions, as shown in the instance
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of the so-called tstatutoryt food scale which silenced
the reformers but did not bind the owners. However,
the administrative response moved slowly from a rigid
legalistic stance towards an active concern partly
through the push of reformist measures and partly by
the pull of public opinion. The collection of statistics
began to run ahead of Parliamentary demand for inforina-
tion - as in the case of wage statistics - and health
provision, became better regulated because of the con-
tinuing deterioration debate. Around the turn of the
century, the Board of Trade began to take the initiative,
with the launching of the Continuous Discharge Certi-
ficate scheme, and it later sponsored Bills dealing
with the payment of larger allotments at more frequent
intervals and impartiality in the certification process.
The Board of Trade had been forced by public opinion
to take an interest in ship losses in the 1830s, was
prodded into activity over certification by Fitzroy in
the 1840s, pestered for information by Plimsoll in the
l870s and badgered by Wilson in the 1890s. Blighted by
Gladstonian parsimony, the Board was always on the defensive,
and Kier's argument that the Board may be cited as an example of the
significant expansion of the Civil Service seems weak, while Mac-
Donagh's view of an upsurge of collectivism in the
application of administrative remedies appears to be
a gross over-statement of the facts. It seems more
likely on the evidence that the conscientious inspectors
whose work in the field of safety, nutrition and accom-
modation has attracted the attention of historians drew
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their strength from the society in which they moved
rather than the institution they served. The Parris
thesis that institutions respond to changes in society
seems more persuasive than the argument that institutions
bring about change by reason of their existence.
The final analysis requires the introduction
of a counter-factual element. It is necessary to
envisage a situation where the Navigation Acts have
not been repealed and the Merchant Seamen's Fund was
well-managed, better-capitalized and had continued in
being. To imagine that desertion had not been made a
crime in 1729; that the steam vessel 'took off' in
the 1840s and that the Factory Acts had been extended
to cover seamen in the 1860s. Most important of all,
to see an industry where seamen had the same amount of
legislation as other workers - that is to say, very
little. If that had been the course of events, the eve
of World War One would have seen a merchant navy almost
wholly manned by British seamen instead of one with a
28% component of foreign seamen and lascars. These
British seamen would have had the benefits of a long-
established sickness and retirement scheme based largely
on their own contributions, a strong union, model
working conditions and considerable labour mobility.
As things went, seamen were the most legislated-for body
of workers, and while that legislation was voluminous it
often failed to touch upon essentials. The Thornton
argument of a delayed industrial revolution at sea may
be carried a step further by saying that the lag in
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industrialisation went hand in hand with the delay
in developing the steam vessel, late unionisation
and the slow pace of advance in seamen's conditions.
In all three instances, the degree of retardation may
be put at about a quarter of a century, with consequent
linkage effects on Britain's national development. A
tight contract of employment and close state super-
vision of a section of the workforce had been designed
to strengthen national defence and enhance trade, but
in the event the disciplinary corset merely restricted
the nation's growth.
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(b) Manning ratio - the mean number of men
employed for every hundred tons of
shipping registered - covering the period
1833 to 1880.	 344
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APPENDIX ONE
Registered tonnage of United Kingdom Shipping, 1791-1914
Year Tonnage
1791 1,414,956
1792 1,436,8291
1793 1,453,316
1794 1,456,279
1795 1,425,611
1796 1,240,8302
1797 1,454,007
1798 1,494,000
1799 1,551,072
1800 1,698,811
1801 1,786,325
1802 1,901,162
1803 1,986,076
1804 2,066,061
1805 2,092,489
1806 2,079,914
1807 2,096,827
1808 2,130,396
1809 2,167,221
1810 2,210,661
1811 2,247,322
Year
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
Tonnage
2,268,731
2,348,843
2,313,170
2,477,831
2,504,297
2,421,354
2,452,608
2,451,597
2,439,029
2,355,832
2,315,403
2,302,867
2,348,314
2,327,341
2,461,461
2, 181, 138
2,19 3,300
2,199,959
2,201,592
2,224,356
2,261,860
Year
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
Tonnage
2,271,301
2,312,355
2,360,303
2,350,000
2,334,000
2,421,000
2,571,000
2,768,000
2,935,000
3,041,000
3,008,000
3,044,000
3,123,000
3,200,000
3,808,000
3,401,000
3,489,000
3,565,O00
3,662,000
3,759,000
1. Lord Liverpool's papers (BLRD Add. MSS. 38,432) show
about 103,000 tons more.
2. England and Wales only.
3. Lord Liverpool's papers show about 157,000 tons more.
4. Drop chiefly due to de novo registration arrangements.
5. BPP Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation gives about
60,000 tons less.
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APPENDIX ONE
(ii)
(All figures represent thousands of tons)
Year Tonnage Tonnage Total 	 Year Tonnage Tonnage Total
(sail) (steam)	 (sail)	 (steam)
1853	 3,780	 250 4,030	 1874	 4,108	 1,871 5,979
1854	 3,943	 306 4,249	 1875	 4,207	 1,946 6,152
1855	 3,969	 381 4,349	 1876	 4,258	 2,005 6,263
1856	 3,980	 386 4,367	 1877	 4,261	 2,139 6,400
1857	 4,141	 417 4,559	 1878	 4,239	 2,316 6,555
1858	 4,205	 452 4,659	 1879	 4,069	 2,511 6,580
1859	 4,226	 437 4,663	 1880	 3,851	 2,723 6,575
1860	 4,204	 454 4,6591	 1881	 3,688	 3,004 6,692
1861	 4,301	 506 4,807	 1882	 3,622	 3,335 6,957
1862	 4,397	 538 4,934	 1883	 3,514	 3,728 7,242
1863	 4,731	 597 5,328	 1884	 3,465	 3,944 7,409
1864	 4,930	 6972 5,628	 1885	 3,457	 3,973 7,430
1865	 4,937	 824 5,760	 1886	 3,397	 3,965 7,362
1866	 4,904	 876 5,779	 1887	 3,250	 4,085 7,335
1867	 4,853	 901 5,754	 1888	 3,115	 4,350 7,464
1868	 4,878	 902 5,781	 1889	 3,041	 4,718 7,759
1869	 4,765	 948 5,714	 1890	 2,936	 5,043 7,9793
1870	 4,578	 1,113 5,691	 1891	 2,972	 5,307 8,279
1871	 4,375	 1,320 5,694	 1892	 3,080	 5,564 8,645
1872	 4,213	 1,538 5,751	 1893	 3,038	 5,740 8,779
1873	 4,091	 1,714 5,805 :	1894	 2,987	 5,969 8,956
1. BPP Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation gives about
72,000 tons less.
2. A Return of Steam Shipping at BPP 1865 L 419 shows
21,000 tons less.
3. BPP Annual Statment of Trade and Navigation gives
34,000 tons less.
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APPENDIX ONE
(iii)
(All figures represent thousands of tons)
Year Tonnage Tonnage Total
(sail) (steam)
1895	 2,867	 6,122 8,988
1896	 2,736	 6,284 9,020
1897	 2,590	 6,364 8,953
1898	 2,388	 6,614 9,002
1899	 2,247	 6,917 9,164
1900	 2,096	 7,208 9,304
1901	 1,991	 7,618 9,608
1902	 1,951	 8,104 10,055
1903	 1,869	 8,400 10,269
1904	 1,803	 8,752 10,555
Year Tonnage Tonnage Total
(sail) (steamJ
1905	 1,671	 9,065 10,736
1906	 1,555	 9,612 11,167
1907	 1,461 10,024 11,485
1908	 1,403 10,139 11,541
1909	 1,301 10,285 11,586
1910	 1,113 10,443 11,556
1911	 981 10,718 11,699
1912	 903 10,992 11,895
1913	 847 11,273 12,120
1914	 794 11,622 12,415
(Sources)
(1) 1791-1795 and 1797-1835. Tables Compiled from Annual
Statements of Trade and Navigation put before the
Select Committee on the Navigation Laws, RSCNL 1847-
48 772-773.
(2) 1796 from PRO Customs 17/18 (England and Wales only).
(3) 1836-1914. R. Page, Commerce and Industry (1919) ii
155-156.
Note Deductions from registered tonnage figures in respect
of engine spaces in steam vessels after 1817 mean
that there is a general under-recording of steam ton-
nage vis-a-vis sailing ship tonnage, and when comparing
the two types of vessel it may be advantageous to look
at Appendix Two which has the respective numbers of
steamers and sailing ships between 1853 and 1914.
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APPENDIX TWO
Numbers of UK-registered steam and sailing vessels,
1853-1914
Year Steam Sail Year Steam Sail Year Steam Sail
1853 1,385 25,224 1873 3,863 21,698 1893 8,088 13,239
1854 1,524 25,335 1874 4,033 21,464 1894 8,263 12,943
1855 1,674 24,274 1875 4,170 21,291 1895 8,386 12,617
1856 1,697 24,480 1876 4,335 21,144 1896 8,522 12,274
1857 1,824 25,273 1877 4,564 21,169 1897 8,590 11,911
1858 1,926 25,615 1878 4,862 21,058 1898 8,838 11,566
1859 1,918 25,784 1879 5,027 20,538 1899 9,029 11,167
1860 2,000 25,663 1880 5,247 19,938 1900 9,209 10,773
1861 2,133 25,905 1881 5,505 19,325 1901 9,484 10,572
1862 2,228 26,212 1882 5,814 18,892 1902 9,803 10,455
1863 2,298 26,339 1883 6,260 18,415 1903 10,122 10,330
1864 2,490 26,142 1884 6,601 18,053 1904 10,370 10,210
1865 2,718 26,069 1885 6,644 17,018 1905 10,522 10,059
	
1866 2,831 26,140 1886 6,653 16,179 1906 10,907 	 9,857
	
1867 2,931 25,842 1887 6,663 15,473 1907 11,394 	 9,648
	
1868 2,944 25,500 1888 6,871 15,025 1908 11,626 	 9,542
	
1869 2,972 24,187 1889 7,139 14,640 1909 11,797 	 9,392
	
1870 3,178 23,189 1890 7,410 14,181 1910 12,000 	 9,090
	
1871 3,382 22,510 1891 7,720 13,823 1911 12,242 	 8,830
	
1872 3,673 22,103 1892 7,950 13,578 1912 12,382 	 8,510
	
1913 12,602	 8,336
	
1914 12,862	 8,203
(Source) R. Page, Commerce and Industry (1919) ii 155-156.
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APPENDIX THREE
Seamen employed on merchant ships
registered in the United Kingdom, 1788 to 19141
Year
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
Number
100,483
100,846
106,371
109,055
109,757
111,361
108,437
104,345
107,769
110,172
114,722
119, 2 352
126,774
132,276
136,626
139,432
Year
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
Number
139,297
142,237
142,277
144,311
144,024
147, 741
150,038
148,456
150,059
153, 881
158,057
162,603
161,961
155,542
158,488
Year
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
Number
158 , 830
159,210
154,283
151,317
150,738
153,548
151,124
153,559
134,195
135,069
134,516
133, 649
136,016
138,432
140,089
142,026k
Year
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
Number
143,109
142,131
143,462
147,357
155,263
165,527
172,341
176,024
175,155
175,691
183,166
l59,634
188,978
191,477
192,900
193,170
1. Comment on the reliability of the figures on this page
is embodied in the note at the end of this appendix.
2. An almost identical figure appears in David MacPherson
Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries and Navi-
gation (1805) iv 490.
3. As explained at the end of this appendix, the figures
from 1835 to 1850 become steadily less reliable because
the Registrar-General of Seamen seldom removed a name
from his register, being reluctant to do so unless a
man died at sea. This figure, taken from Finlayson's
Report 1850, is put in to show that around mid-century
the official statistics are at least 15% too high.
4. A House of Commons exchange on 21 May 1834 produced a
figure of 120,000 men. With allowance made for ships
laid up, men off work between voyages and those who
have alternative employment such as fishermen and
agricultural workers, the tonnage-based figure of
142,026 men, representing a theoretical maximum if
every ship was at sea and fully manned, seems reasonably
accurate. See Hansard 3 23 1148 for the former figure.
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(ii)
Seamen employed on merchant ships registered
in the United Kingdom differentiated by type
of vessel and nationality
Year
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
In Sail
131,277
146,286
155,006
146,522
147,288
151,080
151,434
152,655
146,208
145,487
144,949
146,047
153,651
158,276
158,589
156,568
153,229
153,840
152,186
147,207
In Steam
10,660
13,277
17,519
15,894
21,249
22,838
24,953
25,177
26,298
26,105
27,008
27,816
31,076
37,480
39,054
39,803
43,111
43,662
43,304
48,755
Total
141,837
159,563
172, 5251
162,416
168,537
173,918
176,387
177,832
172,506
171,592
171,957
173,863
184,727
195,756
197,643
196,371
196,340
197,502
195,490
195,962
British
136,044
153,863
165,204
149,216
155,610
160,597
162,012
165,498
160, 210
157,312
N/A
157,767
165,794
173,833
177,363
N/A
174,523
177,239
175,332
177,961
Foreign
5,793
5,700
7,321
13,200
12;927
13, 321
14,375
12,334
12,296
14,280
N/A
16,096
18,933
21,923
20,280
N/A
21, 817
20,263
20,158
18,001
1. A figure of 190,000 men given to the House of Commons
on 3 February 1854 was clearly put in solely to make
a political point. See Hansard 3 130 230.
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(iii)
Seamen employed on merchant ships registered
in the United Kingdom differentiated by type
of vessel and nationality
Year
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
In sail
141,035
137,101
130,877
128,733
126,240
125,811
123,563
120,085
115,177
108,668
102,498
97,201
95,306
91,383
90,968
85,415
81,442
90,594
87,765
84,218
In steam Total British
	
58,703 199,738	 181,973
	
66,619 203,720	 183,129
	
71,362 202,239	 182,399
	
74,873 203,606	 182,687
	
73,427 199,667	 178,994
	
72,827 198,638	 177,727
	
72,999 196,562	 173,926
	
75,500 195,585	 172,242
	
78,371 193,548	 169,145
	
84,304 192,972	 169,692
	
90,405 192,903	 168,098
	
98,736 195,937	 169,920
	
105,421 200,727	 N/A
	
108,271 199,654	 171,871
	
107,813 198,781
	 N/A
	
119,055 204,470
	 N/A
	
121,101 202,543	 N/A
133,079 223,6731 179,969
	
142,498 230,263	 N/A
	
151,890 236,108	 N/A
Foreign
17,765
20,591
19,840
20,919
20,673
20,911
22,636
23,343
24,403
23,280
24,805
26,017
N/A
27,783
N/A
N/A
N/A Lascars
25,277 18,427
N/A
N/A
1. Masters were not included until 1888 - hence the
steep rise in the total figure. Lascars were first
separately recorded at the same time.
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(iv)
Seamen employed on merchant ships registered
in the United Kingdom differentiated by type
of vessel, nationality and ethnic origin
Year In sail In steam Total 	 British Foreign Lascars
1891 81,189 159,291 240,480 186,176 30,267 	 24,037
1892 80,789 160,946 241,735 185,437 30,899	 25,399
1893 78,306 162,668 240,974 186,628 29,549
	 24,797
1894 74,851 165,607 240,458 183,233 31,050
	 26,175
1895 71,606 168,880 240,486 180,074 32,235 	 28,077
1896 68,207 173,832 242,039 178,994 33,046 	 29,999
1897 63,915 177,016 240,931 175,549 33,898 	 31,484
1898 59,167 183,386 242,553 174,980 35,308	 32,265
1899 54,333 189,802 244,135 174,266 36,064	 33,805
1900 50,309 197,139 247,448 174,532 36,893	 36,023
1901 46,492 201,481 247,973 172,912 37,630 	 37,431
1902 44,179 209,361 253,361 174,538 39,825	 39,177
1903 42,238 215,699 257,937 176,520 40,396	 41,021
1904 39,974 219,615 259,489 176,975 39,832	 42,682
1905 37,567 226,119 263,686 180,492 39,711	 43,483
1906 35,622 235,169 270,791 183,340 38,084	 44,367
1907 33,059 244,087 277,146 194,848 37,694	 44,604
1908 30,535 245,186 275,721 196,834 34,735	 44,152
1909 28,334 245,973 274,307 198,474 31,873 	 43,960
1910 25,833 250,473 276,306 201,910 30,462	 43,934
1911 20,728 260,572 281,300 205,065 30,783 	 45,452
1912 17,738 269,023 286,806 208,635 30,960 	 47,211
1913 16,166 275,891 292,057 212,570 32,639	 46,848
1914 14,094 281,558 295,652 212,640 31,396	 51,616
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(v)
Seamen employed on merchant ships registered
in the United Kingdom differentiated by type
of vessel, nationality and ethnic origin
(Sources)
PRO Customs 17/14 to 17/29.
BPP Annual Statements of Trade and Nav4ation.
R. Page, Commerce and Industry (1919) ii 155-159.
Returns of the Registrar-General of Shipping. BPP
1831-32 (130) XXVI 193-199.
Registrar-General of Shipping's Report of 21 June
1843. On BPP 1843 LII 408.
The 1860 Reyort from the Select Committee on
Merchant Shipping, BPP 1860 XIII, Appendix Eleven,
Table Y, and returns at BPP 1860 LX 424, BPP 1871
LXI 212, BPP 1876 LXVI 32 and BPP 1886 LIX 34.
Return of the Registrar-General of Seamen dated
21 February 1867 on PRO MT/9 32 M.1399/1867.
Note
Prior to 1835 the source of information was the
datacollected by the Registrar of Shipping.
Owners registering vessels for the first time stated
how many men they intended to employ, and that number
was never amended in any way. Many ships were laid
up at certain times of the year, were under repair,
or had no crew on board while being loaded or un-
loaded so that the number of men must always be an
over-statement. For the period down to 1815 the
amount of under-recording due to masters not being
included is estimated at 10%, while the over-recording
is about 20%. Lord Liverpool's papers (BLRD Add. MSS.
38,432) show that the official figures are about 10%
too high, and for the period to 1815 that assumption
seems correct. In the slump years down to the mid-
1830s when more vessels were laid up the figures are
probably 15% too high.
Between 1835 and 1850 the Registrar-General of Sea-
men based his figures on register tickets issued,
but there was no provision (except in the case of
death at sea) for removing men from the register.
Between 1841 and 1850 the statistics may therefore
be giving a figure increasing from about 15% to around
30% too high, and the drop of some 50,000 men in the
year 1851 shows that a drastic correction was needed.
From 1888, when masters are included for the first
time, the figures are reasonably accurate.
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APPENDIX FOUR
(a) The form of agreement of 1797.
T k hireby agreed between the Mailer, Seameti, and Mariners, of the
Ship	 now bound for the Port of
and the Mailer or Commander of the laid Ship,
That in Conilderation of the Monthly or other Wages againil each re-
fpe&ive Seaman or Mariner's Name. hereunto let, they feverally Ihali and
will perform .the above-mentioned Voyage; and the laid Mailer doth
hereby agree with and hire the 1id Seamen and Mariners for the laid
Voyage at fuch Monthly Wages, to be paid purfuant to the Laws - of
GreatS Britain; and they the laid Seamen and Mariners do hereby pro.
inife and oblige themfelves to do their Duty, and obey the lawful Corn.'
mands of their Officers on Board the laid Ship or Boats-thereunto belong.
ing, as become good and faithful Seamen and Mariners, and at all Places.
where the laid Ship thaI! put in or anchor during the laid Ship's Voyage,
to do their belt Endeavours for the Prefervation of the laid Ship and
Cargo, and not to negle& or refufe doing.their Duty by Day or Night
nor Ihail go out of the laid Ship on Board any other Veffel, or be on Shore
under any Pretence whatfoever, till the Voyage is ended and the Ship
difcharged of her Cargo, without Leave firft obtained of the Mailer,
Captain, or Cornn{anding Officer on Board; and in Default thereof they
freely agree to be liable to the Penalties mentioned in the Al of Parlia-
ment, made in the Second Year of the Reign of King George the Second,
intituled, An 461for the better Regulation and Government of Seamen in- the
Merchants Service; and the A&, made in t1e- Thirty.feventh Year of His
prefent Majefty's Reign, intituled, An 461 for preventing the Defertion of
Seamen from Britilh Merchant Sbaps trading to Ills &ljØft Colonies and
Plantdtions in the Welt Indies: And it is further agreed by the Parties to
thefe Prefents, That Twenty.four Hours Abfence without Leave IhalI be
deemed a Total Defertion, and render fuch Seamen and Mariners liable
to the Forfeitures and Penalties contained hi the A&s above recited;
that each and every lawful Command which the faid Mailer Ihall think
neceflary to iffue for the effe&ual Government of the faid Veffel, fup-
preffing Immorality and Vice of all Kinds, be Ilri&ly complied with under
the Penalty of the Perfon or Perfons difobeying, forfeiting his or their
whole Wages or Hire, together with every Thing belonging to him or
them on Board the laid Veffel: And it is further agreed, That no Of-
ficer or Seaman, or Perfon belonging to the laid Ship, thall demand or
be entitled to his Wages, or any Part thereof, until the Arrival of the
laid Ship at the above-mentioned Port of Difcharge, and her Cargo de-
livered, nor lefs than Twenty Days in cafe the Seaman is not employed in
the Delivery: And it is hereby further agreed between the Mailer
and Officers of the laid Ship, That whatever Apparel, Furniture, and
Stores, each of them may receive into their Charge, belonging to the faici
Ship, Ihall be accounted for on. her Return; and in cafe any Thing thall
be loft or damaged through their Carelefsnefs or Infuffidency, it lhall- be
made good by fuch Officer qr Seaman by whofe Means it may happen to
________ z F --____	
.	 9	 the
321(a) continued
the Mafter and Owner of the (aid Ship: And whereas it is cuftornary
for the Officers and Se'amen on the Ship's Return Home in the River,
and during the '[irpe their Cargges are deJiverin La Shp each
Night t. €ep, gIcaIly 4Qt)teP1elIdks ef fueh &hipan reightea be it
further agreed by the faid Parties, That neither Officer nor Seaman Ihall,
I on any Pretence whatfoever, be entitled to fuch Indulgence, but thall do
their Duty by Day in Difcharge of e Cargo, and keep fuch Watch by
Night as the Mailer or Commander of the Laid Ship fhall think neceffary,
in r4er for the Prefervation of the a1pve; An4 where4s jt oej kappeni
that Part of the Cargo is embezze4 after being 4elivered into tigtcra,
and s fch Lpffes are made good 1y t1e Owners of the Ships; 1 i
threfore gLeed by tlç.fe 'Frefents, 7hat whateçr Qcer r Sarua t
TalLer thal think roper to appoint, IhaU takç charge gf	 (ap u'
the L1;b.ters, 2nd g with the fame t 	 e lawfql QAy, 'd diere 4e-
Ivç bi Charge t the Shtp's H b4ncL, his	 ezttive, gr fg tbQ
fame fafely weighed at the King's eazp, and in
	 eqercc of ticii vu,
Fidelity, fuçh Officer or Seaman Ihall 'be çn&1e4 o Twq ShiIflg 4
Sixpence eacl Lighter, excluflve of tlir Monthly Pay 'and $hq i1d g
happen that Lighters ar 4ctaine4 a copji4aWe 'Time at the Q:'ay efqr
they cap be unrcaded, l'uch Officer an4 $eaInaJ4 tQ appQintecj ff41 in that
Cafç be çntided toTwoShillings andSixpencc fot eyTwetyfourqu,
czçIuive of their (aid Monthly Pa'; that each $eatna and Mariner who
Thall well and tri1 perform the aove.mndcsic4 Voyage '(prQvido4
always ihat thrç be no Plunderage, Etnbezzlement Qr otiçr unlawful
•.Aas coixniitte4 on thç (aid, Ve1' Cargo or &rcs) L'afl b entit1d tQ
their Wages çr I1re that ny become '4ue. to Jiwi, purriiant tQ th.j
.greemcnt; that 'or the 4uç Pc qrwc of each and ev€ry th abov
nientioneçl Articles and: 4grrnqpts i4 Ackwledgement. of their
being voluntary and without Comptluiun or any otherclaidetine Means
being ufed, the fi4 parties have bercto fubfcribe4 their Names, thc Da;
and Month fc ppf1t to their r4CEtY a.uies	
1
jPlace and L Men'sT&me of Naaei,
I Entry.. 1
4ality. Withcf,
to .aeb
Man's
-	 8gning.
Pay in
she ld,er.
Wole.	 lIal
- Wagqsp€r Wbple
Month, or by Wagns
the un or
the Voya4e.
Source: Schedule appended to 37 Geo 3 c 73.
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(b) the 1835 form of agreement
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(c) Part of Form ENG.1 ueed between i8O and 1970. 323
ENG.1.	
AGREEMENT AND
I
Name of Ship1
FOREIG!
The term "Foreign-going Ship" includes every Ship employed in
some place or places situate beyond the following limits: the
the continent ofEurope between the River Elbe and Bres: mc!
as including the Republic of Ireland.
Official No.	 Port of Registry
REGISTERED MANAGiNG OWNER OR MANAGER
Name	 Address
I	 (State No. of louse, Street and Town)
'13t1	 tOfl whose names are hereto subscribed, and
whose descriptions are contained herein, and of whont.._. -
are engaged as Sailors, hereby agree to serve on board the said Ship, in the
several capacities expressed against their respective names on a voyage from'
No.
Appr
And it is
And the Crew agree to conduct themselves in an orderly, faithful, honest
and sober manner, and to be at all times diligent in their respective Duties,
and to be obedient to the lawful commands of the said Master, or of any
person who shall lawfully succeed him, and of their Superior Officers, in
everything relating to the said Ship and The Stores and Cargo thereof whether
on board, in boats or on shore; in consideration of which Services to be duly
performed, the said Master hereby agrees to pay the said Crew as Wages the
suni against their Names respectively expressed, and to supply them with
provisions according to the Scale printed herein.
And it is hereby agreed that any Embezzlement or wilful or negligent
Destruction of any part of the Ship's Cargo or Stores shall be made good to
the Owner out of the Wages of the Person guilty of the same.
And it is further agreed, that if any Seaman enters himself in a capacity
for which he is incompetent, he is liable to be derated.
And itis also agreed, that additional clauses and the Regulations authorized
by the Board of Trade which are printed herein and numbered'
Source original in private collection of the candidate.
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APPENDIX FIVE
Apprentices indentured to sea service, 1845-1912
Year Number	 Year Number	 Year	 Number
1845	 15,704	 1867	 5,444	 1890	 1,749
1846	 10,376	 1868	 4,975	 1891	 1,847
1847	 11,521	 1869	 4,613	 1892	 1,821
1848	 11,440	 1870	 4,241	 1893	 1,752
1849	 9,659	 1871	 4,111	 1894	 1,861
1850	 5,055	 1872	 4,360	 1895	 1,636
1851	 5,275	 1873	 4,054	 1896	 1,321
1852	 5,845	 1874	 4,455	 1897	 1,302
1853	 6,828	 1875	 4,397	 1898	 1,336
1854	 7,935	 1876	 4,740	 1899	 1,203
1855	 7,461	 1877	 4,488	 1900	 1,103
1856	 7,410	 1878	 4,155	 1901	 1,242
1857	 6,850	 1879	 3,789	 1902	 1,220
1858	 5,578	 1880	 3,501	 1903	 1,072
1859	 5,773	 1881	 2,923	 1904	 1,167
1860	 5,616	 1882	 2,992	 1905	 1,195
1861	 5,836	 1883	 1,972	 1906	 1,451
1862	 5,880	 1884	 1,997	 1907	 1,274
1863	 5,636	 1885	 1,986	 1908	 1,210
1864	 5,520	 1886	 1,766	 1909	 1,261
1865	 5,638	 1887	 1,864	 1910	 1,156
1866	 5,454	 1888	 1,853	 1911	 1,306
1889	 1,723	 1912	 1,461
(Sources) The Supply of British Seamen, Appendix Five,
BPP 181 LIX 237, and Board of Trade returns
at BPP 1890-91 LXXVI 34 and BPP LX 101,
U)0
U)
C)
E
a)
U)
a)
4-)
0
.,-I
U)
a)
•r4
U)
0)
a)
C-)
a)
C)
E
C)
U)
C-)
a)
C/)
z
Co
4
Co
'-4
N-
'-4
0
Co
0
Lf)
Co
'-4
-1
L)
Co
'-4
7
Co
'-I
325
Co
Co
Co
U
0)
a)
	
o	 Co 0	 -
	
o	 ,- C	 - N- -
	
'0	 0 Lt)	 0
	
a	 a	 a	 a	 a
	V) 	 ,4
-
Co Co U')	 C4 t) Co
'0 0 Oi	 4 '0 0 0
'0	 Co '0
	
C4 Co
..	 a	 a
r4	 U')	 ,-4
-
Co Co N-	 CO Co N-
C) - C) N-	 p4')
Co	 N- N-
a	 a	 a
-	 I-C	 -
I-C	 r.4
- U') 4 Co 0 0
N- Co I C '0 '0
	
CO	 P4')	 ii	 LI')	 4	 C)
	
a	 a	 a	 a
	
00	 c'4	 I-C
I-C
	
o	 L	 P4')	 LI)	 p4')
	
LI)	 O	 LI) P4') 0) N-
	
p4')	 I-I	 LI)	 0
	
a	 a	 a	 a
	
Co	 i-C	 p4•)
i-C
I-4	 -	 . I-C 0) i-C LI) i-C
P')	 O 0) 0)
	
00 C) Co
I	 P4) P4') N- r	 (%	 C)
-	 a a
	 a
C'1	 C) -	 P4')
Co	 i-C	 p-C
I-I
•1-4
s-I	 a)
o	 )4 U)
0 Cd 0 U
C-)	 5-i	 U	 5-i	 •,-C
-'-4	 .,-I	 4)	 5-
	
I-i	 Cd C) <
-	 C)	 "-C
	
•	 E	 •	 Cl)	 4)	 C)
Z <Cl) <0E-
-
-
00
0
acd
C)U)
C)
Cd
CdU)
-4 C-I
4-) Cd
C/,
• '-C 0
C) Cl)
0
Cl)
C) a
5-4Co
cdu
p-li-C	 4)
N— a)
0)00 -
C-)
0
C) U)
•• 0	 -C
r:.'4-4	 Cd
5-iC)	 4)
_0	 •i-4
0) a U)
5-i4	 0
Cl)
-40)	 Cl)
-
E	 C)
5-4	 E
0.	 Cd
1-4r-4	 C)
C)
cdU	 4-)
C)
4-4
O.-4	 0
U)
4	 4)
0)0)	 1-4
0
4)
U)0	 C)
C)-
-i-C	 •
5-4 Cd i-C
o • Q? Cd
bOU)
0)0)
4)4J
Cd
Uo
1-i _
0) a	 C)
Ze'r3 U
1-4
0
•	 Cl)
I-C
326
APPENDIX SEVEN
Deserters from UK-registered vessels, 1845-55,
and deserters and failures-to-join at home and
abroad for 1895, 1898-1900 and 1908
Deserters
1845	 10,274
1848	 10,513
1851	 10,039
1854	 10,967
1846
1849
1852
1855
8,854
10,232
9,446
9,282
1847
1850
1853
14,360
9,197
15,624
Deserters
	
Failure s-to-j oin
UK
	
Abroad
	
UK
	
Abroad
	
Total
1895
	
3,629
	
14,502
	
14,399
	
N/A
	
32,530
1898
	
4,535
	
17,457
	
20,111
	
3,200
	
45,303
1899
	
5,728
	
21,116
	
24,046
	
3,849
	
54, 739
1900
	
5,754
	
23,201
	
25,478
	
3,428
	
57,861
1908
	
1,570
	
19,619
	
12,943
	
3,692
	
37,824
Note: No record was kept of men who deserted one ship
to join another at a higher rate of pay.
(Sources) RSCMS 1860 Paper LL, Appendix 11; BPP 1901
LXVIII 71-73 and the Return of Deserters
and Failures to Join in Various Parts of
the World, BPP 1909 (Cd.4803) LXXVIII 1-5.
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APPENDIX EIGHT
Deaths at Sea
(A) 1852 - 1864
Year
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
Disease
1,319
2,020
1,602
2,005
2,235
1,931
1,664
1,421
1,433
1,350
1,315
1,188
1,458
Accident
122
135
119
176
154
120
202
175
184
175
146
187
207
Drowning
721
875
956
1,032
1,346
1,489
1,778
1,630
1,875
1,945
1,998
1,727
2,077
Other
224
418
260
404
308
249
152
419
461
304
326
494
541
Total
2,386
3,448
2,937
3,617
4,043
3,789
3,796
3,645
3,953
3,774
3,785
3,596
4,283
(Source) Board of Trade return of 30 March 1865 attached
to Papers Relating to the Seamen's Hospital
Society, BPP 1865 (305) L 331.
(B) 1866 - 1879
Year
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
Disease
1,909
1,783
1,460
Accident
277
277
Drowning
2,390
2,839
2,839
Other Total
4,866
256	 5,283
5,237
256 4,832
4,523
4,338
(ii)
Accident
282
306
307
Disease
1,255
1,091
1,275
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Year
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
Drowning Other
	
2,859
	
206
	
2,512
	
167
	
2,270
	
299
2,538
2,086
2,001
Total
4,123
5,393
4,602
4,076
4,151
4,181
3,870
3,692
(Sources) Merchant Service (Deaths), BPP 1870 (150) LX 22
and Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen's
Return of 29 July 1878, BPP 1878 (322) LXVII
68-69.
(C) Deaths by wreck, drowning and accident of masters
and seamen, 1891 to 1908.
Year
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
Deaths
1,918
1,864
1,814
1,874
1,869
1,541
Year
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
Deaths
1,424
1,392
1,737
1,537
1,277
1,179
Year
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
Deaths
1,238
1,072
1,192
953
1,241
1,047
(Source) BPP. Various Board of Trade Wreck Returns.
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(iii)
(D) Decennial analysis and comparison of deaths in
mining and the shipping industry, 1861-90.
	
Shipping	 Mining
	
1861-70
	
1 in 73
	
1 in 300
	
1871-80
	
1 in 67
	
1 in 425
	
1881-90
	
1 in 93
	
1 in 519
(Source) BPP. Various Board of Trade Annual Returns.
Crew deaths in steam and sailing shiys, 1900-1914,
by yearly average over five-year periods.
(a) Sailing ships
Years By wreck Accident Disease1 TOTAL % age Workforce
	
1900-04
	
317	 188	 214
	
719	 1.6%
	
1905-09
	
234	 128	 125
	
487	 1.5%
	
19 10-14
	
120	 68	 47
	
235	 1.3%
(b) Steamships
	
1900-04
	
361	 452	 1,031
	
1,844
	
,_ no
	
1905-09
	
284	 441	 1,104
	
1,829
	
0.75%
	
19 10-14
	 5782	 437	 1,054
	
2,069
	
0. 75%
1, Includes suicide and homicide.
2. Includes Titanic losses, which amounted to 673
passengers and crew.
(Source) Board of Trade Return of Shipping Casualties,
1924. An HMSO booklet - copy in BLRD under
reference BS 41/15.
(E)
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APPENDIX NINE
(A) Comparative rates of seamen reortin? sick and
being placed on the sick list in various climates.
Cause
(a) Injury
Reporting
Placed sick
Climate
N.	 S.
Temperate Temperate Med. Trop. Mixed
100	 135	 243	 194	 162
100	 150	 225	 188	 175
(b) Skin	 N.	 S.
Disease Temperate Temperate Med. Trop. Mixed
Reporting	 100	 145	 172	 321	 186
Placed sick
	 100	 229	 229	 386	 214
(Source) J.A. Fraser Robert, 'Returns of Sickness: A
Contribution to Medical Climatology', British
Journal of the Society of Medicine, No. 2
1948 55.
(B) Cases of scurvy admitted to the Dreadnought Seamen's
Hospital, 1852-69.
Year
	 Number	 Year	 Number	 Year	 Number
1852
	
51
	
1858
	
77
	
1864
	
85
1853
	
63
	
1859
	
90
	
1865
	
102
1854
	
124
	
1860
	
77
	
1866
	
101
1855
	
159
	
1861
	
99
	
1867
	
94
1856
	
91
	
1862
	
64
	
1868
	
74
1857
	
77
	
1863
	
86
	
1869
	
40
(Source) Annual Reports of the Seamen's Hospital Society
3
2
2
6
7
29
51
81
22
162
73
8
1
1
184
43
46
172
7
76
152
5
4
37
36
4
61
12
3
29
110
17
8
36
32
1
3
32
(1)(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
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APPENDIX TEN
Distribution of seamen paupers in England
and Wales in the year 1857
County	 Number	 R-anking
Bedfordshire
Berkshire
Buckinghainshire
Cambridgeshire
Cheshire
Cornwall
Cumb e r 1 and
Devonshire
Dorsetshire
Durham
Essex
Glouces tershire
Herefordshire
Huntingdonshire
Kent
Lancashire
Lincoinshire
Middlesex
Monmouths hire
Norfolk
Northumberland
Not tin gh ams hire
Shropshire
Somersetshire
Hampshire
Staffordshire
Suffolk
Surrey
Worcestershire
Sussex
Yorkshire
Angles ey
Cardiganshire
Carnarvon
Glamorgan
Merioneth
Montgomeryshire
Pembrokeshire
Kent
Middlesex
Durham
Northumberland
Yorkshire
Devonshire
Norfolk
Essex
Suffolk
Cuinb e r land
(Source) Return of Seamen in Workhouses or in receipt
of Outdoor Relief, BPP 1857 (315 - Sess.2)
XXXII 573.
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APPENDIX ELEVEN
(A) Naval provision scale, 	 (B) Diet of a merchant seaman,
1785	 1830
1	 2
Weekly: 6 lbs biscuit	 Sunday	 Junk, duff
7 gallons beer	 Monday	 Hog, peas, soup
6 lbs meat
	
Tuesday	 Bread, junk
2 pints peas	 Wednesday Hog, peas, duff
3 pints oatmeal
	
Thursday Junk, duff
ôoz butter	 Friday	 Hog, peas, soup
l2oz cheese	 Saturday Junk, bread
(C) Hospital patients,
1830
3
Breakfast: pint of tea
Dinner:	 jib beef
1b potatoes
(D) Ship Elizabeth Ann, late
1860s
4
Mon/Wed/Fri 11b salt pork
pea soup
Tues/Thurs ijib salt beef
pint soup
Supper:	 pint barley gruel
Daily:	 llb bread or biscuit
duff
Saturday	 As Tues/Thurs
with rice instead of duff
Sunday	 Half ration
preserved meat, and half sal
Tea daily, and lib sugar
weekly.
1. Gilbert Biane, Observations on the Diseases Incident to
Seamen (1785) 301.
2. Diary of Able Seaman Charles Picknell quoted by Basil
Lubbock in his contribution to C. Northcote Parkinson,
The Trade_Winds (1948) 116.
3. MBSHS (3) - 2 January 1830 to 25 July 1834.
4. Wilson, My Stormy Voyage Through Life 36.
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(E) Engineer's mess scale, African Steamship Company,
circa 1860
1
Bread: lib soft bread or Captain's Biscuit. Meat: llbs
per day, all fresh or half salted. Also, lb each of
pickled pork, beef or bacon for breakfast. Vegetables:
a sufficient supply of potatoes or yams. Puddings: plum
on Sundays, plain twice a week. Sugar: lib a week,
butter lib a week, cheese 1b a week, tea 3oz.
(F) The Liverpool Scale 2 (C) Money, Wigram and Sons Scale3
Daily: 3 quarts water	 Daily: 7 pints in hot weather: 6
lib bread
	
in cold
11bs beef or pork Weekly bread - unrestricted
Weekly ilibs flour
1 pints peas
Small quantities of
tea, coffee and
sugar
(second half of nineteenth
century)
pint vinegar
6.4lbs salt beef
4.8lbs salt pork
2lbs flour
lib peas
7oz sugar
6.4oz raisins
3.2ozs suet
ljozs tea
(H) The Board of Trade Scale, 1868k
1.	 Salt beef (or pork, fresh meat, preserved meat, bouilli
1. Candidate's collection.
2. BPP 1867 LXIV 416.
3. Candidate's collection. This scale is based on the issue
of rations to five-man messes - hence the decimal quant-
ities per head - and can be dated to around 1866.
4. BPP 1867-68 LXIII 168-169. This was the scale arrived
at from the suggestions of Dr. Walter Dickson and Mr.
Harry Leach and put out by Thomas Gray.
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and soup) - from lib (preserved meat) to ijlbs
(salt beef) daily.
2. ijlbs fresh bread or lb biscuit daily.
3. lib fresh potatoes daily, or between jib and ilb
dried vegetables weekly.
4. 2lbs flour weekly and j pint split peas weekly,
with alternatives of jib rice, barley or oatmeal
for the latter
5. lb butter or suet weekly.
6. lib sugar or 21b molasses weekly.
7. jib of currants, raisins, prunes or dried apples
weekly.
8. Condiments, including ioz mustard weekly.
9. Small quantities of tea, coffee and cocoa.
10. Lime juice - as the Act directs.
11. j pint vinegar weekly.
12. Intoxicants - at master's discretion.
13. lj gallons of water daily - 1 gallon for drinking
and cooking: remainder for washing.
(I) Board of Trade statutory scale of 19061
4 quarts of water daily, 3lbs of soft bread and 4lbs
biscuit weekly. Other weekly amounts: 3 lbs salt beef,
2 lbs salt pork, 2jlbs preserved meat, lb fish, 6 lbs
potatoes, jib dried vegetables, 4 pint split peas, 	 pint
green peas,
	 pint haricot beans. 2lbs flour, jib rice,
jlb oatmeal, lozs tea, 4oz coffee, ijibs sugar, ib con-
1. First Schedule to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906.
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densed milk, jib butter, lib jam or marmalade, jib
syrup or molasses, 4oz suet, j pint pickles, Soz dried
fruits, 2oz salt, joz mustard, Ioz pepper, oz curry
powder, 3oz onions.
Rations to be "reasonably distributed?? throughout the
week, and biscuit to be supplied in place of soft bread
in vessels under 1,000 tons in rough weather. Substitutes
- fish in place of preserved meat, 1 and preserved meat in
place of pork in the tropics. Stokers to get additional
oatmeal, and an extra quart of water each day.
1.	 Only up to jlb by weight.
(b) Engineroom
Se rang1
2Tindal
Donkeyman
Second Steward
(d) Catering
Cook
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APPENDIX TWELVE
RANKS ABOARD SHIP
BRITISH
(a) Deck
B os Ufl
Bosun's Mate
Quartermaster
Carpenter
Lamptriinnier
Able Seaman
Ordinary Seaman
LA SCARS
S e rang
Tindal
Se acunny
Mistree
Kussab
First Class Lascar
Second Class Lascar
Apprentice
(c) Saloon
Topas
Butler3
Bhandary
1. In larger vessels, such as those of P & 0, there was
a European Donkeyman and the Serang was a separate,
but equal, petty officer.
2. No equivalent. The Storekeeper, who would normally
be next in line to the Donkeyman, was invariably a
European. The Tindal usually controlled the day-
workers and stood his watch with the Chief Engineer
from 0800 to noon and 2000 to midnight. In large
steamers there would be a Tindal for each watch,
with the First Tindal working the same hours as the
Chief Engineer.
3. In smaller vessels, such as those of the Strick
Line, the Butler was also Chief Steward. He had
the same rights of engagement and control over
Stewards as the Serangs had in the deck and engine-'
room departments.
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APPENDIX THIRTEEN (A)
Shipping losses by decades, 1841_19201
Decade
1841-50
1851-60
1861-70
1871-80
1881-90
189 1-00
1901-10
19 11-20
Mean number of 2
registered ships
Sail Steam
23,500 1,000
25,200 1,600
24,400 2,600
21,600 4,Z00
17,000 6,600
12,500 9,200
9,900 10,500
7,600 12,200
Mean number
of losses
	
Sail	 Steam
	
518	 7
	
570	 17
	
640	 38
	
640	 80
	
500	 140
	
340	 130
	
230	 110
	
110	 120
Mean percentage
of losses
Sail	 Steam
2.20	 0.70
2.26	 1.06
2.62	 1.46
2.96	 1,90
2.94	 2.12
2.72	 1.41
2.32	 1.01
1.45	 0.98
1. This technique employed so as to eliminate distortion
caused by single cataclysmic events such as the Royal
Charter gale of 1859.
2. To the nearest hundred vessels.
3. To two decimal points.
Years
18 71-75
1876-80
18 81-85
1886-90
1891-95
APPENDIX THIRTEEN (B)
Seamen deaths by guinguenni, 1871_19201
Mean deaths	 Years	 Mean deaths
	
1,943	 1896-1900	 966
	
1,593	 1901-05	 709
	
2,053	 1906-10	 626
	
1,259	 1911-15	 825
	
1,356	 1916-20	 385
1. War deaths excluded.
(Source) BPP. Various Board of Trade returns of shipping
casualties.
Packages
of stores
rej ected
11,602
10,909
6,292
4,817
3,371
4,232
4,069
Percentage
rej ected
3.0
2.6
1.7
1.4
1.0
1.2
1.2
2.6
2.3
2.3
20
2.2
2.2
108
100
111
94
101
90
4,119
4,310
4,752
4,655
4,590
4,020
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914.
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APPENDIX FOURTEEN
Rate of rejection of ships' stores following inspection,
1908-14
(A) Individual ships
Year of
	
Number of
Inspection	 Packages
Inspected
1908	 1,496
1909	 1,587
1910	 1,520
1911	 1,493
1912	 1,430
1913	 1,493
1914	 1,328
(1906 Act)
Packages
of stores
passed
386,117
411,974
375, 734
339,504
340,237
356,071
330,173
(B) Bulk Stores (1892 and 1894 Acts)
Year of	 Number of	 Number of
	
Percentage
Inspection	 Inspections	 rejections	 rej ected
(Source) Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector of Ships'
Provisions on PRO MT/9 1082.
£ 2-5-0
£2-l0-0
£3-l0-0
£ 3-10-0
£2- 10-0
£2-15-0
£2-17-0
£ 3-0-0
£ 2-17-0
£ 3-2-0
£2-15-0
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APPENDIX FIFTEEN
(A) Mean monthly rates of pay of seamen and firemen,
1850-1906
1
Able Seamen	 Firemen
Year
	 Sail
	
Steam
1850
1852
1854
1855
1858
1860
1862
1864
1865
1866
1868
1869
1870
1872
1874
1875
1876
1878
1880
1882
1884
1885
1886
1888
1890
1892
1894
1895
1896
1898
1900
1902
1904
1905
1906
£ 2-12-0
£2-15-0
£3-5-0
£ 3-10-0
£ 3-10-0
£ 3-7-0
£3-0-0
£2-12-0
£ 3-2-0
£ 2-17-0
£2-17-0
£2-12-0
£2-l5-0
£3-5-0
£3-5-0
£2-i 7-0
£2-15-0
£2-17-0
£ 2-16-0
£3-0-0
£3-0-0
£3-0-0
£3-0-0
£ 3-0-0
£ 3-5-0
£ 3-5-0
£3-15-0
£ 4-0-0
£ 3-15-0
£ 3-17-0
£ 3-10-0
£3- 5-0
£ 3-15-0
£ 3-12-0
£ 3-10-0
£3- 5-0
£ 3-7-0
£ 4-5-0
£ 4-4-0
£ 3-15-0
£ 3-15-0
£3-15-0
£ 3-19-0
£4-2-0
£4-1-0
£4-0-0
£4-0-0
£4-0-0
£3- 14-0
£ 4-4-0
£4-2-0
£4-2-0
£ 4-3-0
£4-8-0
£3-i8-0
£ 4-4-0
£4- 3-0
£4-2-0
£ 3-18-0
£4-0-0
£4-12-0
£4-9-0
£4-2-0
£4-2-0
£4-2-0
£4-4-0
£4-7-O
£4-6-0
£4-5-0
£4-5-0
£4-5-0
1.	 To the nearest shilling.
(Source) BPP. Various Tables showing the Progress of
Merchant Shipping.
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(B) 'Spot' rates of monthly pay for Able Seamen,
1824-99.
Year	 Trade	 Amount Sail or Steam Source of information
1824
1825
1826
1833
1833
1835
1839
1844
1847
1848
1849
1850
1857
1858
1860
1860
1861
1865
1866
1866
1871
1872
1872
1878
1886
1890
1899
Coal	 £4-0-0
Coal	 £3-1O-0
Baltic	 £2-l0-0
Baltic	 £3-0-0
Med.	 £2-5-0
Quebec	 £2-10-0
Indian	 £2-10-0
Baltic	 £3-0-0
Med.	 £2-6-4
Med.	 £2-8-1
Coasting £2-5-0
Transat'ic £2-5-0
N.Ainerica £4-0-0
N.America £4-0-0
Cunard £4-0-Q
India	 £2-10-0
N.America £4-0-0
Tyne	 £5-18-0
Med.	 £3-1-3
N.America £3-16-3
China	 £2-lO-0
China	 £4-0-0
Quebec	 £3-l0-0
Tyne	 £6-l-4
China	 £2-i5-0
Coal	 £4-15-0
Grain	 £4-0-0
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Steam
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Ste am
Steam
Ste am
Sail
Steam
Steam
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Sail
Steam
Sail
Steam
Sail
RSCCL 1825
RSCCL 1826
RSCBS 1844
RSCMCS 1833
RSCMCS 1833
RSCS 1836
Boyd Cable
RSCMSF 1844
BPP 1867 LXIV 174
BPP 1867 LXIV 174
E ames
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(D) Mean monthly rates of pay for engineers, 1850_19181
Year	 Chief Engineer	 Second Engineer Third Engineer
1850
1855
1860
1865
1870
1875
1880
1882
1884
1885
1886
1888
1890
1892
1894
1895
1896
1898
1900
1902
1905
1906
1908
1910
1912
1914
1918
£16-16-0
£18 -0-0
£17- 3-6
£16-18-0
£16- 0-0
£17- 7-0
£17-2-0
£16- 13-6
£17- 1-6
£16- 10-0
£16-18-6
£15-i 3-6
£16-5-0
£16-17-6
£15- 12-6
£15-iS-C
£ 16-10-0
£16-10-0
£ 16-1-6
£15-12-6
£15- 12-6
£15- 15-0
£15-12-6
£15-12-6
£17- 15-0
£ 19-0-0
£ 33-5-0
£i1-13-6
£12- 6-0
£11-13-6
£ 11-12-6
£li-5-0
£ 11-9-0
£ 12-13-0
£12- 3-6
£ 12-13-6
£li-12-0
£11- 12-0
£11-13-0
£ 11-10-0
£11-13-6
Lii- 2-6
L11-2-6
£li-10-0
£11-iS-C
£ 11-7-6
Lii- 7-6
Lii- 5-0
Lii-0-0
£ 11-0-0
£ 10-17-6
£ 12-10-0
£25- 5-0
£9-3-0
£ 10-0-0
£9- 9-0
£ 8-7-0
£8- 7-0
£ 8-19-0
£9- 10-0
£ 8-19-0
L9-9-6
£ 8-16-6
£ 8-8-0
£ 8-10-0
£ 8-4-6
£ 8-15-6
£ 8-5-0
£ 8-0-0
£ 8-0-0
£ 8-2-6
£ 8-5-0
£ 8-7-6
£ 8-2-6
£ 7-15-0
£ 7-15-0
£ 8-0-0
£10'-10-0
£ 21-0-0
1,	 To the nearest sixpence
(Source) BPP.Tables showing the Progress of Merchant
Shipping.
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APPENDIX SIXTEEN (A)
Tonnage/Manning ratio suggested by the 1896 Manning
Conunittee
SAIL	 Tonnage
Under 400
Under 650
Under 800
Under 1,200
Under 2,900
"Effective hands'1
9
13
15
19
30
STEAM
- Tonnage
Under 350
Under 700
Under 1,000
Under 1,500
Under 2,000
Under 2,500
Under 3,000
Master Mate(s)
1	 1
1	 2
1	 2
1	 2
1	 2
1	 3
1	 3
Seamen Bosun/
S
6
7
7	 2
8	 2
9	 2
Total
6
8
9
10
12
14
15
1. 'Effective hands' were the master, mates, carpenter,
bosun, sailmaker and Able Seamen, An Ordinary Sea-
man counted as two-thirds of a man, as did a cook-
steward. Any apprentices were to count as a third
to a whole man according to sea-time and experience.
(Source) Lloyds Manning Pamphlet 1896 10-27.
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APPENDIX SIXTEEN (B)
Manning ratio - the mean number of men employed
for every hundred tons of shipping registered -
covering the period 1833 to 1880
Year
1833
1849
1854
1859
1860
1865
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1880
	
Sail	 Steam	 All Ships	 Source
between 4 and 5 men per 100 tons RSCMCS 1833
	
4.8	 4.9	 RSCMS 1860
	
4.2	 7.5	 4.4	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.7	 4.0	 RSCMS 1860
	
3.8	 6.5	 4.0	 BPP 1878-79 LXIV 27
	
3.4	 5.6	 3.7	 BPP 1878-79 LXIV 27
	
3.3	 4.9	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.3	 4.7	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.3	 4.6	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.2	 4.4	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.2	 4.2	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.2	 4.1	 3.5	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.1	 4.0	 3.4	 BPP 1876 LXVI 33
	
3.1	 3.9	 3.3	 BPP 1878-79 LXIV 27
	
3.0	 3.7	 3.2	 BPP 1878-79 LXIV 27
	
3.0	 3.5	 3.1	 BPP 1878-79 LXIV 27
	
2.9	 3.3	 3.0	 BPP 1886 LIX 200
(1) (a)
(b)
(c)
(2) (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
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